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In modernity the welfare of children is provided for at the institutional 
'intersection' of the family and the state. Where kinship structures are 
diffuse, nuclear hardship leads to increased state dependence. The 
institutional relationship between the state and the family is marked by 
divided responsibility and competition for control over the welfare of the 
individual. In late capitalism, citizenship has expanded to include the rights 
of the child and the child has emerged as a social personality, protected by the 
emotional bonds of the family and by the political rights afforded by the state. 
In modern capitalist societies like Australia, the well-being of the child is 
recognised as important by both the family and the state. Paradoxically, there 
is potential for tension and even conflict where the claims of autonomy and 
the assertion of private property rights in children by the family cut across the 
notions of responsibility and public accountability espoused by government. 
The strain between parental autonomy and state responsibility is often 
unresolved. 
Intercountry adoption is a social phenomenon that removes structurally-
isolated children from the socially marginalised and economically deprived 
conditions of orphanages in order to relocate them, for their benefit, as 
members of caring, well-to-do families. Support for intercountry adoption 
can therefore be expected from all people who are committed to the well-
being of children and who see the nuclear family as the most desirable social 
setting for the raising of children. Since those values are almost universally 
supported in modernity, it might be thought that officials who process 
adoptions applications will have an harmonious relationship with 
prospective adoptive parents. Intercountry adoption services might also be 
expected to run smoothly since all participating parties ostensibly work in 
concert to achieve shared goals. These expectations are not borne out. While 
the two groups share many fundamental values, the relationship between 
officers and applicants in intercountry adoption is often contested and 
tension-ridden as is evidenced by an Ombudsman's report and academic 
research. This thesis explores that relationship sociologically in order to 
identify these tensions and antagonisms and their sources. 
This research explains the persistent tension in the relationship between 
applicants and officers in the Tasmanian intercountry adoption service. It 
argues that the tensions between officers and applicants reflect the normative 
and institutionalised tensions between the family and the state. This thesis is 
examined by analysing the extent to which shared social values and attendant 
patterns of behaviour, ideology and expectation underpin the tensions that 
affect the interaction between the Intercountry Adoption Service officers and 
applicants. 
The analysis shows that the competing attitudes and behaviours displayed by 
Intercountry Adoption Service applicants and officers are 'predictable' 
because of the constraining effects of social institutions on both sides. More 
specifically, the thesis demonstrates that uncertainty and contingency are 
institutionalised features of the relationship between applicants and officers 
since the social actors interact in terms of their roles as representatives of 
their various, competing positions within a broad social framework, as well 
as pursuing individual interests, and that the resulting tension takes on some 
highly predictable forms. 
Interviews were chosen as the most appropriate method for gaining the 
qualitative data that enable the tension in the relationship between applicants 
and officers to be analysed and explained. 
The interviews were used to gain information on the relationship between 
officers and applicants. First, anxiety and tension are explored as reflections of 
the institutionalised tension between the family and the state. Anxiety is 
depicted as an essential characteristic of the politically unequal relationship 
between applicants and officers. Secondly, the thesis explores ways in which 
motivations become an issue around which applicants and officers express 
anxiety. Thirdly, the thesis analyses the way in which the service is rationed 
and the manner in which rationing contributes to tension. Fourthly, the 
compartmentalisation of parenting roles, and the manner in which 
responsibility for the child is divided among officers and adopting parents, 
are analysed by examining the views of the participating parties on 
appropriate procedural pace. Waiting periods are recognised as major points 
of tension. Fifthly, the values shared by applicants and officers are identified 
to show that the relationship is not totally hostile. On the contrary, the 
tension in the relationship is shown to be attributable to competing agendas 
more than to conflicting value systems. Sixthly, and finally, the thesis 
analyses the management of the dissatisfaction, identifying it as an important 
element in the interaction between applicants and officers but as only one 
aspect of that complex relationship. 
In addressing these six issues, this research provides an analysis of 
intercountry adoption that is of value to applicants and officers in inter-
country adoption services in Australia and other receiving countries and to 
many children in relinquishing countries. By investigating sociologically the 
relationship between the family and the state in Western modernity it 
explains the manner in which strain is managed at the intersection of two 
key social institutions. 
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Intercountry adoption, in its ideal form, involves relocating children from 
the economically deprived conditions of orphanages in one country to caring, 
well-to-do families in another. Support for intercountry adoption can 
therefore be expected from all people who are committed to the well-being of 
children and who see the nuclear family as the most desirable social setting 
for the raising of children. Since those values are almost universally 
supported in modernity, it is to be expected that social workers who process 
adoptions applications will have an harmonious relationship with 
prospective adoptive parents. Despite the fact that the two groups share 
many fundamental values, the relationship between officers and applicants 
in intercountry adoption is often contested and tension-ridden as is 
evidenced by an Ombudsman's report (Willee 1986) and academic research 
(Boss and Edwards 1992). This thesis explores that relationship sociologically 
in order to identify these tensions and antagonisms and their sources. 
It is argued that the structural strain between the institutions of the family 
and the state in modernity produces the tensions that characterise the 
interaction between officers and applicants. At the individual level this 
tension finds expression as institutionalised anxiety. The thesis analyses the 
strained interdependence of the family and the state in contemporary 
Australian society in relation to intercountry adoption. It asserts that 
established social values and attendant patterns of behaviour, ideology and 
expectation generate and structure the tensions that colour the interaction 
between intercountry adoption service officers and applicants. 
The chapters that follow show that the tensions that exist between applicants 
and officers are 'predictable'. The thesis asserts that uncertainty and 
contingency are institutionalised features of the relationship between 
applicants and officers. These social actors interact in terms of their roles as 
representatives of their various, competing positions within a broad social 
framework. The resulting tensions take on some highly predictable forms. 
Nevertheless, as Wrong (1980) and Berger (1977) observe, individual people 
are not pre-programmed robots. Influenced in their attitudes and interaction 
by social forces, they remain social actors in principle capable of idiosyncratic 
thought and action. 
First, in order to discern and explain these tensions a theory of the state and 
the family in modernity is outlined. Strain between the family and the state 
generates boundary contests. Such contests are typical of modernisation 
processes and increase with the expansion of citizenship and state welfare. 
Secondly, a sociological analysis is offered of interaction between the family 
and the state in the more narrowly circumscribed context of intercountry 
adoption structures and processes in Tasmania, one of the states of Australia. 
In short, the project uses intercountry adoption to show how specific patterns 
of interaction are affected and can be explained by general institutional 
arrangements and processes of social change. 
This chapter briefly outlines the history, forms and functions of intercountry 
adoption in Australia. It considers the social context of intercountry adoption 
services in Australia and identifies the nature of the tensions between clients 
and officials, and suggests their systemic sources. 
Intercountry Adoption in Australia 
Intercountry Adoption Programs are protocols for the management of 
intercountry adoption between the Australian states and 'relinquishing' or 
'sending' countries. Intercountry Adoption Services are the services 
established within each state for the management of the Australian 
component of the programs. There are eight Australian intercountry adoption 
services, one for each jurisdiction in the Commonwealth. Independently, each 
has established adoption programs with various other countries. 
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In Australia, the adoption of children from overseas became a matter for 
3 
public discussion in about 1975, towards the end of the Vietnam War. 
Distressing images of orphans and other destitute children in Saigon evoked 
emotional responses among many Australians, some of whom rushed to 
'rescue' the children by way of largely unregulated adoption. Subsequently, 
the state's regulatory role increased and led to the development of 
Intercountry Adoptions Service agencies within larger community services 
departments. 
Intercountry adoption in Australia is characterised by a steady trickle of 
applications, swamped by waves of heightened and sometimes short-lived 
interest following media portrayals of unhappy, institutionalised children in 
developing countries. The vocabulary surrounding intercountry adoption 
takes on certain rhetorical forms. Chief among these is the commonly 
expressed view that orphaned or abandoned children in some developing 
countries will not be cared for adequately by their governments or by 
intermediate institutions such as orphanages. The expressed motivations of 
prospective adoptive parents commonly take the form of an amalgam of 
altruism and the desire to parent. The motivations typical of people wishing 
to adopt are explored more fully in Chapter Six. 
Each Australian State and Territory has implemented the power, granted at 
the time of Federation, to legislate in the area of adoption. Claims by Newell 
(1988) that the problems with intercountry adoption services in Australia, 
including irregular procedures, have been overcome with nationally uniform 
intercountry adoption procedures are not supported. His assertion flies in the 
face of the earlier research by Goriawalla (1982: 55) and Picton and Calder 
(1982: 13). Subsequently, the three separate legislative overviews of Boss and 
Edwards (1992), Charlesworth et al. (1990: 129) and Harper (1985a: 18) provide 
further evidence of a continued lack of uniformity among the various 
Adoption Acts and Regulations. More broadly, loft and McIntyre (1992: 84) 
observe that in the United States, too, adoption remains decentralised with 
'no overarching federal agency'. 
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As Boss and Edwards (1992: 14) assert, the Commonwealth Government of 
Australia has a 'vital' interest in intercountry adoption. The Immigration 
(Guardianship of Children) Act 1946 allows for the legitimate entry into 
Australia of non-citizen children where that entry has been arranged under 
the supervision of an adoption agency that is officially recognised by the 
government and where the child passes the compulsory medical 
examination. 
There are also other parties that have a vital interest in intercountry 
adoption. Cox (1986: 1-6) lists the participating parties and includes the 
prospective adoptive parents and the natural or birth parents. He also 
recognises as parties to decision making the Government of the child's 
country of origin, or sending country, and 'middle persons and 
organisations'. Middle persons and organisations are usually referred to as 
'support groups', a term that is often used indiscriminately to denote 
parental support groups and 'non-government organisations'. Parental 
support groups provide information and other forms of support for adoptive 
parents within receiving countries. Non-government organisations have 
direct contact with government officials and managers of orphanages in 
relinquishing countries. They are able to facilitate and expedite adoptions, for 
example, by advising Australian intercountry adoption service managers of 
children who have become available for placement, or by alerting officers in 
sending countries of applicants' files that are to be expected or that seem to 
have become 'lost' between departments. 
Group help for adoptive parents rests on informal social support and shared 
identity. Some authors, such as Hoksbergen (1988a: 4) and Newell (1988: 18), 
argue that such voluntary groups help parents cope with the many racial, 
cultural, religious and territorial issues that arise during the intercountry 
adoption process. Smith and Sherwen (1984: 46) rate the informal support 
gained from fellow adopters as 'particularly important' in light of the 
contraction of state welfare services. The groups provide practical support 
based on the experiences of members. The pragmatic advice that new 
applicants receive in the support group setting helps them to move beyond 
the unrealistic images and expectations that sometimes appear in parental 
phantasies (see Krause Eheart and Power 1995). Moreover, support groups 
can provide emotional support in the form of a reference group for non-
fecund adopters (Aitken 1983: 26). A somewhat different perspective is put by 
Harper (1985a: 19) who argues that support groups help adoptive parents by 
playing an informal intermediary role that facilitates the adoption process. 
Support groups are also of value to adopted children. They are a social 
context within which children can develop cultural, racial and personal 
identity. Transracially adopted children's self esteem depends principally 
upon parental acknowledgement of racial and cultural difference 
(Hoksbergen 1988a and 1988b: 70; Winkler et al. (1988: 110-11). However, 
emphasising the difference between the parents and the child may interfere 
with the bonding process (Howe 1992: 10-11). Relationships with other 
adoptive children in support groups is often difficult. Kim (1980: 221) suggests 
that children's reluctance to meet with other intercountry adoptive children 
of the same race as themselves is a function of the 'painful affects associated 
with their preadoption' experiences. 
Some commentators say that support groups have too much power. The 
'tremendous power' that support groups have over adoptive parents is seen 
by Hoksbergen (1988a: 3) and Triseliotis (1988: 21) as a reason for 
strengthening the state's capacity to regulate and supervise. Effective state 
control is seen as the best way to prevent child trafficking and to reduce the 
incidence of placement disruption (Hoksbergen 1988a, Ngabonziza 1988, 
Harper 1985b, Fopp 1982a, Goriawalla 1982 and Calder 1982). This view is also 
held by Bates (1988: 3) who traces the marketing of children back to 
nineteenth century England, and by Mangold (1978), Scheper-Hughes (1990), 
Cauchi (1987b), Triseliotis (1988: 25-6), Charlesworth et al. (1990: 129), Kligman 
(1992), United Nations (1994: Article 4) and O'Shaughnessy (1994: 124-29). 
Pilotti (1985) argues that a balance must be found between 'a minimum of red 
tape' on the one hand and adequate state regulation to provide a 'maximum 
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of safeguards' for the child on the other. 
Effective state control also minimizes the dangers of 'openness' in adoption 
systems (Hoksbergen 1988b: 58-9; Boss and Edwards 1992: 19-21; Clare 1991: 11) 
as is the case where the privacy of parties is breached by unregulated contact. 
On the basis of arguments such as these the role of the state has expanded. 
This expansion has produced structured strain between the institutions of the 
family and the state that generates tension between officers and applicants. 
The growth of state power also threatens organisations in the voluntary 
sector and, consequently, produces tensions, too, in the relations between 
state officials and representatives of support groups. Those tensions 
contribute to applicants' anxieties about their relationship with state officials. 
The social context 
In modern Australia there is a tacit understanding that under normal 
circumstances no individual person should be allowed to die an avoidable 
death or even suffer preventable misery. Australia is not unique in this 
regard (see Laslett 1988: 170). Where extended kinship units are reduced in 
scale and attenuated by the structural isolation of the nuclear family and by 
neo-local marriage practices, the institution of the state becomes more 
prominent among those that develop to meet human need. 
In systems where the nuclear family is the pre-eminent form, alternative 
sources of welfare exist in the form of private and community-level services. 
Rose and Shiratori (1986), for example, observe that private welfare services 
include personal economic wealth that allows access to market sources of 
welfare. Community-level welfare services are of the kind provided by 
churches and service organisations. The modern Western state contributes to 
both sources of weffare insofar as private economic wealth may be regulated 
by industrial legislation and supplemented by state benefits while community 
services may be underwritten by government or assisted through the 
provision of tax deductibility for donations. 
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Australia has inherited from England a system of state provision of welfare 
services for those individual citizens who do not have access to effective kin 
relations and whose access to market and community sources of welfare fails 
to meet their welfare needs. In societies where the welfare of individual 
citizens is valued, where neo-local marriage practices continue to isolate 
nuclear families domestically, and where kinship structures are diffuse, state 
welfare provision predictably expands as a consequence of the ineffectiveness 
of the kinship arrangements and the inadequacy of intermediate welfare 
structures. This, in essence, is Laslett's (1988) nuclear hardship hypothesis. 
The tenets of the nuclear hardship hypothesis are particularly useful to this 
study of acquisitive adoption as a family-formation strategy for two reasons. 
First, they draw attention to the way in which family-formation strategies 
that involve adoption are an issue for kinship systems based on the nuclear 
family. Given normative neo-local marriage practices and the associated 
weakening of effective wider kin units, extended families are not recognised 
as legitimate sources of adoptive children (see Goody 1981: 84). In this regard 
Australia is in contrast with many other societies, including traditional Sub-
Saharan (Shimkin, Shimkin and Frate 1978: 190-94, O'Shaughnessy 1988: 242- 
43), Chinese (Goody, 1981: 76) and Australian Aboriginal (Boss and Edwards 
1992: 17) structures, where a strong sense of communal ownership of children 
is inconsistent with a view of adoption as a private, nuclear family issue, but 
facilitates intra-group fostering as the mechanism for providing care for 
children otherwise in need of support. Conversely, strong kin group 
structures militate against the relinquishing of children for extra-familial or 
extra-tribal adoption. 
In modern Western societies, extended family members may be approached 
by parents seeking to deposit their children in fosterage arrangements. 
Holloman and Lewis (1978) and Ladner (1977) observe that depositive 
adoption is common in some United States black communities. Extended-
family fosterage may occur as a function of the existence of strong wider 
kinship units that can be approached in times of economic hardship. Such 
fosterage is, therefore, clearly a different phenomenon from the acquisitive, 
family-formation strategy that is the object of this study. Kinship adoption 
does occur in Australia as a result of 'blending' families following divorce. 
According to Boss and Edwards (1992: 18), this practice accounts for more than 
half of all adoption applications. Here, the adoption is neither an acquisitive 
nor a depositive strategy, but a reconstructive process characteristic of post-
divorce, neo-local marriage practices. 
Secondly, the nuclear hardship hypothesis accounts for the expansion of state 
intervention as a provider of welfare for nuclear families. The welfare of 
individuals is a matter for both the state and the family, but the division of 
responsibility for the provision of this welfare is problematic. The nuclear 
hardship hypothesis emphasises the symbiotic relationship between the 
family and the state, recognised by van Krieken (1992), but runs counter to the 
social control theories of the state proposed, for example, by Meyer (1983) and 
Donzelot (1979). Nevertheless, as Pinker (1973) explains, the provision of 
some kinds of state welfare for families is usually accompanied by stigma and 
tension owing to the tacit understanding that welfare is primarily a private, 
family problem that only becomes a public issue when the family fails to 
provide adequate support. 
As we saw above, families are diversely constructed according to cultural and 
economic circumstances. Furthermore, families change according to the life-
stages of their members. In this study, the 'family' is constructed in its nuclear 
form, that is, a discrete residential unit consisting of the conjugal dyad and 
associated children. In contemporary Australia, that is the dominant kinship 
arrangement. Gilding (1991: 115-6), for example, argues that more recently in 
Australia, major post-war factors contributing to individuation, such as 
suburbanisation that served to isolate nuclear families from the wider kin 
group and neighbourhood networks, promoted the notion of the private 
family and emphasised affectionate relations between parents and children. 
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By contrast, the state is that set of authoritative institutions that confers 
socially legitimate, if limited, decision-making power onto individual officers 
who are themselves constrained by bureaucratic and broader social structures. 
Beyond the state bureaucratic department, the political power of officers is 
further constrained by the competing or conflicting powers of other 
bureaucracies, not to mention accountability to elected members of 
parliament. Elected state-officials, in turn, require social legitimation from the 
electorate, a requirement that acts as a constraint on their behaviour. 
Simultaneously, state politicians are caught up in the demands of reciprocity 
in a community of international peers, and must acknowledge the autonomy 
and legitimacy of the political power of these peers. This principle has bearing 
on the way in which politicians and their nominal subordinates conduct 
programs of international significance and sensitivity such as intercountry 
adoption. 
The general problem: tension where we might expect harmony 
In late capitalism, citizenship has expanded to include the rights of the child. 
Turner (1986: 93) observes that, with the coming of modernity, the child has 
emerged as a social personality, protected by the emotional bonds of the 
family as well as the political rights afforded by the state. In modem capitalist 
societies like Australia, the well-being of the child is recognised as important 
by both the family and the state. Paradoxically, there is potential for tension 
and even conflict where the claims of autonomy and the assertion of private 
property rights in children by the family cut across the notions of 
responsibility and public accountability espoused by government. The strain 
between parental autonomy and state responsibility is often unresolved, 
especially now that low fertility levels call into question what were, formerly, 
socially normal styles of family building. 
How then do interactions occur at the intersection of these two institutions? 
In light of estimations that there are thirty-eight million abandoned children 
in India alone (Cook 1989: 11), it might be thought that intercountry adoption 
is in the interests of adoptees as well as adopters, would be approved by all 
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Australian governments, and would enjoy universal support within 
Australian society. Intercountry adoption services might also be expected to 
run smoothly since all participating parties ostensibly work in concert to 
achieve shared goals. These expectations are not borne out. Boss and Edwards 
(1992: 13) show, for example, that support for the notion of intercountry 
adoption is not shared by all parties, especially not by social workers, and that 
the process is not always happy (see also Wilson 1989). Close (1977: 31) also 
asserts that prospective adoptive parents are the party 'most often denied 
adequate attention' by social workers. Furthermore, in a critique of Australian 
adoption services, she writes of the 'trauma of being processed', where clients 
have to conform to 'idealized standards not even found in natural families' 
(1977: 32). 
Even broad claims about intercountry adoption being in the best interest of 
the child have been questioned. Chimezie (1975) bases his opposition to 
transracial adoption on ideological support for familial apartheid along 
cultural and racial lines. Others, such as Macaulay and Macaulay (1978: 286- 
88), Jones and Else (1979: 374), Feigelman and Silverman (1984: 589), Hogan 
and Siu (1988: 496), McRoy (1989: 150), loft and McIntyre (1992: 100) and 
O'Shaughnessy (1994: 129) note a groundswell of opposition among social 
workers themselves to transracial adoption, which some in the United States 
redefine as racial and cultural genocide. Howard et al.'s (1977) survey of 150 
black households found that on this issue the opposition by black social 
workers to transracial adoption was out of step with majority opinion in the 
U.S. black community. Reporting on a survey of 117 social workers in 
Bavaria, Textor (1992: 560) observes that two-thirds of respondents rejected 
the statement that intercountry adoptions should be increased to help some 
of the starving children in the Third World. 
Intercountry adoption does have its supporters, some of whom are critical of 
the stance taken by social workers. Whaley and Wong (1987: 80) assert that 
special-needs children, including children from other countries, are 
increasingly finding adoptive families in the United States, and that often the 
11 
view that white adoptive parents only want healthy, white children is 
propagated by adoption workers in ignorance of the more open-minded or 
accepting intentions of prospective adoptive parents. McRoy (1989: 153) 
observes that social workers' opposition to transracial adoption has been 
disallowed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Kennedy (1994: 
42-3) reports on U.S. Supreme Court support for transracial adoption. While 
lizard (1978: 240-1) writes of colour prejudice among British social workers, 
Dickey (1990: 590) records that in the case of Re N (A Minor) ([1990] 1 Fam LR 
(Eng) 58) the proposition put by the British Agencies for Fostering and 
Adoption that black children should never be placed with white adoptive 
parents was rejected by the Judge, Bush J. 
In explanation, Tizard suggests that social worker prejudice against all forms 
of adoption may result from '...the fact that the adopted children whom 
psychiatrists and social workers see are the tiny minority who are transferred 
to clinics' (1978: 240). Others (Triseliotis 1988: 22-3) explain the opposition to 
adoption by reference to social workers' unwarranted extensions' from 
research such as the report by Brockhaus and Brockhaus (1982) that early 
maternal deprivation leads to major crises in the adoption of older children. 
Discussion of implications of early maternal deprivation has indeed swung 
away from Bowlby's (1951) theory of permanent damage. Triseliotis (1988: 23) 
and Rutter (1981), for example, reassess early maternal deprivation to show 
that '...children can overcome many early negative experiences'. Moreover, 
Tizard and Rees (1977) provide evidence that when compared with 
'institutional children', previously institutionalised children who had 
subsequently been adopted have significantly fewer problems. Raynor (1980: 
149), UNA/der, Lower and Andrews (1969), Cunningham, Cadoret, Loftus et al. 
(1977: 251) and Bolunan (1972: 96) find no higher incidence of poor outcome 
among placement of older children. Harper (1986) reports on a longitudinal 
study of older-age placements in Australia. She concludes that the adoptions 
were 'successful'. Finally, Harvey (1983: 67) indicates an eighty percent success 
rate among the placements of Vietnamese children aged eight and over in 
New South Wales. 
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Officialdom's opposition to intercountry adoption may be attributed to 
awareness among social workers of the problems of deregulated adoption of 
Vietnamese children in 1975 when it was subsequently discovered, as Weil 
(1984: 289) observes, that many of the children had been placed in orphanages 
for protection from fighting and not as a tacit relinquishment for adoption. 
The view that intercountry adoption amounts to the exploitation of women 
and children, as expressed for example by Herrmann and Kasper (1992), may 
be shared by some officers. Following Toft and McIntyre (1992: 83), it appears 
that social worker opposition to adoption results from the view among social 
workers that adoption is not a life-or-death issue, or an issue that influences 
the lives of many individuals. 
Finally, social workers may be aware of the argument that intercountry 
adoption programs mask the inactivity of governments in relinquishing 
countries who should instead be supported internationally to develop their 
own child and family support services (Ngabonziza 1988: 35 and Goriawalla 
1982: 49-57). Such arguments are countered, however, by discussion of the 
principles of permanency planning and of relevant cultural values (Mangold 
1978: 37; Charlesworth et al. 1990: 129; Triseliotis 1988: 24; Maluccio et al. 1980: 
552 and Swain 1984: 293). They are also countered by the view of 
commentators in donor countries, such as Chun (1989), who argues in favour 
of intercountry adoption on the grounds that many abandoned or orphaned 
children are never going to be adopted in their country of origin because of 
perceived stigma. 
The research question: intercountry adoption in Tasmania, Australia 
In this thesis, the sociological analysis of intercountry adoption in Australia 
focuses on the interaction between parents, parent groups and state officials. It 
has regard for Turner's (1984: 37) sharp cultural contrast between the formal, 
impersonal, neutral and universal public domain, and the informal, 
particularistic, and affective domestic world of the family. While the study 
considers structures relevant to all Australian intercotmtry adoption services, 
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as well as many that operate overseas, special attention is paid to the 
Tasmanian situation where tension between the two groups underpinned a 
group complaint in 1986 to the Ombudsman whose subsequent 
recommendations to the intercountry adoption service were ignored. 
Interviews were chosen as the most appropriate method for gaining the 
qualitative data that enable us to explain the tension in the relationship 
between applicants and officers. Following Collins' (1981), the aim of the 
research was one of 'situational reductionism' or 'micro-translation', that is, 
the reduction of macro-strain identified in the analysis of social context, to 
the level of tension in the interaction between applicants and officers. 
Structural strain, tension in interaction and individual anxiety 
Following Smelser (1962: 47-66) structural strain between institutions is a 
feature of social systems in modernity. In intercountry adoption this strain 
surfaces as tension in interaction between public officials and prospective 
adoptive parents, even though they share a commitment to the welfare of the 
child. The analysis of these tensions and their origins in institutional strain 
form the focus of this study. This tension is manifest for individuals as 
general or institutionalised anxiety and is explored in this thesis by reference 
to the motivations of officers and applicants, the rationing of the service, the 
division of parenting roles, the values that are shared, and the management 
of dissatisfaction. 
Institutionalised anxiety In a relationship of unequal and varied political 
power, anxiety predictably emerges as each party considers or anticipates the 
consequences of error or failure (see, for example, Hartland 1985-6; Ham and 
Hill 1984). The relationship between the family and the state is distinguished 
by latent powers of state coercion. The social contract on the institutional 
level - is not free. Clients of state services understand that officials have the 
power, though limited, to make and enforce compliance with decisions and 
directions with which, as clients, they may not concur. The dimension of 
political power thus provides for clients an inherent element of anxiety that 
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the roles of individual officials may either increase or ease, but not dispel. 
Levels of anxiety predictably increase as the consequences of error become 
more significant. In intercountry adoption errors may have serious 
implications for officers' career paths or result, for example, in applicants' 
failure to gain approval-to-adopt. 
The state official will anticipate anxiety on the part of the client whose 
personal project is submitted for assessment to a universalistic value system. 
Clients are excluded from the codified political power available to the official, 
but can exert political leverage through several formal and informal but 
potentially effective mechanisms. These include access to the mass media, an 
arena in which the journalist's agenda often coincides with that of the 
disaffected client. The formation of client support groups for the purposes of 
co-ordinating superregional expression of vocabularies of complaint is 
another form of political leverage available to the client. Such mechanisms 
empower clients politically and therefore provide cause for latent anxiety 
among state officials. 
Anxiety among state officials will predictably foster the professionalisation of 
services. Professionalisation, in turn, consolidates the existing political power 
structures that underpin persistently high levels of anxiety and tension. The 
key elements of professionalisation, as identified by Turner (1993), are 
therefore important to this thesis. They include the establishment and 
constant reification of a hierarchy of competence (Turner 1993: 20), 'boundary 
maintenance' of occupational monopoly (Turner 1988: 131) and the 
mobilisation of bias through the creation of a professional epistemology with 
attendant agenda control as recognised by Ham and Hill (1984: 174-79). 
Professionalisation institutionalises the role of power and prestige enjoyed by 
professional bodies and conversely institutionalises client dependency 
(Turner 1988: 135). Moreover, Wilding (1982: 17) explains that political 
implications of professional epistemology include the mystification of 
professional work that appears as a function of what Turner (1988: 136) calls 
the 'indetermination of knowledge', not to mention claims of technical 
expertise. 
Alternatively, tension in the relationship between officers and applicants can 
be attributed in part to bureaucratisation (see, for example, Andreski 1972, 
Turner 1993, Matthews 1988) where the demands of accountability 
significantly constrain, among other things, officers' ability to apply the 
normal rules of sociability. 
The power of professionals in bureaucracies has its limits. Turner (1988: 137) 
argues that these limiting processes include first, challenges from new 
professional and para-professional groups such as non-government 
organisations; secondly, fragmentation through specialisation and thirdly, the 
growth of bureaucracy, that is, the introduction of rules and hierarchical 
authority structures that undermine professional autonomy. However in 
high trust situations there are substantial parallels between bureaucratisation 
and professionalisation (Hill and Bramley 1986: 164-67). 
Motivations When applicants and state officials who have disparate and 
structurally-derived motivations arrive at the interactive arena from 
different directions tension characterises their interactions. Where the object 
of negotiation has implications for the status of the client's family, adult 
representatives of the family will seek to secure that object as quickly as 
possible. Moreover, they will want to maintain as much familial autonomy 
as possible and to gain acknowledgement or social legitimation from state 
officials that the family's particularistic goals are respectable and deserving of 
support. Conversely, the motivation of state officials is to• apply 
universalistic standards and procedures that underpin official authority 
rather than the particularistic foundation of clients' assumptions, 
perspectives and claims. Officials' actions are carried out against a backdrop of 
procedural rules, compliance with which is the basis for performance 
assessments by superiors. 
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Intercountry adoption applicants will notice the contrast between the privacy 
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and self-determination of natural reproduction on the one hand and the 
politically compromising status of welfare-client on the other. Motivated as 
they are by family-formation plans and/or altruism, applicants will 
predictably resent official intervention unless they are convinced that it is in 
the best interests of the child. 
Rationing of the service Tension is also to be expected as a result of the 
various views, held by applicants and officers, on what constitutes 
appropriate levels of service provision. Therefore, implications of service 
rationing for the relationship are examined. The provision of a new social 
service raises the expectations of the citizenry, leading to a rapid rise in 
demand for the new service. Given that primary welfare of individuals is 
provided for them normally by the family, and given that most people at any 
one time are healthy, state welfare services usually cater for the needs of 
relatively few people at any one time. Those services are funded indirectly by 
all taxpayers. That arrangement provides for a high level of social security for 
all citizens since they are either currently dependent on state welfare or 
anticipate that one day they may well be. Conversely, that arrangement also 
informs a limitation of the political will in modern democracies. In an age of 
universalism, expensive services, that provide welfare for relatively few 
citizens, predictably face legitimation crises. Consequently, bureaucratic 
managers euphemistically redefine the limitation of funding with the 
attendant diminution of service provision as rationalism. The term is 
appropriate because it conveys notions of rationing and of rational 
behaviour. In a universalistic value system, it is rational to ration. Wright 
Mills (1977: 186-88) argues, however, that rationality sometimes contradicts 
reason. For example, from the point of view of officers, rationing may conflict 
with the ideals of service provision. From the point of view of clients, 
rationing may seem unreasonable if it delays or defeats their personal 
projects. 
The division of parenting roles This thesis traces the implications of the 
parenting roles of applicants and officers for their various views on what 
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constitutes appropriate procedural pace and argues that the differing 
perceptions on how long the process should take, and the timing of the stages 
associated with the transfer of responsibility, become major sources of tension 
in the relationship. Given the stigmatisation of many social services 
provided by the state, dients will seek access to such services only if the object 
desired cannot be gained by them from private or market sources of welfare. 
Clients thus approach state welfare services with a degree of reluctance. That 
reluctance may delay their approach to services with the result that clients' 
sense of urgency is heightened by the time of their initial meeting with 
service providers. 
Even where there has been no delay on the part of the client, the 
stigmatisation associated with state services predictably limits requests for 
such welfare to objects that clients feel are essential or at least very important. 
Exceptions to that pattern of behaviour may be demonstrated by clients who 
develop a state-welfare or hand-out mentality. All clients predictably seek to 
manage the embarrassment that emerges as a result of stigmatisation. 
Management techniques may include a consolidation of the view that the 
details of the client's case are extraordinary, such that the approach to state 
welfare is justified and stigmatisation is not. A perspective such as this would 
underpin a strengthened commitment on the part of the client to the 
particularistic orientation that is already predictable. If state services are 
approached only under exceptional circumstances, then the object desired is 
clearly needed urgently by the client. Were the object not needed urgently, the 
client would, where possible, seek access to private sources of welfare. The 
sense of urgency predictably results in tension when applicants have to 
submit to the careful, considered and therefore 'slow' processes of official 
protocol. 
Officer views on procedural pace are informed by a very different agenda. It is 
to be expected that the interacting parties will both seek to secure the best 
interests of the child as they see them. Tension and conflict can be anticipated, 
however, as functions of the varying orientations that provide participants 
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with significantly different perspectives. For example, the officer must be 
satisfied that prospective adoptive parents will provide a suitable home and 
family for the child. For this reason the approach of officers is likely to be 
'measured'. Child psychiatrist Blackburn, for example, advises intercountry 
adoption service workers to insist on a waiting period for adoptive parents 
(cited in Evatt et al. 1978: 120). 
Applicants have a broader perspective on intercountry adoption than do 
officers. Applicants often assume a parenting attitude even before a formal 
application is lodged. For officers, in contrast, the child is socially invisible 
prior to placement. Allowing the child to linger in wretched circumstances in 
orphanages in relinquishing countries (Duffy (1992) is seen by applicants but 
not by officers as inconsistent with the principle of the 'paramountcy of the 
interests of the child' (see, for example, Department of Community and 
Health Services 1995: 5; Mizgalski 1992; Toft and McIntyre 1992: 100). For 
officers, the welfare of the child is post-placement welfare (Fenner 1968: 93). 
While applicants will agree with what English (1990) calls the 'tacit 
recognition' of every adult's right to parenthood, officers will be predisposed 
to accept Picton's (1984: 2) assertion that no-one has a right to a child. 
Officers' and clients' views on procedural pace continue to differ after 
placement of the child. By law, the official retains ex-officio responsibility for 
the welfare of the child until formal adoption is completed in a magistrate's 
court. Adequate supervision of placement requires a longitudinal study of the 
child in the new family setting. Eisen (1979: 199) and Simon and Senturia 
(1966: 864), for example, observe that prospective adoptive parents are 
therefore required to make a full emotional commitment to a child who may 
be taken away from them by officialdom. The adoptive parents, therefore, 
will seek to adopt the child formally as soon as possible. Views on procedural 
pace are clearly informed by divergent notions of parenting responsibility for 
the child. 
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Shared values The study of tension in a relationship should not obscure the 
underlying value consensus without which a relationship would be 
impossible. This study does not examine a phenomenon of open hostility, 
unrestrained antagonism or total war, but elements of tension in a 
relationship of shared values. This research project, therefore, examines the 
paradox of empathy in a strained relationship. Following Parsons, Farrell and 
Swigert (1982: 139-44) define a strained relationship as one where alter is seen 
not to comply with normative rules of sociability. Those rules include 
cultural rules or norms, 'mutually agreed-upon expectations of conduct' that 
underpin the reciprocity that is 'essential to persistent relationships', and 
'cathexis or personal attachment' (Farrell and Swigert 1982: 139). 
Most clients will agree in principle with the need for state officials to adopt a 
universalistic orientation to their work because they accept that the 
legitimacy of the state depends upon it treating all its citizens as equals. State 
officials, conversely, will have personally experienced the primary 
socialisation of the family and, therefore, understand the normative value of 
autonomous and private familial decision-making. Tension emerges, despite 
shared understandings, when applicants mount particularistic arguments in 
support of their application and officers respond with reference to 
universalistic criteria. 
The element of empathy between the client and the officer has implications 
for their relationship. Work by Timms (1973) and van Krieken (1992: 135-37) 
suggests that acceptance of the need for official universalism or fairness will 
encourage intercountry adoption service applicants to comply with state 
regulations and official directions. They will, nevertheless, with reference to 
the institutional status of the family, question the notion of complete state 
authority over the lives of individuals. 
The management of dissatisfaction Tension between officers and applicants 
also surfaces as expressions of applicant dissatisfaction. Pinker (1973) and 
Mauss (1954) both observe that the decision to apply for welfare from state 
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• authorities is stigmatised in modernity. According to Pinker, acceptance of 
state welfare connotes failure. This stigmatisation is usually understood and 
shared by clients themselves. Given the stigmatisation associated with many 
state services, clients can be expected to experience fundamental 
dissatisfaction as a result of their need to access those services. Dissatisfaction 
emerges in part as a result of the dominant social view of state welfare and 
welfare recipients, and is, therefore, a separate issue from the quality of the 
service offered. In addition, applicants must save face when confronted by a 
'critical audience' and may, therefore, find much of their interaction with 
officers to be very uncomfortable. In extreme circumstances they may seek to 
apply political pressure. Following Goffman (1980), this thesis explores the 
management by applicants and officers of client dissatisfaction as a source of 
sustained tension in the relationship. 
Client dissatisfaction may also emerge as a function of substantial loss of 
social rights such as the rights to pursue personal, private projects. 
Intercountry adoption service applicants, for example, are denied the right to 
pursue projects such as invitro-fertilisation or even natural attempts at 
human reproduction. Non-fecund applicants, therefore, are denied the most 
efficient method, namely, simultaneous access to various resources for 
family-building. 
Client dissatisfaction will be highest when the object of the service sought is 
fundamental to the client's self esteem. If client self-esteem is associated with 
normative autonomy, then the most threatening and simultaneously the 
most needed services for those clients are the services that can provide 
objects of fundamental importance to individuals' social sense of belonging 
to dominant cultures or norms. 
The management of dissatisfaction by officials is undertaken not primarily for 
the benefit of the client but to protect the operations or processes from which 
they have become disaffected. Without management, aggrieved clients could 
conceivably seek to destroy, expose, or embarrass the bureaucratic process, if 
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not its operators, that had caused them to suffer. Jordan (1985: 133), for 
example, notes the power of clients, local communities and broader public 
opinion to influence official policy and practice. 
The universalistic orientation of state bureaucracies precludes the option of 
protective face games as defined by Lyman and Scott (1970: 42). The 
relationship between official and client is not equal and reciprocal in social 
terms. Therefore, protective face games predictably do not appear in 
interaction between officials and clients, though they can be expected to 
emerge in meetings of clients' support groups where they have the same 
purpose as do the defensive games played by clients themselves, that is, to 
save the social face of the client in light of failure to gain the desired object(s) 
from the officer. Tension is raised among clients because of the universalistic, 
objectivist orientation required of officers. State officials constitute a critical 
audience. In interaction with clients, the official purpose is not to make 
clients feel better, but to seek information that will provide substantiation for 
subsequent assessments, evaluations, judgements and recommendations. 
The management of dissatisfaction, as well as dissatisfaction itself, emerges as 
a function of the structural arrangements that define the arena in which state 
officials and their clients interact. While Timms (1973) shows that clients are 
in a weak position to challenge expectations of themselves as welfare 
recipients, officers predictably nevertheless seek to manage client 
dissatisfaction. The management of client dissatisfaction by officers emerges 
as a function of the anxiety experienced by officers in the face of client access 
to formal and informal mechanisms for complaint and redress as discussed 
earlier with reference to the management of anxiety. Those mechanisms 
include the use of administrative appeals tribunals, review committees, the 
offices of the Ombudsman and of members of Parliament, the mass media, 
and client-support groups. 
The political power of support groups is limited by their lack of official status. 
Nevertheless, access to sources of political leverage provides all clients with 
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the latent power to affect negatively officials' reputation or standing within 
and beyond professional boundaries. Serious negative influences may 
weaken promotion chances for individual officers. 
Summary 
This thesis seeks to identify and explain tensions in the relationship between 
officers and applicants in the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service. The 
thesis analyses the social context of the service, focusing in Chapter Two on 
emergent strains between the institutions of the family and the state, and in 
Chapter Three on the role of the intermediate institutions of the media and 
adoption support groups in structuring everyday conceptions of the adoption 
process. The structural strains identified on the institutional level of analysis 
are then analysed as tensions at the interactional level. The thesis addresses 
six areas in which that tension is evident. They include institutionalised 
anxiety, the motivations of officers and applicants, the rationing of the 
service, the division of parenting roles, the sharing of values and the 
management of dissatisfaction. These areas formed the points of focus for 
interviews and are discussed in Chapters Five to Ten. 
By addressing these six areas, this thesis provides an analysis of intercountry 
adoption that is of value to applicants and officers in Australia and other 
receiving countries and to those investigating sociologically the relationship 
between the family and the state in Western modernity and, it is hoped, to 
those children in relinquishing countries whose only escape from social, 
economic and political marginalisation is intercountry adoption. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE FAMILY AND THE STATE 
Introduction 
In societies that have experienced a rise of individualism, and are 
characterised by the structural isolation of the nuclear family, and where 
wider kinship structures are diffuse, state welfare provisions typically expand 
especially where intermediate welfare structures are inadequate. Long-term 
processes of social change have brought the institutions of the family and the 
state into a relationship that is characterised by both cooperation and 
competition as each provides in its own discrete way for the welfare of the 
individual. In modernity the family provides for the welfare of individuals 
in ways that are for the most part traditional, emotional and particularistic. 
In contrast, the state's provisions for individual welfare are expressed in 
legal, rational and universalistic terms. The state has expanded its sphere of 
influence into areas of welfare, including that of adoptive children, that 
previously were the exclusive domain of the family. Today, where the 
institutional responsibilities of the family and the state overlap and compete, 
their relationship is marked by strain (Smelser 1962). In general, this strain is 
the source of the tension that is institutionalised in the interaction between 
state officials and their clients. This chapter reviews current literature on the 
family and the state in order to identify the ways in which conceptions of the 
state and its role and of the family and its rights shape the meaning that 
applicants and officers give to their own and each other's behaviour in social 
interaction. 
This thesis analyses the relationship between the applicant and the officer as 
an 'episode of situated interaction' (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 19) within this arena 
of institutional 'overlap'. Structural arrangements in intercountry adoption 
are subject to a slow but more or less continuous process of renegotiation and 
are paradoxically characterised in social interaction between applicants and 
officers by value consensus and institutional interdependence (where all 
parties want the child's best interests to be served) on the one hand, and by 
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• competition and hostility (where 'ownership' and control are contested) on 
the other. 
In everyday interactions, people use conceptions of the social order to make 
sense of their world. These conceptions are not clearly defined, nor learned 
as catechisms. Rather, they are part of the tacit understanding of society that 
everyday actors have. These conceptions are widely shared but not 
universally held. This thesis investigates the way in which socially-derived 
conceptualisations of 'the state' and 'the family' have a powerful influence 
on the behaviour of applicants and officers in interaction. In intercountry 
adoption, it is predictable that applicants' and officers' expectations of their 
mutual social interaction will be shaped by their tacit understandings of 'the 
family' and 'the state'. 
In their 'lived world', people reify the institutions by associating themselves 
and others with the institutions they represent. That process of reification 
confers added social status onto individuals (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 37-8) - the 
bureaucrat becomes 'the state' and the applicant parents become 'the family'. 
The analysis of these institutions in modernity can, therefore, shed light on 
how applicants and officers make sense of their interaction in the 
intercountry adoption 'field of struggle' (Bourdieu 1981: 308). 
The analysis of the relationship between officers and applicants in 
intercountry adoption begins with a review of current literature on the 
modern family and the modern democratic state. Elements of change and of 
constancy appear as salient features of academic discussion on the family. 
Some authors argue that the family is a 'natural' or an 'evolutionary' social 
phenomenon. Others recognise the contingency of family-formation 
strategies on political, cultural, economic and social conditions. Discussion 
on the state includes debate on citizenship, deregulation, and the distinction 
between the state, nation and society. Finally, theories of state/ family 
interaction are examined with special attention to the notions of 
compulsion, value consensus and institutional interdependence. 
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The family 
What is meant by 'the family', has been an enduring subject for academic 
and political debates. In the discipline, two mutually related 'debates' have 
dominated the discussion over the last three or four decades. One debate 
explores elements of constancy and change in the nuclear family structure 
and its functions. The other considers the value-laden question of the merits 
of the nuclear family. Some seek to fortify their entrenched positions, but 
most acknowledge that the nuclear family arrangement is good for some 
people and bad for others. These debates are explored here as they contribute 
to our understanding of the ways in which 'the family' is understood by 
applicants and officers. 
Following Barnes (1979) and Malinowski (1966) the family is defined, for the 
purposes of this study, as essentially a social rather than a biological 
arrangement. With the exception of single-parent families, the definition 
used here is borrowed from Turner (1969: 110), that is, a co-residential 
conjugal dyad and parent/ children dyads, in short, the ego, the spouse and 
their children. Following Whaley and Wong (1987: 59), the definition of 
'family' here includes fictive relationships within nuclear family structures 
such as adoptive, blended, single-parent and step-parent relationships. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the notion of family in this chapter is not 
restricted to 0' Driscoll's (1986: 83) definition of the consanguine or biological 
relationships between parent and child and the affinal relationships between 
adults that define the terms in some of the works discussed. The term does 
not extend to co-residential but non-related groups that, according to Mintz 
(1989: 400), may also be defined as families for legal purposes. Neither is the 
term used to refer to the familial relationships between discrete households 
observed by Laslett (1972: ix), or to such non-Western kinship arrangements 
as the bond of brotherhood established in Eskimo society through delivery by 
the same midwife (Pitt-Rivers 1979: 94). 
Applicants who see the family as a primary institution that has changed little 
over the centuries and the state as a recent invention might be expected to 
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assert that the role of the family should take precedence over the role of the 
state in the care, support and nurturance of the child. Conversely, state 
officers who see the family as a malleable institution that is contingent on 
economic, social and political circumstances, and that on occasions allows for 
the abuse and neglect of children, might be expected to use their position to 
assert a role for the state in the regulation of family life. 
Turning first to the debate on familial constancy and change, demographic 
evidence of the historical persistence of the nuclear family structure in 
England appears in the seminal work of Laslett (1972 and 1973). He refutes 
the claim that the monogamous nuclear family of North-Western Europe is 
the end-stage of an evolutionary line of development traced from primitive 
tribal groupings through pre-nineteenth century extended kinship forms. 
Evolutionary theories of the family are also challenged, for example, by 
Berger and Berger (1983: 87), Aries (1973: 385) and Chandler (1963: 16-17). 
Most recent authors writing about the family recognise that family-
formation strategies are contingent upon the social environment. Cass 
(1990), Aries (1973), Levine (1987), Young and Willmott (1973), Bottomley 
(1983a), Bachrach et al. (1991), Poster (1978) and Gilding (1991) all contradict 
Murdock's (1949) assertion that the nuclear family structure is universal. 
They accept, however, the notion of the 'constancy' of the nuclear family 
structure. Laslett's work, for example, demonstrates the constancy of the 
nuclear family but allows for exceptions and for changes during the life cycle 
of the family. The notion of 'constancy', where the durability of the nuclear 
family structure is demonstrated through the careful examination of 
demographic records is distinct from what may be called, 'inflexibility', 
where the 'family-of-origin' image of parents and their children obscures 
insight into the many other types of family arrangements, not to forget the 
contributions of non-kin to primary group systems of mutual support. 
The debate on constancy and change merges with the debate on the merits of 
the nuclear family structure when authors identify positive and negative 
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changes. In terms of the positive changes to the family, Parsons (1955: 19) has 
been pre-eminent in identifying the increased emotional intensity and social 
exclusiveness of family life as a function of the expansion of the state and 
other non-kinship structures, and of the isolation of the conjugal dyad from 
extended kinship systems. His notion of the specialisation of the family has 
since been taken up by many commentators, including Poulson (1986: 74). A 
similar argument appears in the work of Young and Willmott (1973) and 
Giddens (1992) who have drawn attention to desegregation of sex roles and 
increasing democratisation within the spousal relationship. Vandenheuvel 
(1991: 21) reports that recent National Social Science Surveys found that in 
the United States, Great Britain and Australia at '...least 78 per cent [of 
respondents, in Australia N = 4511] concurred that watching children grow 
up is life's greatest joy'. The popularity of the nuclear family structure has 
been attributed to the particularism, privacy and intimacy of kinship. In 
addition, Young and Willmott (1973: 268) contend that the 'less transitory' 
relationships enshrined in the family system are essential to the human 
condition. Finally, Poggi (1978: 126-7) points to the paradox that, with social 
isolation and the end of economic self-sufficiency, elements of increased 
privacy and growing deprivatisation of the family have emerged 
simultaneously. 
Other authors point to negative changes such as elements of disorganisation 
and dysfunction. From the mid-twentieth century, high divorce rates, 
changes in sex morality, and declining birth rates have been identified by 
some social scientists as symptoms of the general disorganisation of the 
family (see, for example, Zimmerman 1947; Whyte 1956; Goode 1964; Barrett 
and McIntosh 1982). Evidence of continuing dysfunctional pressures on the 
family is presented, for example by Noller and Callan (1992). 
The disorganisation of the nuclear family structure would be welcomed by 
those authors who portray the family as a private, unregulated social 
microcosm of 'potential hate, envy, fear and mutual self-destruction' (Knorr-
Cetina 1981: 23). A major contributor to such depictions of the family is R. D. 
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Laing (1956) who saw the nuclear family as a setting within which women 
and children were often exploited. In addition, many feminists identify the 
functions of the family as the sexual, social and economic suppression of 
women and children, the exploitation of women's labour, and the political 
disempowerment of women through residential and therefore social 
isolation (see, for example, Bottomley 1983b; Miller and Swift 1976; Millet 
1971). Bottomley (1983b) furthermore asserts that for many women who once 
were important economic partners in familial units of production in 
feudalism or early industrialisation, the advent of the role of unpaid 
housewife was attended by a substantial decline in social status with serious 
implications for family relations. Problems attendant to the redefinition of 
sex roles in the postmodern family setting are recognised also in Gilding's 
(1991) analysis of constructive and dysfunctional forces in the history of the 
Australian family. Turner (1993: 5) notes that even Parsons recognised some 
negative consequences for women of the social isolation of the nuclear 
family. 
Part of the debate on the ethics of the family structure focuses on 
implications of the intra-familial distribution of wealth. The assertion that 
familial inheritance is a 'natural' and 'good' system for the redistribution of 
economic wealth is put by Baumgarth (1986). Conversely, Marx and Engels 
saw the family as the 'embryo of slavery', the basic unit of capitalist society 
that protects the institution of private property (cited in Bottomley 1983a: 17). 
Their criticism points to the essential element of deregulation. The family 
structure underpins the unregulated redistribution of wealth and the 
particularism of family formation strategies, of ascription rather than state-
assessed achievement, of personal loyalties, and of the welfare of individual 
adults and children. 
By illustrating the consequences of unregulated family life for many women 
and children, critical theories of the family lend moral support to arguments 
for increased state intervention. Conversely, recognition of the values of the 
family as a stable social environment for the development of healthy 
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personalities and as an institution that is of benefit to the state lends credence 
to calls for the deregulation of family life. It is the deregulation of family life 
that makes it simultaneously so attractive to most citizens and so disturbing 
to those concerned with the welfare of women and children who are the 
most economically and socially vulnerable groups in unregulated settings. 
The ongoing debate on what constitutes appropriate state and family 
responsibility for the welfare of the child emerges from the contradictory 
evaluations of the family and spills over into everyday conceptions held by 
applicants and officers. 
The state 
Tension in the relationship between applicants and officers may also be 
explained by the actors' views on the state. This review of the development 
of the state in modernity alerts us to predictable points of tension between 
'the state' and 'the family' in the conceptualisation of citizens. If the state is 
seen by applicants in intercountry adoption as a differentiated set of 
institutions whose inconsistent relations with society include the 
desubordination of the citizenry, then applicants will tolerate and even 
support state involvement. Conversely, if the state is personified as a unitary 
social 'monster' that tramples on the rights of people and devours the role 
of the family, then applicants will resent state involvement. 
The state is essentially the modern, territory-wide and socially legitimate 
system of rule. Since the state in modernity requires legitimation from 
society, the state, as a set of institutions, has to be seen to be supportive of 
individuals, the market, and intermediate structures such as the family. State 
institutions must also be seen to uphold such key abstract values as natural 
justice, universalism and the rule of law. Thus the state is a source of social 
welfare as well as a system of rule. As such, the state can be expected to attract 
universal support from the citizenry. However, as a legacy of the relatively 
recent expansion of state intervention into the lives of individual citizens 
and their families, the roles of state institutions remain socially 
controversial. 
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The rapid expansion of state activities has taken the form of structural fusion 
as many of the functions of the family, the church, seigneurie, suzerainty 
and other intermediary institutions such as Stande and Parlements have 
been subsumed by the state. However, the state itself is a differentiated entity. 
Its intervention in arenas that in pre-modern times were the domain of non-
state institutions is rarely, if ever, complete and unproblematic. An essential 
feature of the state in modernity is that, if it is to retain social legitimation, it 
must be seen to be able to provide for the individual better than other 
institutions can. State services that are of poor quality call into question the 
propriety of state involvement, not just the standard of the service in 
question. 
Apart from feminist and other critical theory, such association of the macro-
structure with micro-situational analysis is not usually seen with regard to 
the family. On the contrary, dysfunctional families are more likely to be seen 
as aberrations that do not call into question the broader issue of familial 
involvement in care for the individual. In modernity, the main institution 
in competition with the state for socially legitimised intervention in the 
lives of individuals is the family. Both the family and the state provide for 
the individual in socially normative ways. 
Just as there are various theories of the family, so there are contrasting views 
on the modern state. As Boudon and Bourricaud (1989) suggest, defining the 
state is a difficult task. The complexity of the notion of the state is illustrated 
by the wide variety of comment on the subject. For example, some writers' 
analysis of the state is ideologically driven (for example, Meyer 1983; Mount 
1982; Baumgarth 1986; Miliband 1969) insofar as their work is noticeably 
influenced in part by their political views. Others such as Poggi (1978: 93, 135) 
and Evans et al. (1985: 347) personify the state to represent it as a social actor 
with a will of its own, a unity of purpose, and a high level of operational 
organisation or solidarity. As Poggi himself (1978: 67-71 and 161) shows, such 
metaphors of the state may have some merit in reference to monarchical 
absolutism in seventeenth-century France but are inappropriate in 
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association with the modern state that is a complex set of institutions often 
involved in simultaneous political cooperation and contest.. Finally, while 
Mintz (1989: 393) implies that states should be distinguished from courts, 
Poggi (1978: 117) redefines the law as the language of the state. 
The state has been described by some, such as Bottomore (1993: 2) and 
Barbalet (1988: 109), as the principal expression of organised political power in 
national societies, and as a network of power relations of distinct institutions 
to do with the law. That basic description serves in this thesis as the point of 
departure for an examination of the relationship between the state and other 
institutions including the market and the family. 
The argument that the state is an autonomous institution, accountable only 
to itself, is explained by Bottomore (1993: 7) and is asserted by Baumgarth 
(1986). The notion that the state is autonomous is put, for example, by Evans 
et al. (1985). The evidence they give for this autonomy is the capacity of state 
officials to exercise their powers of coercion and administration in the 
pursuance of goals that are at 'variance with dominant classes or any other 
social group' (Evans et al. 1985: 350-51). Furthermore, Andreski (1972: 178) 
points to the phenomenon of state bureaucracies that operate unto and for 
themselves. 
Others reject the notion of state autonomy and choose to argue that the state 
is the guardian of dominant economic interests but equally subject to control 
by those interests. This neo-Marxist perspective appears in the work of 
Miliband (1969), Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987: 254), Poggi (1978: 119) and Davis 
et al. (1992: 27). Marxists are not the only ones who have recognised the 
influence wielded by dominant groups over state bureaucracies, however. 
Matthews (1988), for example, shows in the Australian context that the 
influence on state officials by powerful groups such as commercial 
enterprises or other states is normally stronger than pressure from any other 
source. In addition, others including Bryson (1992) alert us to gender biases of 
state welfare provision. 
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So far this review of academic literature on the state has identified several 
perspectives that could be combined to form a negative image of the state as a 
powerful social actor that is either autonomously dominant or the 'guardian' 
or 'instrument' of dominant social elites. Such conceptualisations would 
predispose applicants to resent state official involvement in their private 
adoption projects. 
Definitions of the state as only the guardian or servant of market forces and 
other dominant groups fail to account for the state's contribution to the 
'welfare mix' described by Rose (1986). Conversely, many views of the 
'welfare state' (see Rose and Shiratori 1986) fail to acknowledge the non-
welfare operations of the state. The simultaneous dependence of the state on 
widespread social legitimacy as well as on economic and political support 
from elite groups has been recognised by Frankel (1978a and 1978b), Turner 
(1986), Barbalet (1988), Shiratori (1986), Baldock (1994) and Bottomore (1993) 
as the basis for the 'inconsistency' of state relations with society. The 
inconsistency appears in simultaneous state support for sustained social 
domination by elites, and for the desubordination of the citizenry. 
Further insight into the inconsistencies of the state in modernity is provided 
by those authors who identify the tension that emerges from the co-existence 
of forces of disunity with forces of unity. They all challenge the notion of the 
unitary state. For example, Poggi (1978: 94-5), Frankel (1978b), Turner (1988: 
97-8) and Pateman (1988) recognise the autonomous and potentially 
conflicting traditions of political action in the army, the police, the diplomatic 
service and the various ministeries, not to mention the unequal power 
relations among citizens in patristic, capitalist societies that deny the 
establishment of power-free, contractual relations. That is not to deny the 
existence of important forces of unity in the state. Poggi (1978: 93), for 
example, lists currency, territory, language and the legal system as elements 
of social life that draw people together by forging common bonds. 
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Further positive aspects of the nature of the modern state become evident in 
comparison and contrast with earlier systems of territory-wide rule. An 
historical overview reveals the legacies of previous embryonic forms of the 
state as well as identifying what the modern state is not. These positive 
aspects include disinterested objectivity, universalism, value consensus, 
social and political legitimation, the rule of law and the expansion of 
citizenship. 
The state in modernity has been compared and contrasted with pre-modem 
systems of rule including Gefolgschaft, seigneurie, feudal anarchy, 
suzerainty, the Standestaat and absolutism. The distinction between the 
ideal of disinterested objectivity and universalism in the modern state on 
the one hand, and the mutual loyalty and personal affection of Gefolgschaft 
on the other is made by Poggi (1978). However, others, such as Matthews 
(1988: 159), Herr and Woollard (1980: 125), observe that the political 
significance of personal relationships in the form of the 'old school tie', 
corporatism and clientelism persists. Moreover, the importance of personal 
relationships within and among elite groups was central to the debate 
between Miliband (1969) and Poulantzas (1969). 
In contrast to the coercion and economic dependency that underpinned the 
unequal relationships between vassals and their dependents in seigneurie, 
the modern state depends on broadly-based legitimacy. The expansion of 
citizenship and the introduction of universal adult suffrage are redefined as 
elements of desubordination that underpin value consensus between the 
state and society and that explain the state's dependence on social 
legitimation. That theoretical orientation appears, for example, in the work 
of Poggi (1978: 23), Turner (1986) and van Krieken (1992). 
The modern state has also been distinguished from feudalism. Feudal 
anarchy or the fragmentation of feudal authority was a function of the 
attenuated lines of legitimation that emerged from a system of multi-
directional political loyalty. Dessler (1986: 292), for example, observes that 
34 
feudal anarchy may have been avoided or lessened if all parties in power 
relationships had recognised the political legitimacy or authority of a 
sovereign state. The modern state is a nationally sovereign system of rule, 
universally recognised as such. 
Both the modern state and the Standestaat are characterised by the rule of law, 
that is, the recognition of prerogatives and obligations of office rather than of 
the person as was the case in feudalism. An important contrast between the 
Standestaat and the modern state, however, is the expansion of citizenship to 
include the majority of the population. Most people in the Standestaat were 
still merely objects of rule, not participants in the system of rule. Poggi (1978: 
51) records that their interests could be expressed only in so far as they 
coincided with those of one or another of the privileged Stande. The 
requirements for social legitimation in the modern state, therefore, are far 
greater than in the Standestaat. 
The rule of law in the modem state more closely approximates the rule of law 
developed in eighteenth-century Prussia. Previously, in France, under 
absolutism, the law was regarded as an instrument of the will of the 
territorial ruler (see Poggi 1978: 75). In Prussia the power of the state ideally 
was depersonalised and objectified and the state was clearly distinguished 
from the larger society. A further similarity between the Prussian model and 
the modern state is state involvement in the regulation and promotion of 
economic activity. Crook et al. (1992: 234) and Rose (1986: 28-9) argue that 
such involvement makes the modern state vulnerable to criticism and 
therefore to a legitimation crisis in times of economic recession. 
Another perspective on how the state may be seen by applicants and officers is 
gained from comparisons and contrasts of the notions of 'state' and 'nation'. 
The terms 'state' on the one hand and 'nation' or 'society' on the other are 
used interchangeably in colloquial usage. Some authors suggest that the 
distinction between the state and society has been virtually obliterated (see, 
for example, Poggi 1978: 131). The distinction has become blurred for others, 
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including Mintz (1989: 395). Still others argue that the distinction is dear. A 
strong proponent of that view is Frankel (1978a: 29). 
The distinction should be kept clear. Only the state is faced with the 
contradictory role of fostering capitalist accumulation while also maintaining 
social legitimacy. Furthermore, the state has. political sovereignty over a 
limited geographical and social territory. Political boundaries need not, and 
often do not, coincide with the emotional, cultural and linguistic associations 
that more accurately define the term 'nationality'. Thus it is that nationality, 
such as the Jewish and Palestinian, can continue to exist in diaspora after the 
demise of the state. 
The difference between the 'nation' and the 'state' is also illustrated by sub-
and supra-state assertions of cultural, linguistic and political affiliation. 
Examples of sub-state, or regional, nationalism are the emergence in 1977 of 
the Bureau of Unrepresented Nations and the 1978 foundation of the Free 
European Alliance. These expressions of regionalism in modern Europe 
emerged simultaneously with the development of the supra-state European 
Parliament to which some regionally national groups, as well as many state 
governments, send delegates. Evidence of stateless national affinities appears, 
for example, in the work of Daltrop (1990: 119), Bostock (1986) and Poulson 
(1986: 63). 
While it is clear that the 'state' and the 'nation' are not synonymous, it is 
nevertheless predictable that state officials will use the terms as if they were 
synonyms. Redefinition of the state as the nation is a tool used by state 
officials to manage anticipated or experienced legitimation problems. Since 
the definition is lost in colloquial usage and is blurred even by some 
academic commentators, we may expect that many applicants and officers in 
intercountry adoption will associate 'the state' directly with 'the nation'. For 
those who make that association, submission to the requirements of state 
officers takes on an element of patriotism or at least loyalty to the central 
unifying structures that are seen to hold the society together and thus to 
define the nation. 
'Society' is a broad concept that in common usage incorporates both the state 
and the market as well as the citizenry. A more refined and questionable 
definition of 'society' associates it with the citizenry, a group to which the 
state, and occasionally the market, is answerable. The state is an institution 
that is (re)created by the citizenry and that confers authority, that is, a unique 
level of social and political status, onto state officials. Following Janowitz's 
(1980) argument that the status of citizenship rests on an interaction of rights 
and obligations, the high status or extraordinary rights enjoyed by state 
officials implies a correspondingly high level of social obligation. In an age 
of postmodernity with its critique of hierarchy and of 'unitary notions of 
authority, or the bureaucratic imposition of values' (Turner 1990: 11; see also 
Easthope 1993), the distinction between the state and society will predictably 
become ever clearer as state bureaucracies face more and more legitimation 
crises. For those applicants and officers who see the distinction clearly, the 
added social status of the association of officers' views and demands with the 
status of the whole society will be lost. 
Institutional interdependence and strain 
On the basis of the foregoing analysis of institutional strain we can expect 
there to be a 'contest' over which institution, the 'family' or the 'state', has 
primacy in the welfare of the child. We can also expect substantial tension on 
the interactional level where state officials and their clients interact. Since 
this tension is often anticipated by both officials and their clients, and can be 
expected to develop further during interaction, their approach to interaction 
is characterised by institutionalised anxiety. 
The growth of the state has led to crises of legitimacy as its ability to provide 
for the individual better than other institutions comes under question from 
individuals and groups who are unhappy with state services and functions. 
Nevertheless, state institutions have demonstrated their ability to provide 
social services well enough to have general social legitimacy. Structural 
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isolation and mobility of the family underpin what Laslett (1988) calls 
'nuclear hardship'. Where kinship structures are diffuse, nuclear hardship 
leads to increased state dependence. The institutional relationship between 
the state and the family is marked by shared responsibility for, and 
competition for control over, the welfare of the individual. 
There are three points of departure in the analysis of the relationship 
between the family and the state: institutional interdependence, competition 
and value consensus. 
Institutional interdependence As a system for the reproduction of human 
labour, and as a unit of consumption, the nuclear family contributes 
efficiently to state economies. That view of the institutional relationship is 
evident, for example, in the work of Berger and Berger (1983: 92), Levine 
(1987), Young and Willmott (1973: 28-31), and Shiratori (1986). In addition, 
the family has been redefined by some, such as Geiger (1970), Tizard (1978: 
244), Rose (1986), Poulson (1986) and Gittins (1985: 138), as an efficient and 
cheap welfare system that relieves the state of an otherwise unmanageable 
social burden. Finally, feminists such as Cox (1990: 191), Cass (1990: 189), 
Stretton (1974: 39), Cass et al. (1994: 27-59) identify the unpaid domestic work 
of women as a key feature of the family's institutional contribution to state 
economy. 
The family is seen by some as politically important to the self-legitimation 
activities of state governments. For example, the deflection of responsibility 
for the welfare of individuals from the state to the family in times of 
economic contraction is noted by Cass (1990), Jordan (1985: 135), Baldock 
(1994) and Luke (1994). Others recognise political benefits of the family for the 
state in the atomisation of society into nuclear kinship units that are easy to 
regulate (see, for example, Dingwall et al. 1984). 
Finally, the family has been seen as a system that contributes to the stability 
of society by preparing individuals for normative acceptance of state 
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authority. That perspective begins with Parsons (1955: 32) and reappears, for 
example, in the work of Frankel (1987a: 17), Maze (1974), Gittins (1985: 138 - 
54) and Dingwall et al. (1974: 212). Parsons (1955) also redefines the family as a 
'personality system' that provides for the psychological well-being of most 
individual citizens. Institutionally, then, the family is of value to the state 
economically, socially and politically. 
The converse notion of state support for the family is explored more 
critically in the literature. For example, while some argue that state 
officialdom is normally reluctant to intervene in family life for the purposes 
of protecting the rights of women (see, for example, Jordan 1985: 130; Barker 
1978: 257), evidence of state intervention on the part of women is provided 
by others including Mintz (1989) and Gittins (1985: 135-6). 
The most familiar aspect of state support for the family is the provision of 
state welfare benefits. Some redefine state welfare as symbolic of state-
awarded citizenship status. Thus Marshall (1950: 24) and Rose (1986: 35) argue 
that universal citizenship rights are underpinned by state provision of 
welfare services. This theory redefines the notion of political equality among 
citizens as a function of state universalism, that is, state benefits are provided 
systemically and dispassionately to all who meet the eligibility criteria. The 
theory does not, however, account for the stigmatisation of welfare service 
recipients. Critical theory of state welfare is developed, for example, by Pinker 
(1973) and Roche (1987). 
Other contributors to discussion on state support for the family point to the 
structure of welfare benefits. Since the first Poor Laws in England, the relief 
of poverty was seen by state officials, in this case the Poor Law 
Commissioners, as first a kinship responsibility. Only when kinship systems 
have failed does welfare become a community and state responsibility. That 
structure provides for a powerful rationing mechanism for state social-
service delivery. It is discussed and illustrated, for example, in the work of 
Benet (1976: 124-5), Maluccio et al. (1980), Gittins (1985: 137), Gould (1988: 177- 
78) and Cass (1990: 169). 
Further, critical theory of state support for the family in terms of welfare 
provision points to systemic gender and class biases that, along with the work 
on stigmatisation, identifies the differences in citizenship rights as they are 
enjoyed by welfare recipients on the one hand and non-recipients on the 
other. For example, the poverty traps associated with long-term welfare 
receipt may deny claimants the right to pursue personal projects such as 
increasing household income or furthering formal education (see Jordan 
1985: 334). Awareness of the negative implications of state welfare underpins 
the use of the phrase 'ilfare instead of 'welfare' by some authors including 
Bryson (1992: 30) and Baldodc (1994). 
The interdependent relationship is also discussed in terms of social contract 
between the family and the state, with some authors focusing on 
interdependence and others emphasising the importance of powers of 
coercion. Petersen (1991), for example, suggests that the family engages in a 
social contract with the state, whereby the family is subject to state regulation 
in return for protection of the rights of the individual. In contrast, Poulson 
(1986: 71-2) explains that the contractual relationship between these two 
institutions is distinguished by the element of latent state coercion that 
precludes the option of familial withdrawal and therefore does not allow for 
contractual freedom. 
Competition The argument that state intervention in family life is 
characterised by compulsion, is based on the view that most people are 
dissatisfied with the ascent of achievement values over ascription, and with 
state limitation of parental authority. That dissatisfaction informs a critical 
analysis of state social-service delivery. 
7 
Theories that emphasise the compulsive role of the state focus on a 
fundamental element of dissatisfaction with the 'heartless' disinterested 
universalism of the state. That view, initiated by Weber (1990: 15), reappears, 
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for example, in the work of Turner (1990: 7) and Crouch and Manderson 
(1993: 67). Universalism can, of course, be defended with reference to 
objectivity and fairness. Those aspects of state operations are not points of 
tension. Rather, dissatisfaction arises over the perceived impersonality of 
state officialdom. Some authors note the 'emotive gap' between the state and 
the family, the implication being that since most individuals form their 
typifications of appropriate behaviour in the particularistic family setting, 
they perceive the disinterested approach of state officialdom as deviant and 
unacceptable. Authors who discuss the tension that emerges from the 
difference between state universalism and familial particularism include 
Gilding (1991: 8), Turner (1986: 79), Eastman (1989: 217), Kline and Overstreet 
(1972: 161). 
Authors, such as Game and Pringle (1983: 100), Petersen (1991: 93) and Mason 
(1989: 4) who emphasise state compulsion, redefine the state as an 
autonomous institution that continues to gain greater control over the 
family. The limitation of parental authority, that is illustrated, for example, 
by O'Driscoll (1986: 96-101) and Mintz (1989: 404), is redefined by some 
authors as an institutional competition over the regulation of individuals 
(see, for example, Peden and Glahe 1986). 
Awareness of coercive state powers and dissatisfaction with the ways in 
which those powers are exercised thus underpin a view of the institutional 
relationship between the family and the state that emphasises the state's 
compulsive role. From that perspective some authors, including Meyer 
(1983), Lasch (cited in Gittins (1985: 134), Mount (1982), Yeatman (1990), 
Berger (1986), Murphy (1977), Brous, Green and Jaggs (1980: 36), Lewis et al. 
(1977), Charles and Kerr (1986) develop a critical view of state 'intervention'. 
Value consensus In contrast, some authors point to the centrality of value 
consensus and identify shared values, rather than the coercive powers of the 
state, as the foundation of social stability. Four aspects of value consensus in 
this context have been identified. First, the family and the state are redefined 
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as institutions that share responsibility for the welfare of the child (see, for 
example, Le Sueur 1990: 26; Harper 1992: 13 and 1990: 11). Next, given the 
high levels of institutional value consensus, the shared responsibility leads 
to tension only in isolated cases. That observation appears, for example, in 
van Krieken's (1992) critical analysis of social control theory, and is implied 
by Laslett's (1973: 249) demonstration of the durability of the nuclear family 
structure. 
Third, in response to those who emphasise the importance of state 
compulsion and point to instances of inappropriate and incompetent state 
regulation of the family, much evidence is provided to illustrate the dangers 
of deregulation. The major work on the implications for children of 
deregulation or the absence of state regulation of family life was produced by 
de Mause (1974). Others who observe that the privacy of the family setting 
places many children at risk include van Krieken (1992: 143-4), Berger and 
Berger (1976: 110), Donzelot (1979), Durran (1993), and Tissier (1993). The 
deregulation of adoption in the form of baby-farming appears in dramatised 
form in Scott's (1990) recent novel. 
Finally, in recognition of the dangers of deregulation for the individual, 
some authors redefine the expansion of state influence over the family in 
terms of state support rather than of state control, coercion or compulsion. 
For example, Mintz (1989), Donzelot (1979), van Krieken (1992), Peterson 
(1993), Taylor (1987), Twose (1987), and Dingwall et al. (1984) are aware of the 
poor standards of much state regulation, but call for improved state services, 
not for deregulation. 
Conclusion 
The distinguishing features in the development of Western societies can be 
broadly classified in terms of cultural, economic, social and political 
modernisation. Cultural modernisation denotes advanced processes of 
secularisation and nationalist (rather than feudal, social-class or parochial) 
hegemony. Economic modernisation involves increased levels of 
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commodification, mechanisation and automation (with attendant 
implications for employment and the natural environment), the 
commercial dominance of capitalist enterprises, some of which are 
multinational firms, and the increasing specialisation or division of labour. 
Social modernisation is characterised by urbanisation, the decline of 
traditional forms of authority (such as the family, the church and 
community organisations), the attendant rise in socio-legal status of the 
individual, and expanding formal education systems that produce near-
universal literacy. Political modernisation is indicated by increasing 
participation in, and the emergence of institutional mechanisms for, the 
conduct of organised democratic processes. Such mechanisms include the 
parliament, political parties, franchise and secret ballots (Lerner 1958). 
Equally important to the definition of political modernisation is the growth 
of state bureaucracies, that is, the executive arm of government. Increased 
structural differentiation has been recognised in state involvement in what 
were previously regarded as exclusively familial matters. 
The kinship and state systems increasingly enter into competition over 
control of familial matters. Both institutions are associated with socially 
legitimate claims to the care and control of children, one based on tradition, 
another on rational principles. Normally, those claims are in harmony with 
each other and with socially accepted values. Disputes may, however, arise 
when individuals and groups argue that certain decisions with regard to the 
welfare of children properly require attention at only the familial or only the 
state level of authority. Disputes are normally between adults and are 
essentially political in nature. Proponents of the notion of deregulation of 
family life, that is, of state withdrawal from family matters, normally 
contend that decision-making on family matters should remain exclusively 
with parents (if sometimes also in negotiation with adult children). 
Conversely, proponents of state supervision of, and intervention in, family 
life may argue that the disinterested universalism represented by state 
authorities confers legitimacy on state-level involvement in family matters. 
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The two views appear as a function of the differentiation and expansion of 
the activities of the state in modernity and of the emergence of the 
individual child as a social entity, where the child has achieved citizenship 
status. Furthermore, the appearance of the debate is also a function of the 
weakened social power of the extended family and the community network. 
In short, the atomisation of society that has reduced the number of effective 
intermediate structures between the individual and the state, has magnified 
both state- and family-level attention on the individual. 
The conceptual framework outlined in this chapter alerts us to six points of 
tension that appear as predictable characteristics of the relationship between 
the family and the state. The first of these is the anxiety that is central to the 
relationship and that appears as a result of the other five points of tension, 
namely, disagreement on the motivations of participating parties, 
implications of service rationing, contested parenting roles, opposing 
inferences drawn from shared values or principles and, finally, the 
management of dissatisfaction. 
As the modern state and family are mutually reliant, it is to be expected that 
state officials and individual citizens, who are almost without exception all 
members of families, will interact amicably and efficiently. At the very least, 
it is to be expected that high levels of congruence will underpin socially 
legitimised and institutionally interdependent typifications of the state and 
the family. It is also predictable, however, that the universalistic orientation 
of state officials and the particularistic orientation of clients will provide for 
different agendas that lead to a relationship marked by tension. Even on a 
highly abstract level of analysis, therefore, it would be surprising if the status-
derived or ex-officio views of appropriate forms of interaction did not give 
rise to episodic conflict. The conceptual framework outlined in this chapter, 
therefore, allows us sociologically to account for the inconsistencies that 
characterise the relationship between families and state officials in modernity 
and to redefine that relationship in terms of cooperation as well as contest. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE MEDIA AND ADOPTION SUPPORT GROUPS 
Introduction 
The strain between the family and the modern state is reflected in the tension 
affecting the relationship between applicants and officers in intercountry 
adoption in Tasmania. This tension can be accounted for in part by the 
existence of socially contested views on the appropriate rights and 
responsibilities that people associate with the macro-institutions of the 
family and the state. 
The intermediate institutions of the mass media and adoption support 
groups also contribute to applicants' and officers' creation of meaning' in 
ways that generate tension in the relationship and, among individuals, 
institutionalise patterns of anxiety. This chapter reviews the literature 
produced by journalists, the news media, and adoption support groups in 
order to assess the direction, nature and strength of the influence of the 
media and support groups on the motivations, expectations, emotions and 
conceptualisations of applicants and officers. Since the issues raised by the 
media and the support groups are discussed also in official reports, we might 
expect those issues to influence the thinking of applicants and officers. 
Media Portrayals 
The media produce emotive material about frustrated prospective adoptive 
parents and poor children on the one hand and about scandals of baby-buying 
on the other. That material provides 'ammunition' for applicants and 
officers in their respective struggles for control and dominance. The media 
present a wide range of issues with regard to intercountry adoption services. 
The issues discussed here could be grouped differently but do reveal the three 
main topics of interest to journalists. The quality of intercountry adoption 
services, the need for state regulation and supervision, and ethical arguments 
for and against intercountry adoption allow journalists flexibility in the 
production of topical articles and programs from various perspectives. For 
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example, emotive expression of outrage at baby trafficking can be expected to 
attract public attention as strongly as do sentimental evocations of 
compassion for desperate children kept apart from frustrated applicants by 
heartless bureaucrats. 
Intercountry adoption makes good copy for the press. Given that the nuclear 
family is an institution that is socially attributed in modernity with 
responsibility for the care of children, it is predictable that headlines and 
emotionally charged stories that imply that the authority of the family is 
being usurped by the state will attract public interest and attention. Such 
stories can be expected to contribute to increased sales of newspapers that 
often do not juxtapose opposing views. Less colourful responses from state 
officials who in any case are constrained by considerations of client 
confidentiality, not to mention regulatory and bureaucratic protocol, are 
usually buried in later editions or relegated to 'Letters to the Editor'. Such 
responses do not correspond with the journalist's aim of gaining public 
attention. 
Intercountry adoption stories about unfortunate children and dissatisfied 
applicants are of value to the journalist for two reasons. They are human-
interest tales and they deal thematically, although often implicitly, with one 
of the most fundamental points of contention regarding modern Western 
social arrangements, namely, the constant structural redistribution, between 
the family and the state, of authority and responsibility for the welfare of the 
child. Clearly, significant change in those arrangements would have major 
social implications. 
In order to attract public attention, some journalists write about intercountry 
adoption policy considerations and developments. Others publicise 
substantial negative criticism of perceived and alleged mismanagement in 
the area. Of the fifty articles that appeared in the period during which this 
research was carried out, twenty-three convey overt and/or implied criticism 
of intercountry adoption services. Due to the poetic (some would say 
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'sensationalist') language used to criticise intercountry adoption services and 
the substantiation of those assertions, media comment on intercountry 
adoption evokes emotional responses from applicants and officers. 
Since applicants see children in desperate circumstances, they approach the 
Intercountry Adoption Service with a sense of urgency. They are motivated 
to adopt not only for the sake of the child, but also to manage their own 
discomfort at seeing children in distress. Conversely, emotional responses 
from officers are aroused by media comment on the dangers of unregulated 
adoption. Images of wealthy Westerners standing, cash in hand, on the 
streets of (say) Bucharest predictably reinforce officers' sense of caution and 
commitment to the consolidation of state regulation of intercountry 
adoption processes. Media comment thus contributes to the tension in the 
relationship by presenting graphic images and anecdotes of the undesirable 
consequences of the commodification of the child (in unregulated adoption) 
on the one hand, and of the bureaucratisation of the child (in official 
processes) on the other. 
This review of fifty recent articles and several electronic media programs on 
intercountry adoption found that the major topics of interest to journalists 
were the ethics of intercountry adoption, the quality of intercountry adoption 
services and, finally, state regulation and supervision. 
Intercountry adoption: ethical considerations Media comment on the ethics 
of intercountry adoption includes several points of contention such as the 
number of children available for intercountry adoption, the temporary 
closure to new clients of the Tasmanian service and the significance of 
ethnicity, racial and cultural identity and national pride. In contrast, the 
living conditions in third-world orphanages appear as a major 
uncontroversial feature of the discussion on the ethics of intercountry 
adoption. 
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The most emotionally charged and best-known form of media comment on 
intercountry adoption is the portrayal of living conditions for children in 
overseas orphanages. For example, one parent, who had just returned from a 
trip to Romania, spoke of two kinds of orphanages. A kind of triage 
operation, as defined by Kirby (1986), sends comparatively healthy children to 
'educational' orphanages, the others to 'throw-away' orphanages (Fyfe 1991a). 
The 2.5 year-old child adopted in that case had allegedly '...spent most of her 
life confined to a cot' (Fyfe 1991c) and could, as a result, not walk properly. 
Nevertheless, media reports indicate that intercountry adoption remains a 
controversial topic. For example, Australia's ratification of the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child is criticised by Opposition 
Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Senator Hill (Examiner 19 December 1990). In 
contradiction, Armstrong M.H.A. (Examiner 22 November 1990), Rollings (3 
May 1990), Vice-President Adoptive Parents Association, and Duffy and Orr 
(30 April 1990), Principal Officer Australians Aiding Children, support the 
ratification and cite it in their opposition to existing and proposed restrictions 
to intercountry adoption services in Australia. 
A major point of contention in the debate on the propriety of intercountry 
adoption is the number of children available. Media reports frequently assert 
that the number of children who could benefit from transnational placement 
is enormous. Three articles were found that publish Tasmanian Community 
Services Minister Jackson's assertion that there are only few children 
available overseas for adoption. In other articles, the Minister's claim is 
disputed by three applicants and a Tasmanian Member of Parliament. The 
debate seems to hinge on the various points of departure. For some 
journalists, such as Hedgcock (1991) and Maxwell et. al. (1991: 41), it is enough 
to cite figures of tens of thousands of children in Third World orphanages. 
From a bureaucratic perspective, some academics including Harper (1985b: 4) 
and Goriawalla (1982: 57) calculate the number available in terms of the 
capacity of official processes rather than in terms of the raw number of 
institutionalised children in need. 
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Criticism of the Western media for their emotional portrayals that feed the 
international demand for adoptive children and therefore subvert the 
development of appropriate child care in Asia is expressed by Goriawalla 
(1982: 56). From another perspective, the Western media are criticised by 
Hoksbergen for their simplistic portrayals of intercountry adoption that 
underpin the naive conceptual frameworks in the minds of some 
prospective intercountry adoptive parents. Intercountry adoption is seen by 
some academics not only as a subordinate option to domestic placement, but 
also as a potentially subversive activity that inverts the structure of 
permanency planning. Transnational adoption is seen as a mechanism for 
the exploitation of economic, and therefore political, inequalities that enable 
wealthy adopters to contribute to the sustained implementation of placement 
options that militate against the viability of familial cohesiveness among the 
poor. That view is put by Goriawalla (1982) and Ngabonziza (1988: 38). 
While only one article was found that merely informs the public of the 
'temporary closure' of Tasmania's intercountry adoption register, six articles 
present that information in the context of focusing on community 
opposition to the closure. 
Some articles report on the views of relinquishing-country politicians who 
regard intercountry adoption services as a threat to their national or cultural 
pride. Moreover, Tasmanian Community Services Minister Jackson said in 
an interview broadcast on ABC Radio on 19 March 1991 that, '...there is a lot 
of pressure, an increasing pressure, in many, many countries for them not to 
adopt their children overseas'. A contradictory view is put by Cohen (1990) 
who redefines concerns about intercountry adoptive children losing their 
cultural and national identity as ideological inhumanity based on sensitivity 
to the charge that some governments are incapable of providing care for their 
own children. 
The mass media report also on views from officialdom that mixed-race 
adoption should be banned. In the material reviewed here, that view is 
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opposed by several Opposition parliamentarians, several support-group 
representatives and one journalist. 
The quality of intercountry adoption services The quality of intercountry 
adoption services is regarded as topical and is approached from various 
angles, including Australia's proactive adoptions policy, waiting periods, the 
relationship between officers and applicants, bureaucratic procedures and 
financial costs. 
Several articles report on the implementation of Australia's policy to initiate 
discussions with other countries regarding adoption programs. Most warn 
that the new policy will not release a 'flood' of overseas babies for adoption 
in Australia, but Thomas (1991) hopes that the new policy will accelerate the 
intercountry adoption process. The negative connotations of the flood 
metaphor convey the official view that a rapid increase in the number of 
intercountry adoptive children placed in Australia would be undesirable. Use 
of the metaphor raises the question of who or what might be inundated. 
Perhaps the intercountry adoption services themselves are at risk. 
Waiting periods are usually redefined as delays. The public is informed that 
prior to the 25 March 1991 agreement by Australia's welfare ministers on the 
new, proactive intercountry adoption policy, clients of intercountry adoption 
services often had to wait up to seven years. Warnings, such as 
Mickelburough's (1990) about the persistence of lengthy waiting periods, may 
therefore still apply. The media report also on prospective adoptive parents 
who try to circumvent official procedures and delays. Milburn (1991a,b,c), for 
example, explains the domicile clause in Australian legislation, that requires 
prospective residential adopters to have been resident in the child's country 
of origin at least twelve months prior to adoption of a child in that country. 
The relationship between officers and their clients is a major aspect of media 
comment on the quality of intercountry adoption services in Australia. 
Unreserved sympathy for clients of intercountry adoption services is 
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regarded as good copy by many journalists. Emotive headlines are common, 
with some journalists choosing metaphors such as 'nightmare', 'victim', 
'heartbreak' and 'closed doors' to imply compassion. Furthermore, 
intercountry adoption service agencies within governmental Community 
Services departments are often the target of criticism for alleged 
incompetence, insensitivity and immorality. In order to sustain the human-
interest element, criticism of bureaucrats is usually couched in discussions of 
individual case studies. Again, emotive language is used, for example, 
Bailey's (1988) 'baby stealing', 'blunder' and a bureaucratic 'faceless panel 
playing God'. 
Perceived excessive levels of attention to formal procedures by bureaucrats 
attracts much criticism in the press. While there is some criticism of overseas 
red tape, most of the criticism found in this regard is aimed at Australian 
intercountry adoption service officials. Emotive language is often used to 
express dismay and dissatisfaction with official protocols. Conversely, 
Hopgood, Chairman of the Council of Social Welfare Ministers, defends the 
need for adoption protocols to prevent child trafficking (Thomas 26 March 
1991). Redefinition of child trafficking as an ironic function of the measures 
officialdom take to prevent it appeared on the Sixty Minutes program 
broadcast in Tasmania on Southern Cross Television on 28 April, 1991. 
Finally, three different perspectives on the financial costs involved in 
intercountry adoption were found. First, various figures are published as 
indications of the costs to clients, namely $5,000, $8,000, $12,000 and $18,000 
per child. Costs associated with the adoption of children from South America 
are reported as higher than normal. Second, one parent argues that children 
who come to live in Australia through intercountry adoption services '...cost 
the government nothing...' (Eaves 3 January 1991). Third, the court custody 
battle following a disrupted placement in Victoria is estimated to have '...cost 
taxpayers more than $250,000' (Grimmer and Chipperfield 1989). 
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Need for state regulation and supervision The third topic identified in this 
review of the media is the need for state regulation and supervision of 
intercountry adoption. This theme appears less frequently than the first 
discussed here, and features two aspects, redefinition of intercountry 
adoption service as a service for the child, and attendant arguments for 
proper protocols to prevent child trafficking. Press reports recognise the 
legitimacy of both family and state institutional intervention on behalf of 
the child. Nevertheless, respect for bureaucratic procedures is not universal. 
Some articles report on isolated and topical stories about applicant awareness 
of and support for legal loopholes. 
Media and tension Discussion of intercountry adoption services in the media 
is charged on the one hand with a sense of urgency by the media portrayal of 
poor living conditions in overseas orphanages, and on the other with a sense 
of caution informed by widespread revulsion at the notion of child 
trafficking. Some journalists seek to exploit the emotional element in 
intercountry adoption for commercial or professional gain. Paradoxically, 
their agenda is served by evocation from opposite directions of the intended 
audience's emotional response. While some articles seek to evoke outrage at 
state usurpation of the rights of individuals, others seek to evoke outrage at 
individuals who disregard the appropriate authority of the state. 
Juxtaposition of these contradictory views in the media does not constitute 
an analysis of intercountry adoption, but does provide graphic evidence of 
the undesirable consequences of inefficient adoption services on the one 
hand, and of unregulated intercountry adoption on the other. Thus media 
contributions to public debate on intercountry adoption can be selectively 
cited by applicants and officers to substantiate their competing assertions on 
how applications should be processed. 
Support Group Portrayal of Australian Intercountry Adoption Services 
A distinction needs to be drawn between parental 'support groups' such as 
Accepting Children Everywhere, that provide information and support for 
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adoptive parents in receiving countries, and 'non-government 
organisations' such as the Intercountry Adoption Resource Network, that 
have direct contact with government officials and managers of orphanages in 
relinquishing countries. Non-government organisations facilitate the process 
once the applicants' file has reached the relinquishing country. On request, 
the organisations can advise state adoption service managers of children who 
have become available for placement. As the work of these two kinds of 
special interest groups often overlaps (for example, they both act as political 
pressure groups), the following discussion refers to both kinds of 
organisation as 'support groups'. 
The major topics in support group newsletters are the role of support groups 
and criticism of state agencies, of service rationing and of the quality of 
intercountry adoption services. 
Not all groups are represented in the literature reviewed here and, as with 
any organisation, the documents that are considered should not be regarded 
as an accurate reflection of the views and wishes of all group members. The 
purpose of the discussion is not to conduct an exhaustive examination of 
parental support group literature, but to gain an indication of what those 
groups regard as the key issues in intercountry adoption. 
The role of support groups Support groups defend intercountry adoption 
and participation by the groups in the adoption process. The groups are 
redefined as valuable in themselves and for the systemic contributions they 
can make in cooperation with state agencies. 
Intercountry adoption is defended, for example, in the mission statement of 
the Australian Society for Intercountry Aid (Children), where it is supported 
as a corollary to the principle that every child has a right to a family. It is 
frequently asserted that many children are in need of intercountry adoption. 
Intercotmtry adoption is redefined as a conduit to overseas aid, a catalyst for 
the development of indigenous social services abroad, and a manifestation of 
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multiculturalism. Nason (1990), Calder et al. (1988) and Kirton (1990) express 
pride in group contribution to the preparation of applicants for adoptive 
parenting. The 'scandal-free' reputation of intercountry adoption in 
Australia is celebrated, despite Cook's (1989) evidence of Australian 
connivance at baby-farming. The literature also contains information on 
group aid and sponsorship programs, and explicit support for state 
regulation. 
Criticism of state agencies Despite the desire to cooperate with government, 
group members frequently use their newsletters to express criticism of state 
agencies. Relationship tension is evident in applicant frustration at 
administrative delays, and complaints about officials' alleged unwillingness 
to initiate the development of new programs. Applicants' anxiety over 
jeopardising their chances of adopting a child, by criticising the state service is 
expressed along with redefinition of Australia as a restrictive and 
uncooperative adoption system. Australian processes are seen as offensive to 
relinquishing countries who therefore prefer to send their children to other 
receiving countries. In Tasmania, criticism of the state service focuses on the 
temporary closure of the applicant list, the alleged 'low' administrative skills 
of officers, the agency's 'refusal' to cooperate procedurally with non-
government agencies, the inconsistency and vagueness of service 
information, and the monopolisation of decision-making authority. 
State rationing of intercountry adoption services is opposed. Services have 
been flexible and imaginative in their choice of rationing strategies. For 
example, while Boss and Edwards (1992: 12) observe that in New South 
Wales and Queensland non-fecundity is an eligibility criterion for applicants, 
ASIAC's (1991: 2) Winter newsletter observes conversely that childless 
couples are not accepted for assessment in Victoria. While there is criticism 
in support group literature of the rationing of services by state officialdom, 
Calder et al. (1988: 3) provide evidence of rationing mechanisms used by 
ASIAC. 
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In summary, the support group literature mounts a defence of intercountry 
adoption that includes the observations that the child's right to a family 
should take priority over considerations of race, culture or ethnicity, and that 
where no suitable family can be found in the child's country of origin, 
intercountry adoption is preferable to long-term in-country 
institutionalisation. 
Published Reports on Intercourttry Adoption 
Intercountry adoption has been the subject of several official investigations. 
The subsequent reports, published since 1983, show that the issues raised by 
support groups and the media become matters for official concern. Analysis 
of the content of these reports shows that they focus on the issues of state 
regulation and supervision, service rationing, the quality of Australian 
intercountry adoption services, the relationship between officers and 
applicants and the role of support groups. 
State regulation and supervision State regulation and supervision of 
intercountry adoption are supported in all the reports reviewed here (Bowers 
1984; Cox 1986; Inter-Departmental Committee 1986; Willee 1986; Fogarty et 
al. 1989; Newby et al. 1991 and Bayes 1993). Bowers conducted a review of 
intercountry adoption services in New South Wales. Cox and Fogarty et al. 
conducted reviews of the Victorian intercountry adoption service. Willee, as 
the Tasmanian Ombudsman, investigated complaints against the 
Intercountry Adoption Service from eleven applicants. Newby chaired a 
review into the Western Australian Intercountry Adoption Service. The 
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Tasmanian Inter-Departmental Committee and Bayes reviewed the 
Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service. 
The discussion on state regulation and supervision distinguishes between 
guardianship and residential adoptions. Guardianship adoptions allow for 
prospective adoptive p,arents to apply with their State or Territory 
intercountry adoption service for approval-to-adopt, to have their 
applications processed and, if successful, to travel to the sending country in 
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order to accompany the allocated child back to Australia. Once in Australia, 
the adoptive child remains under the legal guardianship of the Director of 
Community Services for a period of twelve months to allow for government 
supervision of the child's welfare. Then, supported by official approval, the 
adoptive parents may apply for an Adoption Order (Tasmanian Adoption Act 
1988: Sections 46-7; see also Willee 1986: 6). 
Residential adoptions, that allow adoptive parents to return to Australia with 
the child they have adopted while residing overseas, are subject to state 
regulation and supervision by means of the 'domicile clause'. The Final 
Report A New Approach to Adoption, prepared by the Adoption Legislative 
Review Committee of Western Australia, defines the 'domicile clause' as: 
'...a minimum period of twelve months' genuine residence in the 
country concerned, as a condition for the recognition in Australia of 
an Adoption Order obtained overseas' (Newby et al. 1991: 125; see also 
Inter-Departmental Committee 1986: 154). 
Fogarty et al. (1989: 60) observe that where the clause does not apply, some 
prospective adoptive parents have managed to circumvent state regulatory 
procedures by short-term residence in the relinquishing country. 
State regulation is also supported as the only social arrangement that ensures 
the best interests of the child (Inter-Departmental Committee 1986: 148-9; Cox 
1986: 5-6), and the proper educational preparation of applicants (Inter-
Departmental Committee: 148-9; Newby et al. 1991: 132). In addition, state 
regulation is redefined as symbolic of protection of the health of Australians 
from contagious diseases, respect for the rights of relinquishing countries and 
parents, (Inter-Departmental Committee 1986: 148-9), and respect for the 
priorities of permanency planning (Newby et al. 1991: 130). 
Rationing of the service Rationing can be achieved in several ways. The 
option of restricting intercountry adoption to intra-ethnic placement is 
discussed by Cox (1986: 13) and Newby et al. (1991: 133). That restrictive 
perspective on intercountry adoption is traced back to 1954 in the United 
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States setting by Simon and Alstein (1987: 12). Other forms of rationing 
include the temporary closure of the Tasmanian intercountry adoption 
registration list discussed in the Ombudsman's report (Willee 1986: 6). In 
addition, Willee (1986: 7-8) and Fogarty et al. (1989: 6) focus on the 
underfunding and understaffing of Tasmanian and Victorian Intercountry 
Adoption Services. Furthermore, Fogarty et al. (1989: 6) note intercountry 
adoption service marginalisation within the larger Department of 
Community Services in Victoria. Finally, Bayes (1993: 27-8) supports 
Tasmanian restrictive applicant-eligibility criteria with regard to upper age 
limits, pregnancy and treatment for infertility. 
The quality of Australian intercountry adoption services In the reports of 
investigations into both national and state-based services and policies several 
observations are consistently made on the quality of Australian intercountry 
adoption services. They concern the continued lack of uniformity among 
Australian services despite consensus on matters of principle. This lack of 
uniformity, poor communication, and the poor conditions of employment of 
state officials working in this part of the state service are seen by some as the 
major defining characteristics of intercountry adoption services in Australia 
(Cox 1986: 28; Newby et al. 1991: 124 and Fogarty et al. 1989: 49). 
The quality of the services is seen to be compromised by poor 
communication. Communication inefficiencies among the departments of 
Foreign Affairs, Immigration and the Victorian Intercountry Adoption 
Service, and poor communication from the Victorian Intercountry Adoption 
Service to its clients are exposed by Fogarty et al. (1989: 63-72). Poor 
communication from the New South Wales adoption agency to its clients is 
noted by Bowers (1984: 19). 
Other complaints about the quality of the services include discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of employment of 'sessional' or contract 
workers, who increase service flexibility but are difficult to supervise (Fogarty 
et al. 1989: 68-9) and Bayes' (1993: 40-41) assertion without supportive 
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argument that the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service would 
improve with privatisation. She makes that assertion without reflection on 
past privatisation problems in Victoria that Cox (1986) discusses, or on the 
nature of an intercountry adoption service run by Tasmania's only current 
private adoption agency, Centacare. Centacare, as a Roman Catholic 
institution, may be influenced by the Roman Catholic Discussion Paper on 
Intercountry Adoption (1991: 17) that questioned the propriety of 
intercountry adoption as a form of permanent placement for socially isolated 
children. 
The relationship between officers and applicants State regulation, service 
rationing and the quality of intercountry adoption services have bearing on 
the nature of the relationship between officers and applicants. This review of 
the reports identifies points of tension as well as shared values. Points of 
tension include official demonisation of applicant motivation, social-worker 
opposition to or ideological reservations about intercountry adoption, and 
social-worker emphasis on transracial adjustment problems. Conversely, 
from the perspective of applicants, points of tensions include support-group 
resentment of governmental involvement, applicant frustration with 
administrative delays, applicant attempts to circumvent state regulation and 
supervision, applicant perceptions of officers who 'act like God', and officer 
insensitivity. For these reasons, Willee (1986), Fogarty et al. (1989: 74-86) and 
Bayes (1993: 2) all describe the relationship between applicants and officers as 
'strained' or 'uneasy'. 
The uneasy relationship predictably leads not only to circumvention, but also 
to opposing views on applicant right of appeal. The Inter-Departmental 
Committee and Bayes oppose applicant appeal rights. The Inter-Departmental 
Committee (1986: 158-9) asserts baldly that they are not in the best interests of 
the child. Bayes (1993: 20) argues incorrectly that appeal rights have not 
usually been provided in Australia. In contrast, Mr. Justice Fogarty et al. 
(1989: 61) recommend that applicants• be given the right to appeal to the 
Family Court of Australia. 
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The role of support groups While the uneasy nature of the relationship is 
reflected in the reports, there is also evidence of compliance and cooperation. 
Cox (1986: 45-7), Fogarty et al. (1989: 73) and Bayes (1993: 38, 162) call for the 
recognition of support-group expertise. Evidence of increased levels of 
applicant compliance with state intercountry adoption service requirements, 
and of state reliance on parent groups to facilitate the process once the 
application file has left Australia, is supplied by Cox (1986: 47) and Bowers 
(1984: 19). It seems that some of the key figures in support groups assume the 
role of the 'boss'. Merton (1968: 126-130) defines the role of the pragmatic, 
street-wise boss or precinct captain as one that informally fills the 
administrative gap created by 'structural context' or constraint. 
The reports reviewed here describe aspects of intercountry adoption services 
in Australia. They do not attempt to explore the social structures that 
underpin many of the entrenched attitudes and behaviours. Failure to 
address the social foundations of the elements of tension in the relationship 
between officers and clients seems to imply that the tension can be 
understood as a matter of personality clash. The reports describe the problem 
and construct alternative models of service delivery and the client-role. In 
contrast to that approach, this thesis is designed to contribute to a better 
understanding of the social arrangements that underpin the institutionalised 
tension in the relationship. 
Conclusion 
This review of mass media and support-group contributions to public debate 
on intercountry adoption has identified several sources of tension in the 
relationship between applicants and officers. At the same time, the existence 
of shared values has been recognised. Those values explain how the 
relationship survives the strain. For example, support groups do not call for 
the deregulation of intercountry adoption in Australia. This review shows 
that criticism of the quality of intercountry adoption services should not be 
confused with ideological opposition to state regulation and supervision. 
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There is a debate on how state involvement in intercountry adoption should 
be arranged, not on whether there should be any state involvement at all. On 
the basis of this brief review it is clear that legitimation of state involvement 
as an expression of state responsibility for the child is normative. 
The role of support groups remains a matter for contention. It is widely 
discussed in support group literature, official reports and academic papers. 
The social legitimation of support group involvement, including political 
lobbying, faces challenge on three grounds. Support groups are unofficial and 
therefore unaccountable. Moreover, since support-group experience and 
expertise often exceed that of state officials, the groups form an institutional 
threat to the authority of state services. Finally, the groups are often critical of 
state intercountry adoption services. On a more abstract level of analysis, 
state official disapproval of support groups can be understood in terms of 
institutional rivalry, that is, an unwillingness on the part of some officials to 
acknowledge ex-officio that responsibility for the welfare of children in 
modernity is institutionally ascribed not only to the state but also to the 
family. Individual officers may, as private citizens, recognise the social 
legitimacy of the family in this context, without realising the inconsistency of 
their views. Parsons explains: 
'...the concrete individual actor never acts in one role only, but in a 
plurality of roles and situations, with complex possibilities of variation 
in the expectations and tensions to which they subject the actor' (1951: 
251). 
In media comment there is material that can be used to show the dangers for 
children of inefficient bureaucratic processes and of unregulated adoption. 
Applicants' notions of 'bureaucrats without spirit' is predictably informed by 
their access to emotional reports in the media and is subsequently 
consolidated by the criticism of state agencies published in support groups 
literature. Conversely, officers' conceptualisations of determined prospective 
adoptive parents, for whom the broader implications of the commodification 
of the child have been obscured by single-minded concentration on 
particularistic projects, is reinforced by media portrayals of baby-trafficking. 
In the chapters that follow, the interaction of state officials and applicants in 
the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service is explored as an illustration 
of the effect of structural arrangements on the life-world, socio-political 
consciousness, expectations, attitudes and behaviour of individuals. The 
analysis examines the extent to which dissatisfaction and the management 
thereof in the Intercountry Adoption Service should be seen as a result of 
institutional arrangements rather than as a consequence of the accidental 
meeting of mutually hostile personalities. Informed by abstract analysis, and 
examined empirically, are several points of tension, that despite high levels 
of congruence, to many individuals constitute the salient features of 
intercountry adoption services, even though they do not fit snugly into their 
ideal image of the intercountry adoption process. The elements of tension are 
analysed in light of data gathered in a series of interviews on the structure of 
motivations, rationing of the IntercountryAdoption Service in Tasmania, 
the management of anxiety, the compartmentalisation of parenting roles, 
shared values, and the management of dissatisfaction. 
Chapter Four tells how the research was done. Chapter Five focuses on 
various issues related to the management of anxiety for the light they will 
shine on the tensions felt by applicants and officers. These issues include 
implications of a politically unequal relationship, implications of the 
unintended consequences of error, professionalisation, deprofessionalisation, 
and bureaucratisation. 
Chapter Six, explores the motivations of the participating parties in order to 
identify the seriousness with which they approach intercountry adoption. 
The chapter examines universalistic and particularistic orientations, family 
representation in modernity, motivation for parenthood, parental goals, sex-
typing, childlessness, motivation for adoptive parenthood, adoptive bonding, 




Chapter Seven focuses on the notion of rationing. Deterrent functions of 
various rationing mechanisms are analysed before turning to the 
implications of rationing for intercountry adoption service processes. 
Chapter Eight analyses the contest over parenting roles with reference to 
notions of exclusive and shared parenting, time tracks, stigmatisation of 
clients and officers, and prognostication. 
Chapter Nine identifies the shared values and 'empathy' between applicants 
and officers and thus debunks descriptions of the relationship as 
'adversative' or 'hostile'. The relationship is shown to be tense but not 
antagonistic. Empirical data juxtapose evidence of shared values with 
evidence of tension. In some cases, tension is seen to emerge from shared 
moral principles that are variously interpreted. 
Chapter Ten explores the elements of dissatisfaction identified by officials and 
clients in the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service. Structurally-
derived sources of dissatisfaction are distinguished from problems arising 
from psychological aspects of official roles and individual idiosyncrasies. The 
study identifies the institutional nature of much dissatisfaction, thereby 
providing participants in intercountry adoption with a conceptual 
framework that recognises the structural constraints to behaviour, while 
remaining alert to the ways in which behaviour is interpreted and 





This thesis seeks to understand why tension characterises the relationship 
between applicants for intercountry adoption and departmental officers. The 
strains that emerge as the family and the state provide for the welfare of 
individual citizens have been identified and the contribution to public 
discussion on intercountry adoption from official investigations, the news 
media and support groups has been explored. This chapter provides details of 
the research undertaken to establish the sources and nature of the anxiety 
experienced_ by officers and applicants and thereby explain the tension that is 
typical of their interaction. 
The social events experienced by applicants and officers in intercountry 
adoption are not only related to each other but also to the socially dominant 
conceptualisations of 'the family' and 'the state' that influence participants' 
'creation of meaning'. Those conceptualisations are not simply aggregations 
of all the micro-social interactions that amount to social reality. Such 
aggregates, that are labelled 'taxonomic collectives' by Harre (1981: 147), are so 
complex that they are essentially unknowable. Collins' (1981) 'aggregation 
hypothesis' is thus rejected in favour of a theoretical model that 'addresses 
the interrelation between situated social events' (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 28, Harre 
1981: 144). Thus the approach taken in this thesis is a form of 'theoretically 
informed empiricism' (Knorr-Cetina 1981: 15) for which 'hard data' can only 
be gathered from interviews that allow for the sensitive and careful appraisal 
of participants' responses. 
Some commentators, such as Pierce (1990), Ngabonziza (1988: 35-40), Calder 
(1984: 1) and Harper (1985a) complain about the shortage of research on 
intercountry adoption. However, a body of research does indeed exist. For 
example, quantitative research has been undertaken by Hoksbergen (1988a 
and b) and Bagley and Young (1979), who used the Ziller self-esteem test, the 
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Rutter anxiety scale and Durojaiye's sociometric tests. Longitudinal 
approaches to the study of adoption outcomes, that compared the academic, 
social and 'general' adjustment of adopted children with non-adopted 
children, have been used by Gill and Jackson (1983). They used such objective 
indicators as school performance. In contrast, adoptive parents' perceptions of 
children's adjustment after placement have been explored by researchers 
such as Feigelman and Silverman (1984), Ahlijah (1990) and Kim (1978) using 
questionnaires. That method allowed for nationwide comparisons of 
respondents' answers over time, but did not allow for further examination of 
respondents' intended meanings. Only unambiguous responses to 
straightforward questions could be tallied. 
Researchers such as Jaffee and Fartshel (1970) chose interviews as the method 
of enquiry in their retrospective study of parents' perceptions. That approach 
allowed for the recording of issues raised by adoptive parents. Moreover, 
interviewers could ask for clarification from parents as required. In Jaffee and 
Fanshel's own assessment of their methodology, they assert that the 
interviews provided 'the opportunity to develop a fairly definitive picture of 
the adoptee's overall life adjustment' (1970: 303). However, they acknowledge 
that their methodology had limitations, including the absence of a control 
group for comparison with non-adopted children, the fact that many parents 
had been required to comment on adoption experiences of up to thirty years 
ago, and the fact that adoptees themselves were not interviewed. From that 
research project we can ascertain that where control groups are not required 
and where the objects of investigation themselves are interviewed shortly 
after the relevant adoption experience, the interview method is appropriate. 
Better use of the interview method was made by Shireman and Johnson 
(1986), Costin and Wattenberg (1979) and Dalen and Saetersdal (1987), who 
interviewed adoptees as well as adoptive parents in order to gauge the views 
of adoptees. The reliability of Shireman and Johnson's data can be challenged 
however, since they taped only about twenty per cent of the interviews. 
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Interviews were also used by McRoy, et al. (1982) in their study of self-esteem 
and racial identity in trans-racial and same race adoptees. They used the pre-
existing Tennessee Self Concept Scale and the Family Adaptability and 
Cohesiveness Evaluation Scale. Thus we can see that pre-existing scales and 
tests have been used in both quantitative and qualitative research on 
intercotmtry and transracial adoption. No such tests were found that could be 
used in this study 
Interviews with 'adult adopted persons' and their adoptive parents were 
combined with the data gathered from official case records in Raynor's (1980) 
study on adoption outcomes. In Tasmania, official case records are 
confidential and are not made available to researchers by the Department of 
Community and Health Services. Therefore, this thesis rests only on the data 
gained from interviews. 
Although the literature on intercountry adoption is not vast there is a solid 
base upon which to build. The existing empirical research establishes the 
utility of the interview method in investigating an emotionally charged and 
largely private area of social life. 
Intercountry adoptions as a field for study 
Few children have been adopted from overseas into Tasmania, the smallest 
Australian state with a total population of just under 500,000. Since 
identification of adoptive children and their families is therefore easy, great 
care had to be taken to maintain the anonymity of those who participated in 
the study. A chart tabled at the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption 
Consultative Committee meeting held at 34 Davey Street, Hobart on 3 March, 
1995 shows the following intercountry adoption service placement figures. 
These are shown in Table 1 below. 
The state service has to maintain client confidentiality and may not, 
therefore, supply researchers with lists of applicants who might be 
approached for participation in the study. The names and addresses of 
65 
applicants had to be obtained informally and without the help of the state 
service. Since the intercountry adoption community in Tasmania is small, its 
members are usually aware of how to contact local support groups. The 
groups were of invaluable assistance in the location of respondents. Where 
groups are not listed in public telephone directories, therefore, informal 
social networks serve to advertise them. 
Table 1: Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Placements 















Group meetings are usually attended by successful applicants or those who 
hope to succeed. Unsuccessful applicants tend to avoid the meetings and are, 
therefore, more difficult to locate. The study was discussed with several 
applicants who have been unsuccessful in their attempts to adopt children. 
Given the sensitivity of intercolmtry adoption issues for these applicants, the 
decision was made not to press people in this category to participate in the 
study. 
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The choice of method 
Data collection in this study of intercountry adoption was difficult because of 
the ambivalent attitudes of officers and applicants. Respondents were 
expected to be ambivalent because the responsibilities of the institutions of 
the family and the state overlap. How responsibility for the welfare of the 
child should be divided and implemented remains controversial since 
socially legitimate claims to decision-making authority can be made for both 
institutions. It was anticipated, therefore, that responses to survey questions 
would often seem to be paradoxical and would consequently require 
clarification. 
'Face to face' interviews were judged to be the best method for gathering data 
on the ambivalence that characterises applicants' and officers' assessments of. 
their mutual social interaction and for the resolution of ambiguous 
responses. Confidential interviews were also judged to be an appropriate 
context for data gathering within which study participants could be assured 
that their identity would not be revealed. They could also be assured that they 
need not answer every question and that they could terminate the process at 
any time should they feel uncomfortable with the interview (Polgar and 
Thomas 1995: 139). As a result, participants felt relaxed enough to discuss 
freely the emotionally-charged, private and personal issues that are the topics 
of enquiry for this thesis. All officers and applicants invited to participate in 
the study agreed to take part. Most interviewees expressed their gratitude for 
having been given the opportunity to speak freely on a topic that is very close 
to their hearts. 
The 'in-depth' interviews were 'guided' (Moser and Ka1ton 1973: 298), 
'focused' (Merton 1946) or 'semi-structured' (Minichiello et al. 1990: 92-3) by 
means of a schedule of questions that appears in the appendix to this thesis. 
Those questions were designed to keep the interview within the framework 
of the sociological analysis of the tense relationship between applicants and 
officers. The guided approach has been criticised for undermining the validity 
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of the data by telling us more about the views of the researcher than the 
views of the interviewees (Madge 1975: 177). The danger is that the 
interviewer will guide the discussion to areas that are of interest to the 
researcher, but not necessarily to the interviewee. Aware of that danger, 
'control' of the discussion was given to interviewees by allowing them to talk 
freely. For example, in response to initial questions, some interviewees spoke 
at length and in doing so answered many of the questions that appeared later 
in the schedule. When those later questions were subsequently reached, as 
the researcher worked through the list, interviewees were asked to confirm 
that they had already been covered. Some then took the opportunity to 
expand upon their earlier comments. Moreover, the final question put in 
each case was an invitation for interviewees to comment on any other aspect 
of their adoption experience that had not yet been discussed or that they felt 
required elaboration. 
The value of the in-depth, guided interview lay in the opportunity that it 
provided for interviewees to describe, in their own terms, their opinions and 
experiences with regard to intercountry adoption. The intention was that this 
method would allow interviewees to concentrate on the matters perceived by 
them to be of greatest concern. 
Locating respondents 
Adoption support groups were very helpful initially in the location of 
respondents. Many potential respondents were met at Christmas parties 
organised by support groups in each of the three regions. Once interviews 
were underway, respondents suggested the names of other applicants. 
Interviews with officers were arranged formally. The nature and purpose of 
the study was explained in a letter to the Secretary of the Tasmanian 
Department of Community and Health Services. Permission was gained in 
writing from the Secretary before the initial approach to the adoptions service 
was made. Then a meeting was arranged with the Manager of the service. She 
agreed to circulate among her officers a letter that described the proposed 
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study. Individual officers were thus alerted to the nature of the study prior to 
their being approached for interview. 
The demands of confidentiality preclude the inclusion in the thesis of a 
detailed table of placement dates that would identify respondents. However, 
broad indications can be given. Twenty-eight of the applicants had adopted 
more than one child from overseas. Altogether, the sixty applicants had 
adopted eighty-one children, thirty since 1990. The study population thus 
includes fifty-five per cent of intercountry adoption placements in Tasmania 
since 1990 and sixty-seven per cent of the placements since 1992. 
The scope of the data gathered 
Interview questions focused on the roots of anxiety and on how applicants 
and officers respond to it. In order to avoid influencing the interviewee with 
the researcher's own biases and preconceptions, questions were as open-
ended as possible. Many questions appear in identical form in the interview 
schedules for officers and applicants (see Appendices A and B) so that 
comparisons and contrasts could be made between these two groups. The 
broad range of questions also allowed for comparisons and contrasts between 
discrete groups of applicants. The topics covered are those listed in Chapter 
Two. 
The conduct of the interviews 
Every effort was made to maximise interviewees' sense of comfort and 
'safety' so that they would be able to speak freely of their experiences. 
Confidential interviews in socially 'safe' settings such as respondents' homes 
allowed the researcher to gain respondents' trust. For example, respondents 
could request that the tape-recorder be switched off until they had gathered 
their thoughts. Moreover, in order to confirm that data had been accurately 
recorded, interviewees were asked to participate in the encapsulation of their 
comments. Finally, many anecdotes were recorded that had little or no 
relevance to the immediate concerns of this thesis. Those anecdotes were 
nevertheless interesting in themselves and were important parts of the lived 
69 
experience of applicants and officers. By allowing interviewees to tell their 
stories without interruption, the researcher was able to 'establish rapport' or 
'set the tone' that was invaluable when interviewees were invited to focus 
on aspects of the relationship that is the object of this study (Minichiello 1990: 
141-43). 
Fifty-seven applicants were interviewed in their homes. One was 
interviewed at a community centre and two at the researcher's home. Three 
officers were interviewed at their homes, another one at the researcher's 
home, and eight at departmental offices. Nine interviews were held in the 
North-West of Tasmania, eighteen in the North, and nineteen in the South. 
All responses were recorded anonymously on cassette tape, with study 
participants being assured that their responses would be treated in confidence. 
That undertaking included the anonymity of the interviewee population in 
total. Participants' identity was not disclosed within or beyond the study 
population. Nearly all interviews took longer than three hours to complete. 
Electronic recordings were transcribed so that themes could be abstracted for 
analysis. 
Transcribed data were tallied and cross-tabulated to identify group responses 
that, in turn, reveal the influence of structural arrangements on participants' 
perceptions. 
The characteristics of interviewees 
This thesis reports on the research outcomes of interviews in 1995 with 
twelve Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service officers and sixty 
applicants. All the officers were female, there being no male intercountry 
adoptions officers in Tasmania at present. Thirty-three female and twenty-
seven male applicants were interviewed. Fifty-two applicants were 
interviewed as married couples, with a further seven couples represented by 
the wife. Only one couple was represented in interview by the husband. In 
order to protect the anonymity of applicant interviewees, their occupations 
70 
were not recorded. Broadly speaking the social class of the applicants 
interviewed can be tallied as thirty urban middle class, fourteen urban 
working class, thirteen rural middle class and three rural working class. 
Processing the interview material 
Interview material was recorded on tape anonymously. The tape-recordings 
were later transcribed and each cassette was given a code number to conceal 
the identity of the interviewees. Under the same code numbers, the 
recordings were transcribed. Intermittently, analytical and personal 
comments, that pointed for example to relevant information about the 
interviewee or to similar or contrasting responses from others or to pertinent 
theory, were included in upper case to distinguish them from the text of the 
transcription. Thus the transcripts and analytical and personal logs were 
combined (Minichiello et al. 1990: 253-82). 
The content of the transcriptions was then analysed to reveal the results of 
triangulation. Responses to some questions were often found, as expected, to 
illuminate analytical interpretation of responses given to other questions by 
the same interviewee. The data were then encoded in summary form so that 
they could be used as column titles in tabulated form that, in turn, allowed 
for the efficient tallying of the various responses. Great care was taken to 
record one answer for each interviewee. That required careful transcription 
where spouses gave mutually differing responses on the one hand, and the 
careful distinction in the tabulation process of code numbers that indicated 
single respondents from those that indicated the transcriptions of interviews 
with couples. 
The data gathered on applicants' and officers' views on their mutual 
relationship and social interaction have been organised under six broad 
topics. First, the question schedule focused on participants' motivations. The 
intention was to collect enough data to be able to identify the motivations of 
the participating parties and to compare the motivations of applicants with 
those of officers. A subsequent objective was to ascertain applicants' opinions 
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about what motivates officers to work in the intercountry adoption arena 
and, conversely, to identify officers' views on, and assessments of, what 
motivates people to adopt from overseas. Data on motivations were expected 
to deliver insights into the levels of respect that each party affords the other. 
Secondly, questions were asked about the ways in which the service is 
rationed. It was intended that data collected on rationing would provide 
some insight into the ways in which structural constraints, whether they be 
familial or bureaucratic, variously influence the symbolic meaning that 
participants give to social phenomena. For example, if emphasis on the 
'small number of children' available for intercountry adoption could be 
identified as a way of limiting the number of applications to bureaucratically 
manageable proportions, then an 'unintended consequence' (Harre 1981 and 
Giddens 1981) of that strategy might be that it further alienates those 
applicants who are convinced that there are millions of children available. 
Thirdly, the interview schedule focused on the roots of, and responses to, 
anxiety. It was anticipated that some interviewees might be reluctant to admit 
to anxiety, or that some might not even conceptualise their feelings in terms 
of anxiety. Triangulation of questions was therefore used to approach the 
topic from several directions that allowed respondents to talk about their 
anxiety without having to label it as such. For example, applicants were asked 
whether all applications were successful and whether they felt that there were 
any implications for the relationship between applicants and officers of 
criticism of the service by applicants. Responses to those questions were 
intended to indicate applicants' levels of awareness of the possibility of 
failure and their association, if any, of success with the notion of keeping the 
officers onside. Further triangulation was intended to reveal association 
between the levels of anxiety of applicants on the one hand, and whether or 
not the applicants were preferential adopters. 
Fourthly, data were sought on the association, if any, between levels of 
anxiety among applicants and length of wait for placement. Length of process 
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was tested by many questions, including those that sought responses on who 
controls the pace at which applications are processed. 
Fifthly, data on the extent to which applicants and officers shared relevant 
values were collected. It was intended that the information would give an 
indication of the levels of consensus or adversity that help us to identify the 
relationship either as tense or as antagonistic. Typical questions relevant to 
this purpose were the ones that sought responses on the matters of the 
propriety of state regulation and on post-placement supervision. 
Sixthly, applicants and officers were asked to indicate what, in their opinions, 
were the roots of (any) dissatisfaction and how they responded to that 
problem. Those questions were intended to reveal not only the sources of 
dissatisfaction, but also the ways in which participants manage it. It was 
expected that management strategies themselves might be redefined by 
competing parties and thus become sources of further dissatisfaction. 
The open-ended nature of many of the questions allowed for the resolution 
of apparent contradictions. For example, some participants indicated that 
there were plenty of children available for intercountry adoption. Others said 
that there were not enough. Those apparently contradictory positions in 
some cases concealed consensus. For example, some participants who said 
that there were Plenty of children available thought that the limited service 
provision was inadequate to meet the needs of countless children in need of 
families. Others, who said that there were not enough available, agreed with 
the view that there were countless children in need of families but sought to 
indicate that few of them were being processed bureaucratically for adoption. 
Such consensus emerged from participants' lengthy and unconstrained 
narratives. As an explorative study, this project sought to identify various 
important agendas and issues that can be examined more closely with more 
narrowly targeted research instruments in the future. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INSTITUTIONALISED ANXIETY IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
Introduction 
Anxiety, principally in the form of fear of failure, is institutionalised in the 
intercountry adoption process for applicants and officers. Since failure has 
serious consequences for all parties and since officers and applicants cannot 
fully control outcomes, the relationship between people who want to adopt 
on the one hand and adoption officers or social workers on the other is often 
characterised by tension (Macaulay and Macaulay 1978, Jones and Else 1979, 
Feigelman and Silverman 1984, Hogan and Siu 1988, McRoy 1989, 
O'Shaughnessy 1994, Toft and McIntyre 1992). Manifest dissatisfaction of 
applicants with the service (Boss and Edwards 1992; Willee 1986) and of 
officers with the parenting provided by adoptive parents (Pilotti 1985: 30) are 
expressions of their anxiety. The dissatisfactions of applicants and the 
systemic concerns of officers are commonly the subject of media attention. 
Media depictions of large numbers of children living in wretched 
circumstances have the capacity to evoke emotional responses in applicants 
who adopt the role of rescuer. In response to such images, some prospective 
adoptive parents approach intercountry adoption services with a heightened 
sense of urgency and with the belief that there are many children available 
for adoption. Tension is the result when their sense of urgency is confronted 
by the caution of officers that is fostered by media images of prospective 
adoptive parents jumping the queue and operating outside the system, and by 
the caution of officers that springs from their concern to see placements 
succeed. A satisfactory account of the tension present in the interaction 
between officers and applicants for intercountry adoption must acknowledge 
the contribution of the media. However, this tension, and its individual 
manifestations as anxiety, cannot be reduced to the media's twin factors of the 
apparent reluctance of officers in the face of the needs of large numbers of 
children on the one hand and the alleged self-seeking of applicants who 
74 
attempt to circumvent the system, potentially to the detriment of the child, 
on the other. 
In the United States tension in the relationship between officers and 
applicants has been associated with opposition among some social workers to 
transradal adoption (Chimezie 1975; Howard et al. 1977), in particular black 
children to white parents. In contemporary Australia, the fate of Aboriginal 
children who were removed from their parents and relocated with white 
adoptive parents is a current issue. One legacy is that those involved with 
adoption have a heightened sensitivity about the connotations and risks of 
racial exploitation and that these concerns flow over into the analogous 
situation of intercountry adoption since race is involved there too. However, 
explanations of social worker opposition to intercountry adoption cannot be 
reduced to considerations of intra-ethnic and intra-racial adoption, although 
those considerations were indeed at the heart of the major controversial 
recommendation of the report produced by Newby et al. (1991) in Western 
Australia, because the evidence suggests that adoption workers have 
reservations about intercountry adoption for reasons other than 
considerations of race (Boss and Edwards 1992: 13, Close 1977: 31-2). This is 
consistent with evidence of social worker views in Britain (Tizard 1978) and 
Germany (Textor 1992). Since there is evidence of support for intercountry 
adoption from other professional groups, particularly lawyers (Kennedy 1994, 
Dickey 1990, Harrison 1990, Charlesworth et al. 1990, Bates 1988), it is clear that 
there may be something about the social worker role that creates among the 
incumbents the view that transracial adoption should be approached with 
extreme caution. This chapter identifies the sources of social worker anxiety 
that are integral to the social work role. 
This thesis argues that tension, while in part attributable to media comment 
and concerns over trans-racial placement, is integral to the interaction of 
officers and applicants for intercountry adoption. For both parties the tension 
is attributable to fear of failure. Applicants fear that they will not gain a child 
for adoption and that their claim to parenthood status will be rejected. 
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Applicants are aware that they are constantly undergoing assessment as to 
their suitability as adoptive parents. They wish to present themselves in the 
best light. This involves choices about what to conceal and what to reveal. 
However applicants are uncertain of the standards against which officers will 
assess their application. Under such circumstances individuals will 
experience anxiety. Officers, for their part, fear the consequences of placing a 
child with inappropriate parents. Officers are aware of the possibility that 
applicants will present themselves in the best possible, rather than most 
accurate, light. Insofar as suitable and unsuitable applicants will use the same 
strategies in pursuit of their application, officers face the task of trying to 
discern the appropriate from the inappropriate in a context where a mistake 
is costly to the child, the service generally, and to officers' careers. As 
individuals, officers will experience anxiety too. 
This discussion of tension in the relationship between officers and their 
clients has three parts. First the structural arrangements that underpin 
participant anxiety are explained. The social distance between the two parties 
is explored with reference to state powers of coercion on the one hand, and 
applicant powers of 'political leverage' (Subramaniam 1985: 204, Matthews 
1976: 333) on the other. In that context, officials' fear of occupational error is 
associated with officer professionalisation that, in turn, is analytically 
reconciled with the bureaucratisation of service delivery. Strategies designed 
to secure officer dominance are contrasted with forces of 
deprofessionalisation in order to develop a clear image of the conjuncture 
that underpins anxiety on both sides of the relationship. In the second part, 
the analysis turns to a theoretical discussion of the anxieties of officers and 
applicants. The intersection of universalistic and particularistic orientations 
is discussed in terms of culture shock and political consciousness. Anxiety is 
metaphorically associated with stage fright, social game theory and accounts 
theory. Finally, the chapter reports on the empirical data on anxiety, gained in 
interviews. 
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Structural bases for anxiety 
This part of the chapter identifies the roots of anxiety and the concomitant 
tensions and dissatisfaction. First, family representation in contemporary 
Western societies provides a strong, normative motivation for parenthood 
(Luke 1994, Chombart de Louwe 1970). Normative typifications of 
parenthood include the attractions of privacy, intimacy and self-
determination (Richards 1978: 183-84). The assumption that adults will 
'naturally' make good parents remains largely unchallenged despite growing 
awareness of the rates of child abuse. That assumption is not, however, 
extended to people seeking to adopt. Their suitability for parenthood has to be 
established beyond reasonable doubt and to the satisfaction of officers who 
represent the state. Contrary to normal legal procedures, therefore, the 
burden of proof is placed on the applicants whose socialisation has left them 
unprepared for the load. Anxiety is therefore an institutionalised feature of 
the experience of applicants as individuals in intercountry adoption. 
Secondly, the relationship between the family and the state is distinguished 
by latent powers of state coercion. Clients of state services understand that 
officers have the power, though limited, to make and enforce compliance 
with decisions and directions with which clients do not concur. The 
dimension of political power within relationships between officers and 
clients provides for clients an inherent element of structurally derived 
anxiety that the roles of individual officers may either increase or ease, but 
not dispel. Clients must either meet the universalistic state criteria or 
persuade officers that their case is exceptional and that, therefore, departure 
from conventional procedures is warranted. 
Thirdly, officers know that applicants are not without some power - even if it 
is only the power to sway public opinion. The lower status of the client is 
illustrated by lack of access to the state-sanctioned, legal coercive mechanisms 
of the officer. While clients may be excluded from the codified political power 
available to the officer, however, they can maximise their powers of political 
leverage through a number of formal and informal but potentially effective 
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mechanisms. In New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, for example, 
disgruntled clients can appeal to various kinds of administrative appeals 
tribunals. In South Australia and Tasmania, where such appeals bodies have 
not been provided, weaker dispute-resolution procedures are available 
through such Offices as internal bureaucratic and departmental 
administrative review committees (see Boss and Edwards 1992). In addition, 
and external to state bureaucracies, are the offices of elected members of 
parliament and the Ombudsman. Informal mechanisms for the expression of 
dissatisfaction include access to the mass media, an arena in which the 
journalist's agenda coincides structurally with that of the disaffected client. In 
addition, clients can form support groups for the purposes of co-ordinating 
super-regional expression of vocabularies of complaint (see, for example, 
Cassella 1973: 225). 
Fourthly, state officers are also confronted with the institutionalised anxiety 
that emerges from the anticipated and/ or experienced consequences for 
clients of official error. Anxiety from this source will vary in intensity 
according to the nature of the consequences. Officers who provide family 
services will realise that occupational errors may cause serious injury to, or 
the death of, clients. Thurnham (1993: 143), for example, observes that 
intercountry adoption officers tend to panic because the process and its 
outcome are 'not wholly within their control'. As no public officer can 
reasonably expect to maintain an error-free professional record, the notion of 
inadvertent official injury to clients must be recognised as structurally 
derived. So, too, are the mechanisms whereby officers seek to manage the 
attendant anxiety. They can construct a professional mythology according to 
which officers are incapable of error. Officers will be structurally predisposed 
to redefining themselves as professionally omniscient, objective, 
disinterested, altruistic and expert. Such self-definition is not evidence of 
hubris. On the contrary, the strategy that Elster (1987: 1-2) calls officer 
'hyperrationality' is a result of the anxiety that attends their accurate 
awareness of the consequences of worker fallibility for clients' well-being and 
officers' professional reputations. 
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Fifthly, officers' attempts to manage their institutionalised anxiety may have 
the unintended consequence of creating further sources of anxiety for 
applicants. 'Hyperrationality' is a sociological term that denotes officers' 
exaggerated claims to knowledge, insight and powers of judgement. To make 
those claims acceptable and thereby to consolidate the exclusiveness of official 
decision making, officers often resort to the strategy of 'professionalisation', 
especially where workers' traditional lines of authority and expertise begin to 
be questioned by rival or competing occupational groups and/ or by clients 
(Naftalin 1973: 236; Hartland 1985/86; Turner 1988: 142; Wilding 1982: 17). 
Examples of deprofessionalisation in the form of the demystification of 
professionalism are provided, for example, by Odent (1984) and in 
Thompson's historical novel, The Cry and the Covenant. Professionalisation 
sustains a 'hierarchical relationship between the professional expert and the 
lay client' (Turner 1993: 20). It emerges as a result of political contest and is 
therefore not merely the British imperial legacy referred to idiographically by 
Roche (1987) and Flanagan (1990). 
Maintenance of professional boundaries against the desubordinating and 
deskilling effects of organised client groups is all the more likely when 
evidence of turf defence is already available. Protection of existing 
occupational and decision-making areas from 'encroachment' (Easthope 
1993) by competing professional groups is well-known. For example, despite 
the 1976 Constitutional Convention recommendation that adoption 
legislation be referred from the States to the Commonwealth of Australia, a 
recommendation that was supported by the 1977 Royal Commission on 
Human Relationships (Evatt et al. 1978: 98), the States have maintained their 
authority in adoption matters and have continued to diversify their 
legislation and regulations (see Boss and Edwards 1992; Hennessy 1993: 25, 73). 
Professional boundaries can be maintained in various ways. Reformulation 
or change of systems and procedures in order to address areas of major client 
concern, and incorporation at various levels of authority of alternative 
groups into decision-making processes or even into the arena of service 
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delivery are discussed by some, such as Easthope (1993), Moe (1980: 1) and 
Matthews (1976: 348). In addition, Smith and Weller (1976: 84) give an 
example of official exclusion of interest-group involvement. Furthermore, 
the mobilisation of bias, the creation of professional epistemology and agenda 
control are identified, for example, by Ham and Hill (1984: 174-79) as elements 
of boundary maintenance that underpin what Mueller (1970) calls the 
'depoliticisation' of communication between officers and their clients in 
situations where decision-making powers and arrangements are not open to 
discussion. 
Professionalisation of services is a formalisation of the tacit hyperrationality 
that emerges from officer anxiety over the consequences of occupational 
failure. In intercountry adoption, for example, the elements of 
professionalisation discussed above underpin the myth that officers can make 
accurate assessments of applicants' parenting ability. That myth, in turn, 
serves the purpose of allaying officer anxiety over the consequences of placing 
a child with unsuitable adoptive parents. 
Sixthly, officers work in a structure of divided accountability. They are 
responsible for the child, must act in socially legitimate ways in interaction 
with applicants, and are accountable to their peers and superordinates. Any 
theory about the professionalisation of adoptions services has to reconcile the 
notions of 'professionalisation' and 'bureaucratisation'. If professionalisation 
is characterised by autonomous collegiate control, and if bureaucracy 
normally features high levels of supervision and control of workers by 
superordinates, then the notions of professional and bureaucratic 
occupational structures would seem to be mutually incompatible. State 
officers may, however, maintain a corporate professional self-identity while 
working within a bureaucratic organisation. Hill and Bramley (1986: 166), for 
example, observe that the hierarchical authority structure does not 
undermine professionalisation in high-trust situations where unsupervised 
policy implementation by street-level bureaucrats is recognised and 
legitimised by superordinates as appropriate administrative discretion rather 
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than as idiosyncratic rule-breaking. Bureaucrats as well as professionals may, 
therefore, subscribe to Andreski's (1972: 14) 'dog-does-not-eat-dog principle' 
of occupational solidarity in the 'quest for collective advantage'. 
Turner (1993: 138) suggests that bureaucratic organisational systems produce 
proletarian conditions of work that involve four elements: first, the division 
of labour in which the worker performs a limited number of tasks; second, 
the determination of tasks and conditions by superordinates; third, the wage 
as the principal source of income that is determined by the market place 
rather than through individual negotiation; and, fourth, the formation of 
unions by workers who seek to protect themselves through the development 
of political leverage in the industrial setting. He (1988: 138) does not 
distinguish between high-trust and low-trust situations within bureaucracies, 
but he does condude that all professions have a duality of contradictory forces 
that simultaneously push them towards proletarianism and 
professionalisation. 
With regard to Turner's first two elements, in high-trust situations, the tasks 
of individual workers may not be specialised. On the contrary, tasks may be 
arranged in holistic units of service-delivery that are determined in 
negotiation with superordinates. The third and fourth elements identified by 
Turner do apply to both high- and low-trust situations and serve to 
distinguish high-trust bureaucratic arrangements from professionalism. 
Nevertheless, professionalisation can be identified within state bureaucracies 
and is to be expected where strategies of occupational control are needed to 
manage the anxiety that arises from the fear of failure or error on the one 
hand and from political competition from client groups on the other 
- especially where those groups may be able to provide a better quality of 
service. 
In intercountry adoption, managers control the criteria for selection and 
rejection of applicants. Moreover, as Toft and McIntyre (1992: 96-7) observe, 
officers have the discretionary power to recommend for approval. In their 
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efforts to achieve parenthood status, therefore, applicants are in the hands of 
the officers. In the social world of intercountry adoption, the status of officers 
is thus substantially higher than that of the applicants. The difference in 
status between the participating parties underpins the social distance between 
them and is enhanced by the fact that the rewards and sanctions that officers 
are empowered to administer are of major significance to applicants. 
Finally, anxiety may be activated by the nature of the social power held by 
intercountry adoption service officers. Their power is 'integral': 
'...in which decision making and initiatives to action are centralized 
and monopolized by one party alone' (Wrong 1969: 47). 
Effective attempts to limit such power, and thereby possibly lessen the cause 
for anxiety, depend upon '...sources of power independent of the integral 
power holder that can be mobilized to enforce them' (Wrong 1969: 48). 
Where such independent sources of power are not readily available to 
applicants, as is the case for example in Tasmania, high incidences and levels 
of acute and chronic tension in interaction with bureaucrats whose word is 
law are likely to persist. 
Anxiety and the process 
In order to be able to arrive at an informed judgement about the suitability or 
otherwise of applicants to intercountry adoption services, officers organise 
several interviews that allow them to meet with prospective adoptive 
parents face-to-face. Some of these interviews are held in departmental 
offices, others in applicants' homes, but in every case applicants as well as 
agents know that the meetings have been called to allow an assessment to be 
made of applicants' latent or demonstrated ability to parent. Where meetings 
in private homes may normally seem to confer some kind of social 
advantage on the home-owners, this does not apply in intercountry adoption 
service cases because the home is also under scrutiny as a symbolic 
representation of the parenting ability of the applicant. 
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Perception of the risk of failure The anxiety that applicants predictably 
experience at these interviews can affect their behaviour in ways detrimental 
to their perceived chances of success. Because of the fear of making a poor 
impression on the officer, with the attendant implications of rejection from 
the program and failure to gain a child, applicants intuitively understand that 
their projected identities as parents are being subjected to close scrutiny. Close 
(1977: 31) observes that to be rejected is to feel 'socially condemned as inferior 
to accepted norms'. The perception that every behaviour must be congruent 
with the projected identity, and that any digression may be taken as evidence 
that the claimed identity is false, places the intercountry adoption service 
applicant in a social situation similar to that of the actor who, by assuming a 
character and a role on the stage, must consistently behave in ways congruent 
with the assumed identity or lose credibility. It is appropriate, therefore, to 
associate the acute anxiety experienced by the actor with that of the 
intercountry adoption service applicant. Both are players in social games and 
both are prone metaphorically to stage fright that: 
'...is generated in one of two ways: knowing in advance that a situation 
will open one to total inspection of self, or anticipating that a slip or 
flaw will suddenly thrust one into a position that invites challenges to 
a claimed identity, or both' (Lyman and Scott 1970: 160). 
Stage fright as experienced by actors is nevertheless significantly different 
from that faced by other kinds of social actors. Actors have to memorise lines, 
and rehearse delivery, gesture, timing and movement. After frequent careful 
rehearsal, perhaps including choreography, the play is performed for the 
intended audience. Conversely, intercountry adoption service applicants 
have no opportunity for practice or rehearsal of the 'role' of interviewee or 
parenthood. They do, through socialisation, have models that provide them 
with a typification of the 'status' of parenthood. Furthermore, they will 
predictably seek help and support from more experienced applicants in the 
hope of preparing themselves for the anxious process of second-guessing 
officers in interview, but that is distinct from the preparation of the actor 
whose rehearsal is directly aimed at mastery of the pre-existing 
characterisation created by a playwright. 
To clarify the distinction, a sociological definition of the terms 'status' and 
'role' is required. Cicourel (1970: 7) observes that status is socially given, that 
is, it is institutionalised. In contrast: 
'...How an individual actually performs in a given position, as distinct 
from how he is supposed to perform, we call his role' (Kingsley Davis 
cited in Cicourel 1970: 42). 
That distinction helps to explain how individuals of the same social status 
may behave very differently from each other; their statuses are the same, but 
their roles are not. For Cicourel, the metaphor of transformational grammar 
is more effective than the metaphor of the stage in explaining the 
phenomenon of individual innovation within socially prescribed 
boundaries: 
'...The dramaturgical metaphor of the stage is defective in explaining 
how [social] actors are capable of imitation and innovation with little 
or no prior rehearsal just as a child is capable of producing 
grammatically correct utterances that he has never heard and is 
capable of understanding utterances that have never been heard 
before' (1970: 28). 
Some actors are, however, capable of playing well-known parts in innovative 
ways, despite the pre-recorded lines and stage directions. If innovation is 
possible in the largely prescribed world of the stage, and if linguistic 
innovation is possible despite the myriad of grammatical rules and the 
dictates of idiom, how much more scope for innovation and imagination 
must there not be for the intending adoptive parent who, without helpful 
reference to a social manual, grammar or script, must communicate a 
credible performance to a critical audience. If, therefore, experienced actors, 
who presumably do not have to fear that they will forget their lines or stage 
instructions, nevertheless experience stage fright, it is predictable that 
intercountry adoption service applicants as social actors, without the benefits 
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of scripts or choreographers, will also suffer from anxiety, particularly as the 
scope for imaginative and innovative role playing is wide and unrehearsed 
and the expectations of the critical audience are largely unknown to the actor. 
Furthermore, in contrast to actors who, at the conclusion of the performance 
can relax because their behaviour from that moment on will be regarded as 
'game-exclusive' (outside the frame of reference of the game) (Lyman and 
Scott 1970: 32), intercountry adoption service applicants' behaviour in social 
interaction with officers is consistently 'game-inclusive'. The likelihood and 
level of anxiety are predictably increased where evaluation of the role 
performance is indefinite. 
Finally, a distinction must be made between the predictable levels of stage 
fright experienced by well-rehearsed actors and the levels of anxiety 
experienced by applicants who face evaluation in what Lyman and Scott 
(1970: 180) call a 'first time situation'. 
Social games without rules The relationship between officer and applicant in 
intercountry adoption can be further understood by considering the notion of 
social games. Lyman and Scott (1970: 37) discuss the notion of 'face games' 
where players may seek to 'defend' their own or claimed identities against 
challenge, or to 'protect' the claimed identity of the other player(s). 
Intercountry adoption service applicants, who experience anxiety, play 
defensive face games in terms of that theoretical framework. Of more interest 
to the purpose of this chapter, however, is the concept of 'protective face 
games'. 
In protective face games, the aim of ego is to restore the social face of alter or 
alters. Davis and Schmidt (1980: 287) explain that if an 'untoward act' by ego 
may be understood as a temporary loss of status, then in normal, pleasant, 
that is, 'nice', social interaction, alter will play down or pretend not to have 
noticed the identity-betraying behaviour. Such protective face-saving 
behaviour is not only nice, but is also indirectly defensive. The protection of 
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alter's social face can be seen as a gift that is given in the tacit understanding 
that, should the unhappy situation arise, alter would reciprocate by acting 
restoratively in response to a loss of face by ego (See Levi-Strauss 1980). 
Neither the stage-actor nor the intercountry adoption service applicant 
however, can reasonably expect such niceness from their critical audiences. 
That is not to say that theatrical audiences and intercountry adoption service 
officers are necessarily obnoxious. Rather, in those social environments the 
normal rules of protective face-saving do not apply. 
Thus in intercountry adoption services, applicants' attempts to play defensive 
face games are complicated by officers' refusal to play protective face games. 
After all, officers attend interviews not to make applicants feel socially at 
ease, but to determine their capacity for sound parenting behaviours. The 
well-being of the child is at stake. Furthermore, officers have their own social 
games to play. 
The metaphorical association of interaction between officers and clients with 
games should not be taken to imply that interviews are usually conducted in 
an atmosphere of frivolity. On the contrary, the atmosphere is predictably 
filled with tension as a consequence of the anxiety of the applicant and the 
serious dedication of the officer. For the applicant what is at stake is the 
claimed identity of being able to parent well (with all the attendant 
implications for future self-identity in a strongly pronatalist society). For 
intercountry adoption service officers, what is at stake is nominally the 
interests of children (with possible tacit ,concerns about the effects of official 
tonduct on career prospects). Ultimately, both the behaviour of officers as 
well as of clients in intercountry adoption services is subject to evaluation. 
However, the purpose of official interviews is to evaluate only the applicant. 
From a diathetic perspective, it could be argued that because some 
individuals are of a more nervous disposition than others, the propensity for 
anxiety is a matter of psychological rather than sociological interest. In 
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response, Abramson (1980: 199), Coyne and Downey (1991: 403) observe that 
the diathetic approach does indeed provide a theoretical account for the 
various responses to stress among people, but go on to point out that its focus 
on the constitutional predisposition of individuals obscures the relevance of 
environmental factors. An important aspect of those environmental factors 
is the notion of orientations. 
In the interaction of the two orientations of disinterested fairness on the one 
hand and private projects on the other, the ethnocentrism of each party may 
emerge. The anxiety that results from the impact of divergent traditions can 
be identified as a form of culture shock, where the individual has to adjust to 
unfamiliar language, values, perspectives and expectations. As a 
consequence, officers and applicants can be expected to use management 
mechanisms that may include respectful and obsequious behaviour as each 
seeks to keep the other party on side. 
Anxiety as a result of communication problems Applicants may also 
experience anxiety as a result of not knowing what to expect from officers: 
'...The "stability' of the world of contemporaries for the actor refers to 
the typifications employed by him .... the typical is rendered 
homogeneous, nonproblematical and, therefore, taken for granted' 
(Cicourel 1970: 38). 
Without typifications, the world becomes unstable; an ideal basis for the 
activation of anxiety. 
Cicourel nominates 'reciprocity of perspectives' as the first rule of social 
interaction where: 
'...Both participants must presume that each will generate recognizable 
and intelligible utterances as a necessary condition for the interaction 
to even occur, and each must reconstruct the other's intentions (deep 
structure) if there is to be coordinated social interaction' (1970: 34). 
In intercountry adoption interviews, applicants and officers speak the same 
language sufficiently well to be able to communicate. However, the applicant 
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is incapable of knowing the agent's intentions. They can only be guessed at. 
The communication, therefore, is not equal and reciprocal. On the contrary, 
it is one-sided, with the applicant obliged to divulge hitherto private 
information and the officer privileged to keep selection criteria a secret. Such 
a communicative framework is clearly conducive to anxiety. 
Strategies for the management of anxiety How, then, do individuals cope 
with anxiety? Lyman and Scott (1970: 182-5) identify three kinds of coping 
strategies: those that 'prevent' stage fright from emerging, those that 
'contain' it and those that rescue performers or help them save face. None of 
these strategies is likely to apply in intercountry adoption; because applicants, 
unlike actors, do not know how or when they might betray their claimed 
identity. If bureaucratic selection criteria are not divulged to applicants, it is 
impossible for applicants to be certain about how their performances are to be 
assessed. Withdrawal from programs is possible at any stage, but as it is not 
commensurate with the goal of acquiring a child, it does not constitute a 
coping strategy. On the contrary, withdrawal may be considered as an option 
only after coping strategies have failed. 
Applicants can attempt to cope with their indeterminate anxiety by 
developing a linguistic code that will allow them to defend their claimed 
identities. The formation of group consciousness, that Wrong (1969: 57) 
identifies as an elementary step in political organisation, is impossible 
without the linguistic articulation of group concerns. Political organisation 
may enable applicants to hold officers to account. 
By virtue of their superior social status, officers may not feel obliged to 
explain their behaviour. When explanations are given, they may be 
expressed in formal or frozen linguistic styles that indicate that '...speaker 
and auditor are in rigidly defined statuses' or that '...an irremovable barrier 
exists between the two parties' (Lyman and Scott 1970: 132). 
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Alternatively, the giving of account can be avoided by 'mystification' that 
suggests: 
'...that alter is not aware of certain facts - facts that are secret - which, if 
known, would explain the untoward action' (Lyman and Scott 1970: 
134). 
Thus anxiety may be enhanced by the lack of an account for, say, failure to 
grant approval-to-adopt. Applicants may be left wondering about what they 
might have done wrong. In stark contrast to this, applicants are seriously 
required to give accounts for their desire to parent. 
The pervasiveness of anxiety and the fear of failure 
The predictions of anxiety for applicants and officers in intercountry adoption 
and the responses to that anxiety were borne out in interviews. The reality of 
anxiety was evident in the responses that officers and applicants gave to 
questions about the success rates of applications and placements. The 
intention of these questions was to see if awareness of the possibility of 
failure and disruption can be associated with anxiety. Applicants were also 
asked about the criteria used for eligibility and suitability screening. Finally, 
applicants were asked to indicate their views on applicant criticism of the 
service. Officers were asked to express their views on the level of difficulty of 
assessment. Subsequent questions to officers focused on professional 
implications of disrupted placement, and anxiety over the possibility of 
disruption. Finally, officers were asked about the quality of pre- and in-
service training programs and of education programs for applicants. 
High levels of anxiety were found among applicants and officers. Fifty 
applicants said that applications are not always successful. Only five said that 
they always are successful. The other five did not know. Thirty-six said they 
discussed those concerns with other applicants. Twenty-seven said that they 
did not discuss the concerns with officers. Only eight applicants said that they 
did discuss those concerns with officers. Conversely, six officers said that 
applicants do discuss those concerns with them. Four said that applicants do 
not. 
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Forty-four applicants, all of whom were aware that not all applicants 
eventually adopt a child, indicated that they had worried about the possibility 
of failure to gain a child for adoption. Only six indicated that they had not 
worried about the possibility of failure. Another five, who did not know 
whether all applications are successful or not, also indicated anxiety over the 
possibility of failure. In addition, forty-nine applicants and all twelve officers 
said that placements are sometimes disrupted. These results show that there 
is substantial fear of failure and widespread awareness of the possibility of 
failure among the people interviewed. 
The high level of anxiety over the possibility of failure to gain a child for 
adoption is associated with awareness of the possibility of unsuccessful 
application, but not with the view that there are too few children available 
for adoption. Thirty-seven applicants, who thought that there were enough 
children available to meet intercountry adoption demands in Australia, were 
aware that applications do not always succeed. They all expressed anxiety 
about the possibility of failure to gain a child for adoption. Conversely, of the 
nine who said that there were not enough children available and that 
applications do not always succeed, only five had nevertheless not worried 
about the possibility of failure to gain a child for adoption. 
For most applicants, the anticipation of success or failure was associated with 
the quality of their relationship with the officers, not with the number of 
children available. The fact that they were not keen to discuss those concerns 
with officers is indicative of the social distance identified in the introduction 
to this chapter. The social distance may be underpinned by applicant 
perceptions of officers as a 'critical audience'. For example, twenty-one 
applicants said that they did not know what the suitability criteria were and 
that they received no encouragement from officers. Sixteen said they had to 
'second-guess' the officers in order, as several put it, to 'tell them what they 
wanted to hear'. 
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The social distance is further illustrated by the reluctance of applicants to 
express their strong criticism of the intercountry adoption service to officers 
for fear of jeopardising their applications. Lack of criticism should not be 
misconceived as an indication of tacit support for the process. Forty-three 
applicants said that they were hesitant to criticise the service since criticism 
jeopardises the application. For example, when asked whether applicant 
criticism of the service held any implications, one said, 
'Yes, you would think it might prejudice your chances of 
adopting'. 
Another replied, 
'Yes, you get the feeling that if you criticise too much you 
mightn't be successful'. 
Only one applicant in that group had not worried about the possibility of 
application failure. In contrast, thirty-four of them said that they had 
experienced anxiety about the possibility of failure to achieve their adoption 
goals. Only ten applicants said that they had successfully criticised the service. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that applicants feel they need encouragement. 
Fifty-two said they needed encouragement to continue with their 
applications. Only four said that they did not need it. Also expected was the 
finding that applicants do not seek encouragement from officers. Twenty 
-eight said that they did not receive encouragement from officers. Rather, 
their seeking encouragement from other applicants in preference to family 
and friends suggests that the shared experience of structurally-derived 
anxiety underpins a sense of anxious community that, in turn, predictably 
reinforces group attitudes. Forty-three received encouragement from other 
applicants. Sixteen did so from friends and fifteen from family members. 
Only twelve gained encouragement from officers. 
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It is in this context that Smith and Sherwen (1984: 47) recommend the 
provision of a politically 'neutral' counsellor for adoptive families. Bishop 
seems intuitively to sense the social distance between the institutions of the 
state and the family: '...It is critical to help mothers find positive support 
systems that are not professional' (1976: 1787). Unless state agencies meet 
what Bane (1983) calls the 'challenge' of providing the personal care and 
concern that individuals require, it seems likely that support groups will 
continue to fill that role informally. 
Officers also experience anxiety, although of a different kind. Assessment of 
applicant suitability is rated as 'very difficult' by three officers and as 
'difficult' by another five. For example, as one officer put it, 
'A lot of it has to be subjective. I'm very aware of the 
responsibility. If it doesn't work, the child is left a non-
person'. 
Another said, 
'Very difficult. Everyone cleans the house before you 
arrive anyway - do you know what I mean? It's 
frightening. What if I put a child with a paedophile?'. 
Only one officer said it was 'easy'. Moreover, it is clear that the normative or 
'responsible' perspective for officers is to adopt a pro-parenting role with 
regard to their relationship with the prospective adoptive child. Goody 
identifies five role elements in the dyadic relationship where the child grows 
to maturity with the care of the biological parents: 
'...genitor/ genetrix; source of status identity (pater/ mater); nurse; tutor 
in moral and technical skills; and sponsor in the assumption of adult 
status' (1971: 332). 
The intercountry adoption service officer may assume abstract and vicarious 
pro-parenthood responsibility for the last four of these elements. One of her 
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concerns is to ensure that the intercountry adoptive child gains full 
Australian citizenship status as well as family-member status. The difficulty 
in remaining emotionally detached from the child was expressed frankly by 
several officers, one of whom commented, 
'It's difficult to remain detached because of the legal 
position the child is placed in on placement disruption. It 
is a non-citizen child. I've got to the point where I think, 
"My God, I'll have to adopt this kid myself because there's 
nobody to do it". The professional me says I can't do that'. 
Her other concerns include the desire to guarantee (or indirectly provide) for 
the child access to long-term, high-quality health care and education that 
would underpin the future assumption of adult status. 
In that context it is interesting that thirty-one applicants identified financial 
security as a key element in the assessment process. In modernity, material 
wealth provides a sound basis for prediction of future life-chances. Perhaps 
officers are more comfortable with the relinquishment of children to wealthy 
families. Officers, who see themselves as solely responsible for the welfare of 
the child, unwittingly assume pro-parenthood status. The role of the 
assessing officer may therefore be redefined as that of a relinquishing pro-
parent. That perspective allows us to expect that officers will relinquish pro-
parenting responsibility for the child very reluctantly in societies that feature 
neo-local marriage practices and the attendant atomisation and isolation of 
the nuclear family. In short, officers' socialisation does not prepare them for 
the role of relinquishing parent. 
That theory is supported by the findings that ten officers associated placement 
disruptions with negative implications for officers' occupational status, and 
that all twelve officers expressed awareness of the possibility of failure to 
achieve the goals of securing happy placements for children. The anxiety of 
officers here, as with applicant concern over failure to gain a child for 
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adoption, is ultimately based on the fact that success is largely determined by 
the behaviours and decisions of alters whom ego cannot control. 
Officer anxiety over the notion of disruption is also rooted in the low levels 
of pre- and in-service training and the low levels of specialisation that 
obstruct the development of professional expertise. Pre-service training lasts 
one day. In-service training occurs four days per year, not counting on-the-job 
induction. Officer visits to sending countries are virtually unheard of. It 
comes as no surprise then that officers could make only vague, and 
sometimes very inaccurate, estimates of disruption rates. Eleven said that 
they did not know the national rate. One guessed incorrectly that it was 10 per 
cent. Five estimated correctly that it is 'very low'. All twelve said that they did 
not know the international disruption rate. One officer said she did not know 
whether it was greater or smaller than fifty per cent. 
Those estimates can be compared with published research outcomes. For 
example, Harper (1985b: 6), in a review of statistical surveys conducted by 
Harvey (1983), Kadushin and Seidl (1971) and Kim (1978), puts the disruption 
rate between one and three per cent. Since they have inflated perceptions of 
the risks of disruption, those officers, who think that the rate of disruption is 
much higher than it actually is, will experience added tension and anxiety. 
Nevertheless, turf defence mechanisms are evident in their discussion of 
providing a 'professional service' for which their professional training and 
intuition are invaluable. For example, mystification of the evaluation 
process was illustrated by the officer who said, 
'It's a difficult, long, tedious, highly-involved process. You 
can't take responses at face value. You have to get to 
know your family really well to be able to satisfy yourself 
that they are OK. I use my intuition and professional 
skills of following issues through'. 
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Despite their low levels of training, therefore, most officers did not express a 
desire to draw from the resources of support groups. However, one officer 
expressed frustration with the department's policies on liaison with support 
groups, 
'Sometimes I don't get all the information. I'm not 
passing on right information to applicants. I'll ring up 
and ask something and my supervisor will say "Oh, yes, I 
got that information yesterday". And I know darn well 
that my applicants have already got that information 
from self-help groups on the mainland - and we, the 
officers, don't get it till later. I feel that my supervisor 
could be a little bit more congenial or approachable with 
sending countries. Other states (of the Australian 
Commonwealth) do it. Sending countries may feel more 
comfortable in dealing with a state if they have a good 
rapport with the supervisor. I can't see why we can't work 
with, say, ASIAC as they do in Melbourne. If you mention 
ASIAC here it's like a dirty word. Applicants complain it 
takes too long or why weren't they told about the 
paperwork needed'. 
Finally, exclusion mechanisms are also evident within the intercountry 
adoption service that allows officers little discretionary power. The service is 
tightly controlled from a corporate office that is reluctant to disrupt 
placements. Only four officers said that other officers discuss concerns about 
the possibility of placement disruption with them. While the risk of placing a 
child with unsuitable adoptive parents is a source of chronic anxiety for 
officers, exercise of the authority to disrupt placements also causes anxiety. 
Though rare, disruption against the wishes of the adoptive parents and/or 
the child is predictably traumatic, whether the process severs familial bonds 
(in happy placements) or causes loss of face for adoptive parents (in 
unsuitable placements). Disruption of placements may serve the pro 
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-parenting agenda of individual officers, but might lead to the eventual 
disruption of programs with sending countries. One officer commented, 
'I felt that the Department was saving face with the 
sending country - so I was told to keep the child in 
placement. Anybody could pick up the warning 
signs in the case of a child who had been in 
placement for two years and still not adopted. 
When I got there she was moved. I would have 
moved her a lot earlier'. 
Another said, 
'I was told to counsel the family and keep the child 
there. When I visit I see a dysfunctional family - 
the mother about to have a nervous breakdown 
and the other child caught in the middle. I feel the 
Department was ... The applicants were intelligent 
adults but that child was not meant for them and 
they were certainly not meant for her. The 
applicants told me as soon as they saw the child 
they knew she was not for them. Now the child is 
really happy in another placement'. 
If sending countries notice a high disruption rate among Tasmanian 
intercountry adoption service placements, they may choose to send no more 
children for adoption. The Intercountry Adoption Service could therefore, 
become obsolete, leaving street-level operatives with the option of 
secondment to other agencies within the Department of Community and 
Health Services. 
Implications for the Manager position would be more serious. Managerial 
involvement with intercountry adoption, at the level of agency co-ordinator, 
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is specialised. The intercountry adoption service is a marginalised, 
structurally peripheral (for example, the only non-regionalised) service 
within the Department. Most intercountry adoption service officers spend 
most of their working time on fostering or other out-of-home-care services. 
For them, involvement with intercountry adoption is part of a 
comprehensive curriculum vitae that allows for flexibility of placement 
within the Department. The Manager of a redundant agency, in contrast, can 
only present an obsolete curriculum vitae. Another structural element that 
underpins placement maintenance policies is the financial cost of disruption, 
estimated by O'Neill (1991: 84) as $19,738.22. Disruption of intercountry 
adoptive placements is, therefore, structurally not in the interests of the 
Manager, even though it may be in the interests of the child and the case 
officer. 
It is clear then that placements can not be disrupted easily. Since substantial 
social pressure is placed on officers to recommend wisely, they experience 
institutionalised anxiety, particularly at the points of recommendation for 
approval-to-adopt and recommendation to the court for the granting of an 
adoption order. The weight of responsibility in this regard was captured by 
the officer who said, 
'This whole child's life is now going to be dictated 
by my recommendation'. 
Conclusion 
Anxiety is thus integral to the intercountry adoption experience of applicants 
and officers. Awareness of the possibility of undesirable outcomes is a matter 
for concern for both parties. Fear of jeopardising the application is a major 
obstacle that prevents many applicants from discussing their anxiety with 
officers. Conversely, officers' notions of 'professional detachment' maintain 
the social distance that reduces the effectiveness of communication with 
applicants. The next chapter explores the implications of the institutionalised 





Motivations are drawn in to the relationship between officers and applicants 
for intercountry adoption in several ways. In the first place, parental 
motivations are central to the criteria by which officers decide on the 
appropriateness of applicant parents. Secondly, applicants' judgements about 
officers' motivations are integral to applicants' judgements about officers' 
performance of their professional role and play a large part in applicants' 
assessments of the degree to which the whole process of adoption is seen as 
satisfactory. Any perception that officers are motivated by considerations 
other than 'the best interest of the child' will result in officers, their 
performance or the service generally, being negatively evaluated by 
applicants. Thirdly, the strength of the applicants' motivations impels the 
applicants to continue to participate in a system where screening mechanisms 
are designed to test their very commitment. Fourthly, the content of the 
motivational structure, in the form of the desire of applicants to secure a 
child and the desire of officers to achieve an enduring placement dictate what 
may be conflicting views about an appropriate pace for the adoption process. 
Finally, motivations become part of the vocabulary of complaint that each 
party constructs against the other or, conversely, become part of the 
vocabulary of affirmation or approval. 
The previous chapter explored the institutionalised anxiety experienced by 
applicants and officers in the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service and 
showed that fear of failure and the limits to the control of the process were 
key sources of anxiety that introduced tension into the relationship between 
officers and applicants. In the chapters that follow, selected aspects or 
manifestations of that tension are considered. This chapter analyses the role 
played by motivations of the participating parties and the manner in which 
motivations of the competing parties become a source of tension. This focus 
should not, however, obscure the fact that social constraints, shared values 
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and typifications also sustain the relationship between officers and applicants 
despite the, sometimes, dysfunctional pressures. For this reason, this chapter 
identifies shared as well as conflicting motivations. 
First, the benefits of the family for the state on the institutional level are 
identified. Those benefits give us reason to expect that state officers will 
support the family within the wider institutional order, including adoptive 
family-formation strategies. Secondly, three aspects of modern society are 
identified that substantially contribute to the strength of applicants' 
motivation to adopt. These three aspects are the positive representations of 
parenthood in the media and in marketing, the concomitant social 
disapproval of voluntary childlessness and the gender-specific social rewards 
for parenting. Thirdly, the chapter turns to points of tension by showing how 
service restrictions are misconceived by some applicants as evidence of 
opposition to intercountry adoption from officers. Fourthly, officers' power of 
coercion is also identified as a source of misconception among applicants over 
the motivations of officers. Finally, officers' need to legitimise their critical 
role and their powers of coercion is seen to contribute to their demonisation 
of applicants' motivations. 
Motivations 
Official support for intercountry adoption As we saw in chapter two, the 
family is of enormous economic benefit to the state. For this reason alone 
governments continue to provide support for the family as an institution. 
For example, in the 1940s, Australian population policies were designed to 
encourage adults to have more children and took the form of child 
endowment payments or family allowances. The government of the day was 
keen to effect a substantial increase in the size of the Australian population. 
Nevertheless, 'illegitimate' births were frowned upon (see, for example, Cass 
1990: 178). Only children born to de jure married couples were wanted. The 
assumption was that children born and raised in secure kinship settings 
would predictably not only develop psychological well-being and respect for 
authority, but also have most of the parenting costs met by the family. 
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Since the 1940s, increasingly social service provision has been made for single 
parents. Children born to single mothers are labelled 'illegitimate', that is, 
they are not legitimised by state officialdom. An important reason for that 
label is the economic consideration that illegitimate children are officially 
'unacceptable' because they place greater financial impost on the state as a 
result of lower family income. Since they place the entire economic burden of 
parenting on the state, experiments at raising children outside the nuclear 
family setting, such as the 1920s Leninist innovations in the Soviet Union, 
are still rejected (Geiger 1970). The nuclear family system of parenting-cost 
displacement and distribution remains the most cost-efficient setting for 
social reproduction. It is, therefore, supported by state officialdom and we can 
recognise that support, for example, in state funding for the Tasmanian 
Intercountry Adoption Service. 
Applicants' support for intercoun try adoption Some authors report critically 
on psychoanalytic assumptions that motivation for parenthood is based on a 
'biologically given reproductive drive' (see, for example, Flapan 1969: 406). 
The idiographic nature of psychoanalysis that ignores the implications of 
social environments is also recognised by some authors, such as Benatar 
(1995). Authors with an eye for social motivators for parenthood observe 
along with Whaley and Wong (1987: 72) that universally there is little, if any, 
evidence to substantiate the notion of a 'parental instinct'. 
Applicant motivation is thus not driven by instinct but is informed by 
normative expectations of parenthood status that are derived from primary 
socialisation in the nuclear family setting and from child and family 
representation in the popular media and in marketing. Parenthood is 
associated with maturity, for example, in the work of Whaley and Wong 
(1987: 59-62) where children are identified as indicators of six of the eight 
developmental stages of the family. In addition, Berger and Kellner (1970: 57) 
reconstruct parenthood as the 'objectification', that is the consolidation, of the 
conjugal relationship. In other words, parenthood is redefined as a signifier of 
conjugal health, happiness and strength. Furthermore, the normative 
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expectation that the autonomy of consanguine families will be protected in 
court is illustrated, for example, in Liss' (1988) analysis of family law cases. 
Positive expectations about parenthood underpin typifications of parenthood 
as an iconic signifier of personal and familial maturity. Those expectations are 
themselves underpinned by the positive representation of parenthood in 
popular culture in modernity (see, for example, Chombart de Lauwe 1970: 257- 
8 and Luke 1994). Luke (1994) observes, however, that images of transracial 
parenting rarely appear in popular literature. As we saw in chapter three of 
this thesis, however, the mass media frequently convey images of socially 
isolated children in desperate circumstances in overseas orphanages. 
Nevertheless, it is predictable that biological family-formation strategies will 
be preferred over domestic and transracial adoptive parenting. 
The empirical data gathered in interviews give some insight into applicants' 
preferred family-formation strategy. Forty-one applicants, the vast majority, 
indicated that their structure of motivations began with biological parenting. 
The second option for this group was intercountry adoption, with domestic 
adoption a third choice. Not all applicants who indicated that biological 
parenting was their first choice had children 'of their own'. For example, six 
applicants indicated that they were not interested in IVF treatment. Some had 
tried it, others had not, 
'We would never consider IVF again'. 
'We didn't want intrusive medical procedures'. 
Only four applicants indicated that their preferred options went from 
biological parenting to domestic adoption to intercountry adoption, 
'Having problems conceiving and local adoptions are a 
very long wait'. 
'Local adoption was not viable. We wanted a family. We 
would have gone for local first, but having one 
intercountry adopted child, we wanted another. We 
would never consider IVF again'. 
Three applicants said that intercountry adoption was their first choice. These 
results suggest that for most, if not all, applicants the typification of parenting 
is based on their conceptual or experiential familiarity with the intimacy, 
privacy and sell-determination of biological reproduction. Moreover, the data 
show that applicant commitment to intercountry adoption is very high. For 
most, it is the second option. 
Careful interpretation of these results requires us to distinguish between the 
chronological order of preference and the motivational order or structure of 
preferences. These retrospective data indicate which option was considered 
first by the respondents. The fact that intercountry adoption was a subsequent 
option should not be misinterpreted to mean that applicants were only 
weakly committed to the idea. Once applicants have made the decision to 
adopt from overseas, and particularly once they have met their adoptive 
children, the notion of intercountry adoption becomes reified in the child and 
in some cases the attendant new parenthood status. Intercountry adoption 
may, therefore, not have been their first choice, but, in light of failed attempts 
to conceive, it may well be their strongest chance of achieving parenthood 
status. 
In addition to the positive representations of parenthood in the media and in 
marketing, an analysis of applicants' motivations to adopt must also consider 
the significance of conformist social pressures. Whaley and Wong (1987: 71) 
and Miller (1988: 582), for example, identify powerfully conformist social 
pressures for adults to have children. In contrast, political and economic 
conditions that sometimes militate against fertility among the poor are 
identified by some authors, including Cass (1990: 181) and Miller (1988: 584). 
However, as voluntary childlessness is still a deviant social phenomenon 
(see Callan 1986: 85), it is clear that social adversity has not yet defeated the 
strength of most women's internalised desire to parent. Indeed, the desire to 
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parent is redefined by some as a function of economic hardship, effective 
kinship relations providing individuals with a source of welfare. Authors in 
this group include Shimkin, Shimkin and Frate (1978), Meyer and 
Singarimbun (1977) and Twose (1987: 13). Finally, Morton Thompson's 
historical novel The Cry and the Covenant illustrates the irrepressibility of 
the desire to parent despite horrific associated health risks. 
Explanations other than economic and health considerations have therefore 
been sought for voluntary childlessness. For some women the answer may 
lie in 'success avoidance' and 'marital satisfaction'. Some women, it is 
argued (see, for example, Callan 1984: 211 and Miller 1988: 584), are motivated 
towards motherhood as a mechanism for avoidance of the risk to the 
conjugal relationship of their competing successfully with the male spouses 
in the labour marketplace. It is also asserted that the perceived value of - 
children declines when alternatives are found that meet the 'needs associated 
with children'. It is in this sense that voluntarily childless wives tend to have 
higher levels of marital satisfaction than do mothers. 
Negative conformist pressures for parenthood also help to explain the 
attraction of parenthood status. Such pressures include 'culturally-derived 
punishments' for non-fecund women, reprobation from spouses of non-
fecund adults, and social labelling of voluntary childlessness as deviant, 
taboo, selfish, immature and foolish (see, for example, Taylor 1987: 4; Aitken 
1983: 21; Houseknecht 1988: 385-6 and Miller 1988: 585). Moreover, Callan 
(1985) concludes from his study of 24 single and 21 married students that 
stigmatisation is equally strong for voluntarily childless men and women. 
If the desire to parent is a universally powerful social force, then parenthood 
is predictably associated with sex- or gender-specific rewards. Research 
evidence points to gender differences with regard to parenthood. Luke, for 
example, observes that in English, the term 'mothering' is associated with 
childcare while fathering denotes the male 'biological function of producing 
a child' (1994: 298). Furthermore, it is suggested by some authors that with the 
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advent of parenthood women 'feel more feminine and exhibit more 
feminine behaviours'. Men do not conversely show more traditionally 
masculine behaviour. On the contrary, their self-concept is said to become 
'less masculine' (see, for example, Whaley and Wong 1987: 73). 
Anticipated partial loss of masculinity would not motivate most men to 
become fathers. Rather, the emasculative effect of parenthood on sex-typing 
would be a disincentive for them. Feldman and Aschenbrenner (1983: 286), 
however, observe that men's enactment of feminine roles is not at the 
expense of their well-established masculinity. Parenthood allows most men 
to gain socially acceptable access to some traditionally feminine role-
behaviour patterns, thereby adding to, rather than subtracting from, their pre-
parental behaviour options. 
The combined effect of these positive and negative pressures for conformity 
to the normative values associated with parenthood is reflected in statistical 
reports. Callan (1986: 85), for example, observes from census estimates that 
fewer than 'ten percent of women prefer voluntary childlessness or a single 
child family'. Reporting on a survey of 4511 Australians over the age of 
eighteen, Milburn (1991b: 46) notes that fewer than 'two percent of 
respondents chose the formula of either one or no child'. In conclusion to a 
cross-cultural study of parenting goals, Levine (1974) asserts that the desire to 
parent is a universal phenomenon. It is predictable, therefore, that many non-
fecund couples will not be content with their childlessness. 
The sense of loss and grief attendant to the acknowledgement of personal non-
fecundity has been noted by some, including Aitken (1983: 17-22), Harper 
(1985b) and Howe (1992: 6). Given the evidence of high failure rates in in-
vitro fertilisation (IVF) programs (see, for example, Rowland 1992), it is 
predictable that many of those couples will feel motivated to adopt. 
Of the sixty applicants interviewed, thirty-five were not parents prior to their 
adoption of a child from abroad. Of those thirty-five, three were married to 
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spouses who were 'biological' parents. Of the sixty applicants interviewed, 
thirty-two who had not achieved parenthood status biologically indicated 
that they sought to adopt from abroad in order to 'hav'e children' or 'form a 
family'. Ten applicants who had not previously achieved parenthood status 
biologically indicated that they sought to adopt from abroad for altruistic 
reasons. Of those ten, seven also indicated family-formation motivations. 
Twenty-five applicants had gained parenthood status biologically prior to 
adoption from abroad. Those adoptive parents are known in the related 
literature as 'preferential adopters'. Of those twenty-five, three had married 
with spouses who were not parents. Eighteen indicated that they sought to 
adopt from abroad in order to 'have children' or 'form a family'. Seventeen 
said that they were motivated by altruistic reasons to adopt from abroad. Four 
indicated altruistic as well as family-formation motivations. Those 
motivations were typically expressed in the following ways, 
'We wanted to be parents'. 
'We wanted to adopt a child from a third-world country 
to give the child a chance'. 
Service restrictions The scope, scale and efficiency of adoptions services are 
limited by the running costs. Funding restrictions limit staffing levels and 
usually exclude expensive training programs such as visits by officers to 
sending countries. With bureaucratically imposed staffing levels, adoptions 
officers thus have to provide a service without the facilitating benefits of 
personal contacts with officers in sending countries. The number of 
applicants accepted for assessment must therefore be managed so that officers 
have reasonable workloads. 
Hard evidence on deterrence of applicants is available. The Tasmanian 
service's Annual Report (Department of Community and Health Services 
1993: 59) records that of the 200 couples who attended pre-application 
information seminars in the year ending 30 June, 1993, only thirteen went on 
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to apply. Those figures compare negatively with Toft and McIntyre's (1992: 90) 
recording of a United States agency that had about one-fourth of the 625 who 
attended orientation go on to apply. 
The levels of funding that restrict the number of applicants the service can 
accept for assessment and that contribute to the slow processing of 
applications (see chapter eight), are a source of great frustration for some 
officers. As one officer put it, the problems have been exacerbated by the 
regionalisation of the Department and the bureaucratic division between 
policy makers and service providers, 
'It's an absolute disaster. I am accountable for what 
happens, but have absolutely no control over the 
resources allocated to it. It is absolutely disastrous. 
Departmental reorganisation has caused utter and 
complete chaos'. 
Many applicants, on the other hand, attributed the service restrictions and the 
slowness and inefficiency of process to the hostile motivations of officers. 
Many of the motivations attributed to officers by applicants do not reappear as 
officers' goals. Twelve applicants said that they did not know what motivated 
officers. Ten officers indicated that their motivation was to promote the 
welfare of children. A typical expression used by officers was, 
'to provide the best possible future for children placed 
from overseas'. 
That response was attributed to officers by only eighteen applicants. Sixteen 
other applicants indicated that the motivations of some officers were 
positive. Conversely, thirty-four applicants indicated that for officers 
intercountry adoption work was just a job or a part of the job. As one parent 
put it, 
'I haven't come across any that's got a real love for 
intercountry adoption'. 
Another said, 
'Certainly it's not something that they enjoy at all. Part of 
their job description'. 
A third explained, 
'Because they made it so hard, I had the feeling in the end 
that maybe the officers were racist and didn't want non-
white children in Australia. When we were in the 
orphanage to pick up our child, we saw another child that 
needed a home and we wanted to adopt him. We rang 
the Department in Tasmania but it was all negative. You 
have to start the process all over again'. 
State powers of coercion Such examples of officers' powers of coercion 
illustrate the sharp contrast between adoptive family formation and the self-
determination of biological parenting. Since biological parenting is normal 
and the originally preferred option for most applicants, that contrast is itself a 
source of tension. Furthermore, the element of dominance or compulsion 
contradicts the developing democratisation of conjugal intimacy that has 
emerged as a function of the rise in status of women in modernity. 
Economically independent men and women sustain conjugal relationships 
only for such emotional reasons as love and affection. The essential 
affectivity of the postmodern conjugal relationship is described as a 'pure 
relationship' in Giddens' (1992: 185) work on the transformation of intimacy 
in postmodern society. Such emotional motivations are extended to the 
adoption project by applicants but run counter to the officers' responsibility to 




Officers control of the process underpins a hierarchical relationship with 
applicants that does not sit well with the reappearing 'symmetry' (Young and 
Willmott 1973) or egalitarianism of the nuclear family. Challenge to 
authority can be expected as a result of the time characteristics of postmodern 
society identified by Easthope (1993: 294), the rejection of unquestioning 
submission to absolute authority, '...the growing appreciation of the diversity 
of choice', and the emergence of the postmodern individual who '...is 
reflexive and creates him or herself through lifestyle choices'. Thus the 
different domains of the family and the state provide for structurally-derived 
variation in the agendas of applicants and officers, that is a predictable source 
of tension. 
Twenty-four applicants, who saw the exercise of coercive power by officers as 
arbitrary, attributed those officers with negative or obstructivist motivations 
such as the desire to wield bureaucratic power and to deter people from 
applying. Typical comments were, 
They were motivated by bureaucracy. They just wanted to 
throw a spanner in the works to try and deter you'. 
Some were specific, 
'Our officer was actively against intercountry adoption. It 
was fairly obvious that she disapproved of intercountry 
adoption because you could catch her out at times when 
she deliberately obstructed things or withheld 
information. At an information seminar she said 
intercountry adoption is a form of colonialism - I'm 
quoting her. She was malicious, obstructive and gave 
false information. She would refuse to accept any advice 
we had received from ASIAC about what the sending 
country required in our file. She saw that admitting that 
applicants had legitimate information was a way for her 
of losing power. She wanted to maintain control over the 
situation'. 
An (unlikely) alternative future society where state welfare services operate 
in accordance with the principle of client autonomy, rather than the principle 
of official coercion, is outlined by Jordan (1985: 330-349). Unfortunately, he 
does not explain how the social structures that currently hinder, if not 
prevent, the democratisation of social-service delivery are to be removed. 
Those structures underpin current inequalities in the relationship between 
officers and clients. The democratisation of the relationship between officers 
and clients would require, for example, a massive change in political will if 
state services were to be funded to the level where service rationing were no 
longer necessary. Jordan's mechanism of compulsory consultation could, 
moreover, only effectively serve the principle of autonomy if it could be 
guaranteed that officers actually gave due political weight to the views of 
clients. Such guarantees would require massive supervisory mechanisms 
with high levels of subjective evaluation on the part of the supervisors. 
Jordan's ideal alternative future society predictably appeals to postmodern 
individuals who, as Easthope (1993) asserts, are suspicious of the unitary 
authority implied by scientific and professional exclusiveness. Jordan (1985: 
339-40) suggests that increasing political pressure for bureaucratic change may 
result in the replacement of official arbitration with mediation and 
facilitation. However, the emergence of his ideal relationship between officers 
and clients is militated against by fiscal constraints and officialdom's 
resistance to deskilling, not to mention the political inertia of current systems 
of social management. It is predictable, therefore, that the institutionalised 
powers of coercion will be defended and retained by state bureaucracies, even 
though those powers contribute to tension in the relationship between 
service providers and their clients. 
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Legitimation crisis Officers' powers of coercion are a source of strain in their 
relationship with applicants. Officers therefore need to legitimise their 
coercive authority. One way in which they do this is by claiming the 'moral 
high ground'. The demonisation of applicants' motivations, for example, is a 
boundary-maintenance mechanism that underpins the professionalisation of 
officers by pre-empting applicant endorsement of the fundamental altruistic 
principle of the paramountcy of 'the welfare and interests of the child' 
(Adoption Ad Tasmania 1988: S.8). In addition, the mechanism may be used 
to preclude applicants from the option even of agreeing with officers that 'a 
healthy motive is generally seen to be one that aims to provide a home for a 
needy child rather than a child for a home' (see, for example, Triseliotis 1993: 
119). For example, one officer said, 
'Altruism on its own is very dangerous. "The poor little 
unfortunates - we'll take them in and they'll be grateful" 
- and they're not'. 
Placement problems are associated by some authors with parental non-
fecundity. For example, Whaley and Wong suggest that with the advent of 
adolescence, adopted girls may have difficulty in accepting their sexuality 
because they may 'not be able to identify with a nonfertile parent' (1987: 83). 
Conversely, Howe (1992: 6) suggests that non-fecund mothers sometimes 
have trouble accepting the sexual maturity of their adopted daughters. Such 
views on family-formation motivations form part of a broader argument that 
amounts to a demonisation of all applicant motivation. For example, 
imagination and anticipation among prospective adoptive parents is 
redefined by authors, such as Harper (1985b), Smith and Sherwen (1984) as 
unrealistic 'phantasy'. More specifically, applicant altruism is redefined as 
'rescuer phantasy' that they associate with unrealistic expectations about the 
child's behaviour in response to its 'rescue' by the benevolent adoptive 
parents. The balanced observation that, while dangerous, phantasies about 
the child-to-be are healthy since they provide the mother with a 'dress-
rehearsal for parenting', also appears in the work of Smith and Sherwen 
(1984: 39), but was not mentioned by any officer in interviews. 
The most common motivation expressed by applicants was the desire to 
achieve parenthood status or to enlarge the size of the existing family with 
the inclusion of adopted children. The total number of applicants who 
indicated that motivation was fifty, of whom thirty-two were childless at the 
time of application. The total number of applicants who indicated altruism as 
their motivation for adoption was twenty-seven of whom ten were childless 
at the time of application. 
The motivation among preferential adopters was almost equally distributed 
between family-formation and altruism. In contrast, among childless 
applicants the family-formation motivation was indicated almost three times 
as often as altruism. There was, therefore, a substantial difference in the 
structure of motivations among childless applicants on the one hand and 
preferential adopters on the other. For childless applicants the adoption 
project is undertaken to achieve not only a child, but also parenthood status. 
Officers' perceptions of applicant motivations were not always consistent 
with the aggregated responses from applicants themselves. For example, 
eleven of the twelve officers who participated in the study said that 
applicants were motivated by the wish to form a family or add another child 
to the family. That is in line with applicants' responses. However, ten officers 
said that applicants were also motivated by the desire to help a child in 
unfortunate circumstances. For example, one officer said that sometimes 
applicants are motivated by the desire 'to help a child already in the world'. 
In fact, fewer than half the total number of applicants indicated altruism as a 
motivation. Six officers mentioned childlessness as a contributing factor in 
the structure of applicant motivation, but only one officer associated the 
family-formation motivation with childless applicants, and the altruism 
motivation with preferential adopters, 
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The motivation is to have a family in the case of infertile 
couples. Preferential adopters want to give a home to a 
child who otherwise wouldn't have one'. 
Officers' apparently inflated estimates of the significance of applicant altruism 
may be linked to officers' need to ration the service. That link is discussed in 
greater detail in chapter seven. Officers placed more emphasis on altruism as 
a motivation for applicants than did the applicants themselves, for example, 
'Do-gooders do it out of duty, not out of volition'. 
In contrast to the British immigration worker who thought that altruism was 
a 'fair enough' motivation for intercountry adoption applicants (see 
Humphrey and Humphrey 1993: 25), three officers redefined applicant 
altruism as predictive of placement problems. Indeed, altruism in applicants 
was associated with a weaker capacity for both bonding and acceptance-of-
difference. Two officers asserted that altruism is attended by expectations of 
gratitude from the child. Finally, altruistic applicants were expected to be 
more likely, on the one hand, to accept the credit if the adopted child excels, 
and, on the other, to be inclined to allude to the child's origins if the child 
does not excel. In other words, altruistic applicants were expected to 
reconstruct the adoptive relationship between parent and child in terms that 
deny parental responsibility for any undesirable behaviour of the child. 
The association between altruistic motivations and the alleged negative 
implications for placement was not substantiated with argument or reference 
to experience or research. No reference was made even to any academic 
assertions such as Winkler et al.'s (1988: 109) unsubstantiated association of 
applicant altruism with increased post-placement adjustment problems. 
Since the association between the motivation and its alleged implications is 
not explained, it seems that some officers were prejudiced against altruism 
among applicants. One officer expressed her intuition thus, 
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'I believe there are many more problems in families 
where the applicants have the do-gooder mentality'. 
Conversely, three officers indicated their disquiet about applicants who are 
motivated by the 'need to have a child'. One of these officers linked that 
motivation with the payment of fees to the Tasmanian Intercountry 
Adoption Service. The problem here was that non-fecund or fee-paying 
applicants were seen to focus on their own parenting aspirations, that is, their 
'right to a child', rather than the needs of the child. As one officer put it, 
'Sometimes people get submerged in their own needs and 
think of the child from their own point of view, not from 
the child's point of view'. 
Conclusion 
The data show that the contesting parties attribute to each other motivations 
that are different from the motivations those parties claim for themselves. 
This chapter has shown that there are more motivations involved than just 
the successful placement of the child. Moreover, it has explained how 
broader considerations such as the restricted funding of the service and the 
challenge to official powers of coercion can influence how motivations of the 
'out-group' (Merton 1980) are attributed. Sources of tension are thus capable 
of diversifying into new sources of contention and conflict. Given the range 
of officers' views on applicant motivation, applicants' best strategy in 
interaction with officers would be to show support for agency regulation and 
supervision procedures. Applicants should also acknowledge the propriety of 
officers' high status. As their motivations are variously defined by officers, 
applicants should not show too much enthusiasm for their personal 
adoption projects. Rather, they should show commitment to, and support 




RA'TIONING OF THE INTERCOUN'TRY ADOPTION SERVICE 
Introduction 
Rationing strategies, in governmental agencies as in other bureaucratic 
organisations, take many forms and may be implicit, explicit, formal and 
informal (Turner 1988: 198-99; Knapp 1984: 90; Foster 1983: 12). Implicit 
rationing restricts access to services through budgetary controls and public 
demand. Explicit rationing includes the more overt and therefore politically 
visible attempts by governments to control client eligibility. The notion of 
'formal rationing' includes publicly visible mechanisms of social control 
such as documented eligibility rules, points systems, official waiting lists, 
charges and means tests. Informal means of welfare rationing, such as 
deliberate delay, deterrence and withholding of information, are far less open 
to public scrutiny. 
Rationing contributes to the tension in the relationship between officers and 
applicants. In the first place any apparent limitation to the number of 
children, or to the number of applications accepted, is seen by applicants as 
symbolic evidence of the limits to government support for intercountry 
adoption. If governments are perceived not to support the service, or to deter 
applications, they will be perceived as increasing the risk of failure. This 
anxiety or fear of failure will generate tension in the relationship between 
officers and applicants. Secondly, applicants who are aware of the conditions 
in overseas institutions will link concern for children with speedy processing 
and see any obstacles, delays or restrictions in number as an indication that 
the government cares little about children. Similarly, the same limitations 
may be seen by applicants as government's lack of concern for them in their 
desire to become parents. Thirdly, applicants who are aware of the large 
number of children potentially available for intercountry adoption will not 
accept government protestations that there are few children available. 
Fourthly, mechanisms for the regulation of the adoption process that 
applicants see as delaying strategies will generate anxiety about the eventual 
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outcome — even though officers see these same mechanisms as essential to 
the process of placing children in secure, successful and long-term 
relationships by allowing time for adequate assessment and supervision to be 
undertaken. 
The previous chapter identified the Department of Community and Health 
Service's need to restrict the intercountry adoption service to manageable 
proportions as a source of anxiety that contributes to the tension in the 
relationship between officers and applicants. The restrictions were discussed 
in the context of the analysis of motivations that showed that some 
applicants took limitation of the service as evidence of hostile, negative and 
obstructivist motivations among officers. This chapter explores the rationing 
of the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service in greater depth in order to 
gain further insight into how the number of children available and the 
number of applications accepted 'colour' the relationships between officers 
and applicants. 
Predictably, some rationing mechanisms are strongly defended by social-
service officers who will act to protect working conditions, their reputations, 
jobs and careers against outsiders in various forms of what Lyman and Scott 
(1970: 103) call 'turf defense'. Officers may internalise bureaucratic rhetoric 
and be unaware that rationing of the service strains their relationships with 
clients. 
Just as predictable as official defence of rationing is client dissatisfaction with 
it. Rationing, after all, represents a diminution of service to current and 
potential clients. Clients' complaints about their interaction with intercoturitry 
adoption service officers, then, should be expected to reveal disquiet about 
rationing mechanisms, even if the behaviours and procedures at issue are not 
recognised by clients or even officers as rationing mechanisms. Client 
dissatisfaction is usually expressed informally as a part of the oral tradition 
that gives expression to their 'vocabularies of complaint' (Turner 1988: 152). 
Some officially recognised complaints have been published, however, and 
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they do indicate disquiet over rationing techniques. An example is the 
Tasmanian Ombudsman's Report (Wilke 1986), discussed in chapter three. 
The implementation of explicit rationing rules is subject to officers' powers of 
discretion and are sometimes so complex that clients remain ignorant of their 
rights and of decision-making guidelines. The effects of rationing are, 
however, always discernible to clients and are a source of tension. In 
intercountry adoption, for example, many applicants have attempted to 
circumvent official processes because of frustration with the procedural pace 
(see, for example, Kroger 1991), or with restrictive mechanisms such as the 
'domicile clause' that is used for residential adoptions in Australia but not in 
New Zealand or England (Triseliotis 1988: 26; Fogarty et al. 1989: 60; Fyfe 
1991b). (The distinction between residential and guardianship adoptions is 
explained in chapter three.) The domicile clause in Australian legislation 
requires prospective adoptive parents to live in the child's country of origin 
for at least twelve months immediately prior to the recognition of the 
relinquishing country's adoption order by the Australian state (Newby et al. 
1991: 125; Fogarty et al. 1989: 60; Interdepartmental Committee 1986: 154; Fopp 
1982b: 58; Milburn 1991a, b, c). 
This chapter identifies three structural constraints on the scope and 
procedural pace of the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service. The first 
constraint analysed is the restriction of funding that is beyond the control of 
the case-officers and the manager of the agency. Secondly, the marginalisation 
of the adoptions agency by the current management structure is seen to have 
major implications for levels of resourcing. Thirdly, the necessarily 
protracted nature of the assessment process is explained. Despite these three 
structural constraints to funding, many applicants blame officers' alleged 
philosophical opposition to intercountry adoption for the limitations of 
service. Rationing is thus identified as a source of tension in the relationship 
between officers and applicants. The allocation process is not used as a 
rationing mechanism and does not contribute to relationship tension. 
However, officers' assertions about allegedly low numbers of available 
children are identified as a further source of tension. 
Rationing of the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service 
Accessibility to the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service is restricted, 
limited or rationed due to funding restrictions, the lack of access to 
representation on managerial levels within the bureaucracy, and the length 
of time needed for the careful assessment of applicants. The rationing of the 
service is necessary from the point of view of officers who Jake their 
assessment tasks seriously and who are aware of the funding constraints. For 
applicants, however, the rationing amounts to a diminution, and in some 
cases, a denial of a service that they want and that is in the interests of 
institutionalised children overseas. 
Funding restrictions The limitation of funding for social services has a long 
history. State welfare services usually cater for the needs of minorities, but are 
funded indirectly by all taxpayers. That arrangement creates a high level of 
social security for all citizens, that, because of its expense to the public purse, 
is nevertheless controversial. 
The phenomenon of social-welfare rationing in late-capitalist Western 
nations occurs in part as a result of the world-wide recession (Johnson 1985; 
Turner 1988). Turner, for example, argues that since 1973, when: '...the 
producing and exporting nations [took] control over the supply and price of 
oil by means of collective action' (Odell 1983: 211), late capitalist economies 
have experienced '...decline in commodity prices, an increase in world 
indebtedness, a spiral of inflation and unemployment, and a crisis in the 
world monetary system' (1988: 183). He goes on to argue that the economic 
recession has led to a crisis of legitimation for modern democratic 
governments as they seek to balance their responses to the conflicting 
demands of business that seeks greater profit and expansion, and the 
electorate that seeks greater access to improved social services (1988: 183-84). 
Rationing of social service provision is one response by Western 
governments to that fiscal crisis. 
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Rationing of social welfare services was evident before the oil crisis of 1973, 
however. Because of its social functions, rationing is an institutionalised 
feature of social service provision (see Foster 1983: 14). For example, some 
historical studies identify rationing as a mechanism for the deterrence of 
potential clients from access to social services in the administration of the 
1834 Poor Law Amendment Act in England (Glennerster 1975: 39). Others, 
such as Garfinkel (1956) and Turner (1988: 57-8), discuss the deterrent effects 
of rationing in the hospital setting. 
In Tasmania, the government has thus followed a long tradition. With an eye 
to reducing the Tasmanian state debt, government policy has significantly 
limited the funding of social services. The effects of that policy on the 
Intercountry Adoption Service have been noticed by applicants. Forty-one 
applicants said in interview that the service is inadequately resourced. Only 
nine said that it is adequately resourced. Six said they did not know. When 
asked to explain their assessments of inadequate resourcing, nineteen said 
that the officers, who are often not properly qualified or trained, are 
incompetent. Typical comments include the following, 
'There is limited funding and limited knowledge. More 
training is needed to find out what goes on in sending 
countries'. 
'They definitely work on the barest of information'. 
'The officers are not very well qualified. They don't have 
the knowledge they should have'. 
'Officers are not very professional, not very well trained. 
It would be good for officers to go to the sending countries 
and see how the orphanages work. One officer went and 
learned a lot but was later shunted out of the Department 
as she was becoming too committed to intercountry 
adoption and the Department opposes intercountry 
adoption'. 
Thirteen substantiated their views on inadequate resourcing with reference to 
the need for more staff. 
'If the service was better funded, they would have more 
staff and better information'. 
They could do with more staff. 
Eleven others said the problem is the lack of specialisation that limits officers' 
chances of developing appropriate levels of expertise. As one applicant couple 
put it, 
'Workers don't have enough time for intercountry 
adoption work. Our worker has one and a half days a 
week. The rest is local and fostering and other programs. 
Even if they had one full-time on intercountry adoption 
it would be better'. 
Four applicants suggested that the service should maintain control but liaise 
with non-government organisations that can facilitate and accelerate the 
process. Such co-operation was seen as a cost-efficient way of facilitating the 
process, of educating officers, and of circumventing the service restrictions 
caused by limited funding, 
'The only way I can see it overcoming budgetary 
constraints is a greater partnership with non-government 
organisations and parent groups. Use of voluntary 




Officers were also aware of the funding constraints. Nine expressed their 
frustration. For example, one said, 
'We are straightjacketed by not being able to visit the 
sending countries and work face to face with the services 
there'. 
Six said that intercountry adoption work is only a small part of their total 
workloads. As one officer put it, 
'Intercountry adoption is something fostering officers do 
off the side of their desks'. 
Three said that fostering takes priority over adoption work because fostering 
is seen as crisis work. That impression was recorded also in Timms' (1973: 20) 
study of applicants in Britain some twenty years ago, and underpins his call 
for specialisation of adoption work. Three wanted the Department of 
Community and Health Services to specialise adoption work in order to 
maximise officers' opportunities for developing expertise. One expressed her 
views in the following way, 
'It would be good to have specialist officers for fostering 
and adoption. The restructure of the Department didn't 
allow any specialisation at all'. 
Three said that staffing was adequate for the existing number of applicants. 
Two said that the service is understaffed. 
On the whole, applicants and officers agreed that the service is inadequately 
resourced. While applicants complained of the 'incompetence' of many 
service providers, officers identified systemic limitations to the development 
of expertise as a major cause of the problem. Bureaucratic structures that 
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redefine specialisation as deskilling militate against the development of 
expertise in a narrowly defined area. For example, where 'merit' is defined as 
'generalism' and 'adaptability' by managers of bureaucracies that provide a 
wide range of services, the occupational careers of individual officers will be 
advanced by comprehensive, rather than specialised, work experience. 
Moreover, the development of officer expertise would accelerate the 
processing of applications, thereby increasing service demand and the need 
for more funding. Finally, specialisation of officers would warrant their 
visiting sending countries in order to familiarise themselves with conditions 
and procedures there and to create personal relationships to facilitate the 
processing of future applications. Specialisation is, therefore, structurally not 
in the interests of officers' career paths, nor in the interests of bureaucratic 
executives who are rewarded for budget control or rationing and not for 
service expansion. Funding for the adoptions agency is restricted not only by 
general departmental policy, however, but also by the current management 
structure. 
Management structure Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service workers 
are marginalised within the larger Department of Community and Health 
Services. The Department follows the British example, cited by Triseliotis 
(1993: 132), of giving intercountry adoption a lower priority than the 
placement of special needs children in local care. Intra-departmental 
marginalisation of the intercountry adoption service might also be a result of 
reference-group awareness of discredited permanent placement policies such 
as those cited by Thurnham (1993: 140). 
Current bureaucratic arrangements have structurally isolated the Adoption 
Service from the regionalisation of all other agencies within the Department. 
One officer expressed her views ironically, 
'All the service delivery is regionalised because that is 
thought to be better, especially in a state like Tasmania 
with such a large population. "Unfortunately" they can't 
regionalise adoption. We've been so lucky with adoptions 
to keep the cohesion we've got'. 
As the only non-regionalised agency, the Adoption Service is left with 
'cohesion' but without clear managerial lines of accountability. More 
importantly, the service does not have formalised access to the managerial 
level within the departmental hierarchy. One officer pointed out the 
important funding implications, 
They couldn't regionalise adoptions services. So this unit 
can't be a part of central office (it was always a part of 
Head office) because it is not policy. Neither is it confined 
to one region. So it's what they call "out-bureaud" to the 
Southern Region, which means it is a pain in the neck to 
the Southern Region, but it has no lines of 
communication with the North and the South, and I 
mean none'. 
Another explained, 
'There are seven programs, each has about six 
subprograms all competing for resources. It's a fight with 
your mates. There is now an administrative structure 
which doesn't provide for adoptions services because 
those services don't regionalise nicely and they haven't 
built into their management structure a flexibility to 
allow you lines of communication with decision-makers 
at policy level so that the other services with whom you 
are competing for funding do have clear and undisputed 
access to decision-making bodies or individuals while 
you do not'. 
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A third said, 
'The Department is not keen on adoption. They don't 
know where it fits. Managers forget about adoption. They 
don't know how it works. It is a fairly autonomous unit 
with negative funding implications. We are the only non-
regionalised part of the Department'. 
Restricted funding and a lack of representation at senior level within the 
bureaucracy deny the adoptions service the staffing levels it would need to 
increase its client load. Officers could increase service accessibility by 
completing the assessment reports on new applicants much quicker than they 
currently do. However, since that option would require a major change in 
officers' sense of appropriate service-delivery standards, they are likely to 
reject it. 
The assessment process Officers have to ration the service in order to be able 
to assess applicants thoroughly 'in the best interests of the child'. The process 
of assessing the future parenting ability of an applicant is essentially one that 
requires officers to make predictions and to hope that those predictions will 
in time be shown to have been accurate. As we saw in chapter five, officers 
have a keen sense of responsibility for the child. The assessment process, that 
is therefore necessarily careful and thorough, will inevitably take 
considerable time to complete. Without additional funding, the service could 
only increase the number of applicants for assessment by reducing the time 
taken for assessment. The need for deterrence increases along with the 
number of applicants. The option of quicker processing would compromise 
the quality of the service in the eyes of many officers. Their views were 
encapsulated by the officer who said, 
'It's a long, difficult, tedious process. You don't take their 
responses at face value. You have to get to know your family 
'really well to be able to satisfy yourself that they are OK'. 
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Restricted service accessibility can thus be identified as a result of the 
complicated nature of the assessment process. Responses to the question in 
interview on service accessibility show a polarisation of views. Thirty-nine 
applicants and two officers said that the service is not constantly available to 
the public. In contrast, thirteen applicants and ten officers said that the service 
is constantly available to the public. Seventeen applicants' and two officers' 
views that the service has been closed from time to time are corroborated by 
the Intercountry Adoption Service's own annual reports' that intercountry 
adoption lists were closed from July 1990 till July 1992 (Department of 
Community Services 1992; Department of Community and Health Services 
1993: 59). Given the high turnover of staff, it is possible that some officers are 
not aware that the Intercountry Adoption Service lists have ever been closed. 
While the question of service accessibility proved controversial, there was 
agreement on the need for an assessment process that is designed to 
determine the suitability of applicants for adoption. All seventy-two 
interviewees agreed that there should be an applicant-screening process by 
state officers in Tasmania. For example, one applicant said, 
'Sometimes there may be a personality clash between the 
officer and the applicant. But the screening process is 
good. Applicants should be screened because there are a 
lot of people who love these little children because they 
are dark and they think they are little dolls. But once they 
get older they are like any other child. If they are not 
going to get a proper home life they might as well stay in 
their home country'. 
Some others said that the screening process is not stringent enough. As one 
put it, 
'There has to be screening of some kind. One officer was 
very thorough. She explained to us it was going to take 
time because she had to do this and this. The first officer 
saw us once and said she could see we were alright and 
that was it. Most of that interview she spent talking about 
her child - most inappropriate. An hour is not enough for 
screening. Anybody could pull the wool over her eyes'. 
Forty-five applicants said that officers support the existing screening process. 
Those results suggest that there is a high level of value consensus on the 
matter of screening for approval in Tasmania. However, applicants, who 
supported the process in principle, usually expressed criticism and suggested 
improvements. For example, of a total of twenty-nine complainants, thirteen 
said some questions were intrusive, twelve said that officers were not 
sufficiently informed or qualified to conduct the screening process properly, 
and eleven expressed criticism about the irrelevance and stringency of the 
medical form. Furthermore, forty-seven applicants who said there should be 
a screening process, indicated substantial dissatisfaction with the service in 
general. That dissatisfaction, that is discussed in detail in chapter ten, was 
expressed, for example, in the following terms by one applicant, 
'There should be a screening process, but it needs to be 
improved. We waited years to be approved. The 
Department never explained why it took so long. Round 
and round in circles. We attended an eight-hour seminar. 
For the first five and a half hours we got why we should 
not adopt from overseas. To me that is totally disgusting'. 
Dissatisfaction with the screening process was also expressed by some officers. 
One, for example, wanted protocols to be established between the adoption 
service and the Child Protection Board, 
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There's not a child protection check. It's going to change 
but has to go via a panel. Fostering has a child protection 
check. From now on I will ask applicants if it's OK that I 
do a child protection check because if something goes 
wrong and we have not done that we could be liable. I can 
access child protection documents with the permission of 
applicants but not without. We leave ourselves wide 
open. In the Act it says you can't adopt a child if you have 
a record of an offence against a child. We won't be able to 
find out that if we don't do a child protection check. 
Currently the screening runs the risk of contravening the 
Act. Officers should have a check done on themselves 
too'. 
That officer's concerns have since been allayed by the introduction into the 
process of official access to any Child Protection Board data for the purposes of 
assessment. 
The allocation process While there was substantial dissatisfaction with 
aspects of the assessment process, applicants expressed very little disquiet 
about the allocation process. Forty-three applicants said that the sending 
country allocates the child to prospective adoptive parents. Only three said 
the adoptions manager does not always pass the offer-of-allocation on to 
applicants for consideration. Five said that ASIAC allocates. Four said the 
Tasmanian service manager allocates if asked to by sending countries. Two 
said they had chosen the child themselves. Two said they did not know who 
allocates the child to applicants. 
There was virtually no misunderstanding among applicants about who 
allocates intercountry adoptive children. It is therefore not the case that 
applicants are generally of the view that officers ration the service by 
withholding allocation or by allocating children only to their favourite 
applicants. Furthermore, there was little complaint about eligibility criteria. 
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Number of children available Other research has shown that adoptions 
officers will show a 'blue-ribbon' attitude of encouragement towards 
intending applicants when the supply of children exceeds demand (see, for 
example, Reid 1971: 6-8; Melichercik 1981: 12; Harris 1981: 192). In addition, 
Toft and McIntyre (1992) illustrate the flexibility of adoption criteria. Faced 
with a shortage of adoptive applicants, officers lower the price or costs of 
adoption, for example, by guaranteeing the applicant a 'perfect' child. 
Conversely, when there is a shortage of children, eligibility criteria for 
applicants become more restrictive. Thus Close (1977: 33), for example, 
associates stricter criteria with decreased supply of children. 
The simple association between rationing and the number of children 
available for adoption rests on the assumption that officers face no other 
pressures to limit the size of their services. It also rests on the assumption 
that bureaucrats do not arbitrarily limit the number of children available in 
order to deflect client criticism about service rationing. Given the evidence 
that there are many children who could benefit from intercountry adoption 
(see, for example, Boss 1993; Benet 1976: 133-4; Gamage 1993; Snow 1994; and 
Thurnham 1993: 142), the replacement of 'blue ribbon' with 'red tape' appears 
as a function not of a lack of children but rather as a function of the size of the 
agency. Since the agency is small, there is a need to ration the service and 
manage the attendant dissatisfaction from frustrated clients. 
Forty-eight applicants said that there were adequate children available for 
intercountry adoption. As one applicant put it, 
'There are plenty of children overseas that need adoption 
who have been processed for adoption because their 
names appear in support group literature'. 
Nine applicants and four officers said there were not enough available to 
meet the demand from prospective adoptive couples in Tasmania. Five 
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officers said they did not know whether there are enough children available. 
One officer said that there are enough families available in Tasmania for 
intercountry adoptive children. Forty-three applicants, including four who 
had said that there were not enough children available, indicated that the 
number made available for adoption is bureaucratically limited in Australia, 
'Yes, more than enough from personal experience. The 
Department says there are not enough because it has 
some hidden agenda. The number made available for 
intercountry adoption is limited by bureaucratic processes 
and bureaucratic anti-intercountry adoption ideology'. 
Another compared Tasmania with the United States, 
'It seems strange you can only apply for one country at a 
time. There are a lot of children out there that could be 
adopted. The numbers are limited by government 
negotiation. The U.S. adopts heaps more children 
proportionately than we do - so there must be lots of kids 
out there'. 
Twenty said that the number is limited by state bureaucracies in the sending 
countries. Fourteen of them said that the number is limited by state 
bureaucracies in sending countries and in Australia. 
Nine applicants at first seemed to agree with the Department's official 
position on availability, that is, that there are few children available for 
intercountry adoption, and that availability is determined by authorities 
other than the Department. However, applicants' responses only reveal the 
perception that the number of children available for intercountry adoption is 
bureaucratically limited. That perception is in line with the view expressed in 
the Proceedings of the 4th North American Conference on Adoptable 
Children (see Benet 1976: 134). Interviewees who, for example, identified 
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welfare departments in sending countries as sources of rationing, seemed to 
agree with the Tasmanian departmental line that the numbers of children 
available are beyond its control. Most of those interviewees, however, also 
identified the Tasmanian Department as a source of rationing. That 
identification is a predictable point of tension. Intercountry adoption service 
pronouncements about low numbers of children available for intercountry 
adoption (See for example, Department of Community Welfare 1990: 16) are 
questioned by some officers and are, on the whole, not accepted by applicants. 
The identification by twenty applicants of service-rationing mechanisms 
beyond the Tasmanian Department's control indicates a level of congruence 
between officers and applicants. 
Conclusion 
The Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service asserts that there are very few 
children available for intercountry adoption. The monetary and non-
monetary costs of adoption to applicants are therefore raised. For example, 
unpopular fees have been introduced, and constantly emphasised statements 
concerning the small number of children available for adoption serve to deter 
all but the most motivated from applying. Once in the scheme, applicants are 
continually told by officers to expect delays. Applicants are also told to expect 
serious post-placement adjustment problems on the part of the child as part 
of the normal adoption process. Such statements, too, deter people from 
applying. Finally, applicant motivations are sometimes demonised and 
normal respect for applicant privacy is pushed aside in the alleged interests of 
the child. Applicants pay a high price for permission to adopt. The process 
tests their commitment, motivations, integrity, values, and patience. 
Nevertheless, this empirical study of rationing shows that applicants and 
officers do not adopt polarised positions. Applicants' attitudes to rationing of 
the service are ambivalent. State intervention, regulation and supervision of 
adoptive family formation is acceptable to applicants where the interests of 
the child are seen to be promoted. Where the service has failed to convince 
applicants that rationing is in the interests of the child, let alone of the 
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applicants themselves, dissatisfaction appears. Dissatisfaction on the part of 
the weaker party in a politically unequal relationship underpins frustration, 





At first glance, during placement, responsibility for the child appears to be 
'shared' between officers and applicants. While the adoption process runs 
smoothly, cooperation appears to characterise their relationship. At this stage 
of the process applicants assume the status of parents, refer to themselves as 
adoptive parents and begin to exercise typical parental 'rights' over the child. 
For their part, officers appear to 'delegate' just such custodial rights to 
applicants — even if only in the form that applicants' assumption of parental 
roles is not contested by officers who withdraw into the background. 
However, this thesis argues that when issues of guardianship emerge, a 
contest is generated over who has the right and responsibility to act as the 
'parent' of the child. In such contests the residual rights of officers become 
evident. In cases of dispute over authority, the parental roles of the adoptive 
parents and of the officers become more clearly defined. The assumption of 
total parenthood status by applicants, acquiesced to by officers as part of the 
normal transition into full custodial rights, becomes a matter of contest as 
officers exercise their residual powers and 'claim back' some of the authority 
that they appear to have delegated. It is the exercise of the very real powers 
that officers have over the children, whose care they supervise, that points to 
the fact that roles are not shared but rather compartmentalised. In the normal 
course, the tension that is evident in the relationship takes the form of 
anxiety, largely latent, about control and responsibility. Once roles have been 
sharpened in the course of a dispute, and the relative position of the parties 
clarified, the tension between officers and applicants becomes manifest and, 
given that legal lines of authority have hardened, turns on the timing of the 
transfer of parental roles fully to the applicant parents. In every day terms, 
applicants come to accept that officers have rights over the child; rights 
which, one day soon, will pass over to them as fully-fledged parents. 
131 
This chapter explores that anxiety and tension further by focusing on the 
parenting roles assumed by officers and applicants. The distribution of 
parenting roles affects officers' and applicants' expectations of each other. In 
particular, it influences their views on the pace at which applications should 
be processed and the timing of the transfer of parental authority. 
Adoption is essentially different from fosterage, ritual sponsorship and 
adrogation that Goody (1971: 335) describes as various ways of dividing the 
care and responsibility for children between families. She contrasts those 
child-placement options with adoption where: '...the substitution of one set 
of parental roles for another, rather than the sharing of roles, is the object' 
(1971: 335). Her set of parental roles contains five elements, only the first of 
which is restricted to biological parents: genitor/ genetrix, source of status 
identity, nurse, tutor, and sponsor (1971: 332). Later she makes it clear that her 
understanding of 'substitution' in adoption is one where: '..."total 
parenthood" is renounced by one couple and assumed by another' (1971: 342). 
Furthermore, she concludes that the 'transfer' of all available parental roles 
in adoption is the antithesis of the pattern of 'shared' parental roles '...found 
in the institutions of fosterage, ritual sponsorship and adrogation' (1971: 344). 
Since Goody's (1971) theory of adoption does not account for the status and 
role of the intercountry adoption service officer, it is too restrictive for this 
analysis of relationships in intercountry adoption. Her conceptual framework 
is limited to the analysis of ideal unregulated adoption where, unlike in the 
murderous institution of babyfarming, parental roles are transferred directly 
from the biological parents to the adoptive parents. In state-regulated 
guardianship adoption, officers temporarily assume ex-officio the rights and 
responsibilities normally associated with relinquishing parents. 
Ritual sponsorship and adrogation are alien to modern Western societies, but 
fostering remains. Of interest to this chapter is the fact that, as we saw in 
chapter seven, many adoptions officers also work as foster-care workers. 
Crisis, out-of-home-care service takes up more of their time than does 
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adoption work. Thus when Goody observes that.. 
'...there is in adoption, as it is practised in our society, no basis for the 
sharing of parental role elements, just because adoptive parents are 
seeking to fill all these roles themselves. They want a whole child, not 
a part of one' (1971: 342)... 
...she is writing from the perspective of (prospective) adoptive parents and 
not from the perspective of Intercountry Adoption Service officers. We can 
imagine that officers can distinguish between adoption and fostering, but the 
ability to distinguish between these institutions is not necessarily attended by 
the ability to suspend the normative bureaucratic pattern of 'shared' 
parenting in an unequal power relationship with clients. In other words, 
there is no evidence to show that official preparedness to relinquish all pro-
parenting rights and responsibilities appears as a result of official cognizance 
of applicant goals. Rather, officers' approach to intercountry adoption is 
informed by their familiarity with the dominant, and to them normative, 
pattern of shared parenting. 
In fact, parental roles are not shared. Rather, they are compartmentalised and 
that has implications for officers' and applicants' perceptions of time. 
Divided parenting arrangements, such as fostering, are underpinned by the 
institutionalised, if not legislatively stipulated, status and role of the 
biological parent, the welfare officer and the foster parent. Such long-term 
parenting arrangements are better described as compartmentalised than 
shared. The notion of 'sharing', with its (in this case) misleading connotation 
of consensual and symmetrical division, denotes pro-parental involvement 
of various parties but does not indicate the level or nature of each party's 
rights and responsibilities. In contrast, 'compartmentalisation', with its 
connotation of inflexibility, more accurately conveys a sense of rigid or 
institutionalised allocation of pro-parental rights and duties and, because it is 
not connotative of mutual consent, is more representative of the unequal 
social and political power within allegedly 'shared' parenting arrangements. 
In the following discussion, applicant urgency and commitment to project 
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completion are explained in part as results of the social stigmatisation of 
welfare services, and are contrasted with officers' sense of professional 
caution. Officer reticence, that persists despite the weight of research evidence 
in favour of happy outcomes in approximately ninety-seven per cent of 
intercountry adoptions, is identified as a source of frustration for applicants. 
The difference between officer and applicant views on procedural pace is 
recognised as a major point of tension in the relationship. However, 
significant elements of consensus are also identified. 
In relationships of unequally compartmentalised social and political power, 
discrepancies between officers' and applicants' judgements of what 
constitutes appropriate periods within the process predictably emerge as 
points of tension. Conceptualisation of time allocation and procedural speed 
is thus to a large extent structurally derived. 
Parenting roles and the pace of processing 
Now that the postmodern conjugal dyad is characterised by a re-emergence of 
familial 'symmetry' (Young and Willmott 1973), and often the attendant 
'democratisation' of the spousal relationship (Giddens 1992: 185), there is a 
sense of mutual control and intimate, creative self-expression in biological 
reproduction. The perception of being in control is strengthened by the 
highly 'determinate' nine month waiting period of pregnancy. The analogy 
between adoption and the birth process drawn by Berry (1973: 101-2) is false. 
Humphrey and Humphrey (1993: 26), for example, show that applicants in 
intercountry adoption are obliged to conform to the social domination of 
strangers for indeterminate periods that, since they are usually much longer 
than nine months, are perceived by prospective adoptive parents as 
frustrating, lengthy delays. 
Furthermore, pregnancies are typified as 'episodic', that is, they are 
'...characterized by an intensity of activity' and in that sense can be compared 
to romantic affairs (Lyman and Scott 1970: 194). Conversely, intercountry 
adoption service waiting periods are 'continuous', long-term, slow and 
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requiring an '...inhibition of excessive spontaneous emotionality' (Lyman 
and Scott 1970: 194). In other words, applicants are denied the expression of 
precisely those emotional highs normally associated with antenatal 
parenthood. Applicants typifications of anticipated parenthood thus prepare 
them for the normal pregnancy and birthing process, but not for intercountry 
adoption procedures. 
Typification of adoptive family formation for intercountry adoption 
applicants is informed not only by comparison and contrast with pregnancy, 
but also by knowledge of local adoption. Intercountry adoption procedures 
usually take longer than pregnancy but are quicker than current 
arrangements for domestic adoption. Depending on applicants' points of 
reference, therefore, the intercountry adoption process may seem fast or 
slow. Applicants' views here will, of course, also be influenced by the actual 
time taken for their adoptions to be completed. 
Regulations, that stipulate limited age-differences between child and 
applicant or that limit the total time allowed for applicant involvement in 
programs, impose deadlines. In Lyman and Scott's (1970: 207) terms, 
applicants may experience 'time panic' as a result of their need to make a 
good impression within a limited period. 
The separate orientations, agendas and subcultures of officers and clients 
predictably inform differing views on procedural pace. As Pinker (1973) 
observes, given the stigmatisation of many social services provided by the 
state, it is predictable that clients who seek access to such services will only do 
so if the object desired cannot be gained by them from private or market 
sources of welfare. In other words, state welfare services are provided for 
citizens who, demonstrably, have failed to gain welfare objects through the 
family, friends or the market place. State services are the last port of call. 
Where possible, citizens will first attempt to gain the welfare they need from 
private, non-stigmatised sources. We can expect, therefore, that clients may 
approach state welfare services with a structurally-derived degree of 
135 
reluctance. That reluctance may delay their approach to services with the 
result that a sense of urgency has developed in clients prior to their initial 
meeting with service providers. Reluctance to approach services for help can 
be expected to persist after placement. For example, Howe (1992: 2) observes 
adoptive parental reluctance to seek guidance from the Post-Adoption Centre 
in London. 
Officers and applicants all seek to secure the best interests of the child. 
Tension emerges, however, as a result of the varying orientations that lead to 
significantly different perspectives. Officers' opinions on procedural pace are 
informed by a very different structurally-derived agenda. For example, the 
officer will maintain the pro-parenting role element of sponsor as explained 
by Goody (1971: 332) until she is satisfied that the prospective adoptive 
parents will provide a suitable home and family for the child. It is at that 
point that the evaluative component, that underpins the tension in the 
relationship with applicants, ends. 
With regard to the unidentified, pre-allocation child, the officer seeks to 
respect the various rights of biological parents and the rights of the child to be 
placed with suitable adoptive parents. Since a careful and thorough 
examination is needed, the assessment of applicant-suitability is necessarily a 
slow process. Painstaking examination of intercountry adoption applicant 
suitability will be insisted upon by officers who have to satisfy themselves 
that the prospective adoptive parents are suitable applicants for exclusive, 
private (that is, unsupervised) access to, and care of, the child. That insistence 
has implications for the speed of processing and for the number of applicants 
the service can accept. As one officer put it, 
'The time taken for the home study (that is, the 
completion of the assessment of applicants) varies from 
region to region according to the number of applicants'. 
Officers talk about 'shared' responsibility for the child, but that concept is 
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alien to the pattern, normative to applicants, of private and holistic child care 
within the nuclear family setting. A preoccupation with the rights of the 
child, along with the low levels of specialised pre-service training and 
professional development, leave officers ironically unprepared for their 
responsibilities for post-placement support of the adoptive family. Support 
for the family would be an obvious way of supporting the child. Such support 
is needed in light of the research evidence of post-placement problems, 
including depression among adoptive mothers (Gair 1994). Adoptive parents 
see the child as a member of the family. Officers may share that view, but 
from their perspective as pro-parental guardian of the child, they tend to see 
the child as an individual. Officers' emphasis on the rights of the child, 
therefore, predictably create tension where that emphasis is seen to compete 
with applicants' concern for the rights and well-being of the adoptive family. 
Some authors assert that the bureaucratic principle of the paramountcy of the 
best interests of the child in this context is not followed in official practice 
(see, for example, Eisen 1980: 56). Adherence to the principle of the best 
interests of children has ironic stressor effects for children if it obscures the 
concerns of parents (Boss and Edwards 1992: 27). Failure to address their 
concerns, leads to adoptive parental stress that, in turn, has a detrimental 
effect on adoptive children. That argument is put, for example, by Eisen (1979: 
199) and the Community Welfare Advisory Committee on Adoption Matters 
in South Australia (1976: 27). That committee responds to the identified 
adoptive parental stress by recommending the implementation of stricter 
eligibility criteria as a rationing mechanism, and the provision of counselling 
for those applicants whose names are subsequently removed from the 
Adoption Register. Their response involves a procedural but not a structural 
change. Officers remain as arbitrators in positions of unassailable, unitary 
authority. 
The positive results of research into adoption outcomes and the 
internationally low disruption rate of between 1 and 3 per cent (see, for 
example, Harper 1985b: 6) for intercountry adoptive placements will not be 
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known to the majority of intercountry adoption officers who have received 
little specialised training. Past successes, therefore, do not contribute to 
official confidence that current applicants will make good parents. Rather, the 
onus of proof remains with applicants who must establish to the satisfaction 
of officers that the intercountry adoptive child will be looked after well in the 
adoptive family. Ultimately, the intercountry adoptive tasks for applicants 
and officers are impossible to achieve. Applicants can not demonstrate 
beyond reasonable doubt that they will be good parents to the intercountry 
adoptive child. Conversely, officers can never be completely sure that the 
applicants they approve for adoption are actually suitable. In the final 
analysis, officers have to trust the applicants' assurances. It is no wonder, 
then, that the views on procedural pace differ. 
An overview of studies of intercountry adoptive children's post-placement 
adjustment and functioning is provided by Triseliotis (1993). He cites on the 
one hand the findings by Rathburn (1965), Garde11 (1979), and Hoksbergen 
(1990) who showed that some children were unhappy and had adjustment 
problems, and on the other the positive outcomes reported by Gunnarby et al. 
(1982), Hofvander et al. (1978), Loenen and Hoksbergen (1986), Simon and 
Alstein (1987), Gill and Jackson (1983), Feigelman and Silverman (1984), Kim 
(1978), Pruzan (1977), and Ahlijah (1990). 
Rathburn (1965) finds that almost one third of the thirty-eight intercountry 
adoptive children he studied in the United States had adjustment problems. 
Simon and Senturia (1966) and, more recently, Howe and Hinings (1987) also 
record negative results. They find a significantly high representation of extra-
familial adoptive children and adolescents in psychiatric settings. Simon and 
Senturia infer from their data that non-relative adoption is '...a specific stress 
associated with increased incidence of psychiatric illness' (1966: 867). 
Adopting a psychological perspective, Simon and Senturia locate the stress 
and attendant anti-social behaviours within the adoptive family. They 
suggest that future studies should examine the contribution of hereditary 
factors to the delinquency of adoptive minors (1966: 865), but fail to locate the 
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undesirable behaviour in broader soda! contexts. They do not, for example, 
consider any lasting effects of pre-adoption trauma. Nor do they acknowledge 
that juvenile delinquency is a social construction that, as Cohen et al. (1993: 
557-58) for example confirm, varies between biological and adoptive families. 
Cohen et al. (1993) find that adoptive families are more likely to account for 
behaviour problems in terms of the child's genetic make-up and pre-
adoption experience. In contrast, biological families tend to explain problems 
in terms of family dysfunction. For biological families '...parent separation 
from each other rather than from the child was more often seen as a 
solution', while adoptive families '...were more likely to consider removal of 
the child from the home as a solution' (Cohen et al. 1993: 558). Simon and 
Senturia, possibly unaware of such sociological research and theory, propose 
a simplistic solution to the problem of adoptive child delinquency in terms 
that, like Eisen's, consolidate existing political power structures, 
'...Our study suggests that child care agencies might well 
consider criteria for selecting persons who can adopt so that the 
specific stresses we feel to be inherent in the adoption situation 
might be minimized' (1966: 867). 
Gardell (1979) finds serious adjustment problems among sixty-four per cent 
of intercountry adoptive children who were six years or older on arrival in 
Sweden. In contrast, Lawder et al. (1969), Cunningham et al. (1977: 251) and 
Bohman (1972: 96) find no higher incidence of poor outcome among 
placement of older children. Hoksbergen (1990) attributes the reduced 
popularity of older adoptions among the Dutch to public awareness of 
children's adjustment problems. Based on a review of research conducted in 
the 1960s and 1970s, Kim et al. (1979) conclude that the long-term effects of 
transracial adoption remain controversial. Simon and Alstein (1987), 
however, find that domestic transracial adoptions within the United States 
were halted not because of awareness of adjustment problems but because 
child welfare agencies saw the change of policy as politically expedient. 
Shireman and Johnson (1986) record positive outcomes for most 
transradally adopted children in the United States. McRoy et al. (1982) find 
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no difference in child self-esteem in a study of thirty transracial adoptive 
families and thirty black in-racial adoptive families. They do, however, 
observe that the black transracially adopted children had greater difficulty in 
the development of racial identity. 
Macaulay and Macaulay (1978: 292) observe that in the 1970s, transracial 
adoption was a matter for official discretion. Hill and Bramley (1986: 167) 
describe official discretion as a mechanism for the distancing of policy 
makers from the resolution of 'critical value problems'. In other words, any 
dissatisfaction with transracial adoption was managed by allocation of 
decision-making power to official discretion rather than departmental policy. 
Tizard (1978: 240) and Feigelman and Silverman (1984: 601) observe that the 
important point of comparison is between adopted children and those still in 
orphanages or similar institutions, not between adopted children and 
children 'born into stable families'. Tizard and Rees (1977) and Winick, 
Meyer and Harris (1975) confirm that post-institutional adoption has 
beneficial effects on children compared with children still in orphanages or 
similar institutions. Dumaret (1985) and Bohman and Sigvardsson (1988) 
find that adopted children progress better than children returned to their 
biological parents. Gunnarby et al. (1982), Hofvander et al. (1978) and Loenen 
and Hoksbergen (1986) observe that adjustment and health problems among 
intercountry adoptive children in Sweden and Holland gradually diminish 
or disappear. Gill and Jackson (1983), Feigelman and Silverman (1984 and 
1983: 146-72), Kim (1978), Pruzan (1977), Ahlijah (1990), Bagley and Young 
(1979) and Costin and Wattenberg (1979) find positive implications for the 
transracial adoption of children when compared with non-adopted or infra-
racially adopted children. 
Transradal adoption has also been found to have positive effects on the IQ of 
adopted children. There is debate on this topic, however. Levin (1994: 13) and 
Lynn (1994: 26) assert that the mean IQ difference between blacks and whites 
is 'significantly genetic in origin' and that the mean IQ of black children 
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adopted into white families is therefore the same as the mean IQ of black 
children raised in black families. In contrast, Moore (1986) and Waldman et 
al. (1994) argue that transracial adoption of black children into middle-class, 
white families has beneficial effects on the IQ and educational achievement 
of the children. The heredity/ environment debate reveals evidence from 
both sides that transracial adoption at worst has no effect on mean black IQs, 
and at best has a beneficial effect. 
Lack or shortage of specialised intercountry adoptive training explains 
officers' lack of awareness of the positive outcomes of most research on 
intercountry adoption placement. That lack of awareness, along with the 
need for the officer to be seen to be adopting a disinterested, dispassionate, 
objective, careful and considered approach to each case, precludes rapid 
decision-making. In addition, the officer's primary socialisation underpins 
her reluctance to revoke pro-parental rights. It is predictable, therefore, that a 
fast pace of operation, that clients welcome as efficient and humane, will be 
seen by officers as hasty, careless, unprofessional and inappropriate. 
The expectation that officers would take a cautious approach to their work 
and to the ultimate relinquishment of their pro-parental authority over the 
child, was borne out in interviews. Nevertheless, officers showed substantial 
empathy with applicants' frustration over waiting periods. 
The empirical study found that applicants and officers gave similar responses 
to questions about what constitutes an appropriate wait for an intercountry 
adoptive child. Fifty-eight applicants responded to the question on what they 
considered an appropriate period to wait from application to placement. The 
total number of months nominated was 943. The mean was sixteen months. 
The range was from two to twenty-four months, with a median of thirteen 
months. The mode was twenty-four months. Twenty applicants said that 
twenty-four months was an appropriate time to have to wait for placement. 
Some simply indicated that, 
'Two years from application to placement' 
was appropriate. Others responded in greater detail. For example, one said, 
'Approval should take no more than six months 
here and preferably no more than three months in 
the relinquishing country. Approval to placement 
should be no more than twelve months. The total 
should be no more than twenty-one months to 
two years'. 
Fourteen applicants said that a waiting period of up to eighteen months 
would be appropriate. Eleven said twelve months, another eleven said nine 
months, and one applicant said two months was an appropriate period to 
have to wait. Of the fifty-six respondents, therefore, only thirteen indicated 
that the process should take no longer than a normal pregnancy. 
Five officers said that twenty-four months was an appropriate time to have to 
wait for placement. Two officers said eighteen months would be appropriate. 
Three said twelve months. One said up to five years' waiting could be 
realistically expected. Another one said twelve months was an appropriate 
period to wait for a decision on approval to adopt in Tasmania. One officer 
explained her views very carefully by pointing to the distinction between the 
notion of an 'appropriate' waiting period and a 'realistic' waiting period, 
'Nine months would be ideal. I doubt I could wait three 
to four years and maintain the same level of feeling 
about the whole thing. Maybe between twenty and forty 
years of age having to wait four to five years is not so bad, 
but past forty having to wait five or six years is something 
which I feel has quite concerning effects. A five-year wait 
for a child is not reasonable but realistic'. 
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Actual waiting periods as recorded by applicants were on average longer than 
officers' indications of normal waiting periods from application to 
placement. Where applicants had completed more than one application, only 
the longest period waited was recorded for this comparison. Fifty-two 
applicants indicated how long they had actually waited for placement. The 
total number of months indicated was 1,709. The mean was thirty-three 
months. The range was from nine to eighty-four months, with a median of 
forty-seven months. The waiting period of twenty-four months was 
experienced by nine applicants. Twenty-seven applicants waited longer than 
two years. Twenty-one waited three years or more. Thirteen waited four years 
or more. 
Four officers indicated that the normal waiting period for placement was 
within twenty-four months. Two officers indicated that the normal waiting 
period for placement was thirty-six months. Two officers indicated that the 
normal waiting period for placement was eighteen months. Two said there is 
no normal waiting period. Four said it varies, depending on the sending 
country. One said it does not vary according to sending country. One said she 
did not know where the delay occurs. One expressed her frustration on behalf 
of applicants, 
'It normally takes longer than twelve months. After the 
file has been approved and sent overseas, it can be there 
twelve months and we hear nothing. Then the 
application has to be reviewed here to update the 
information. I can't do much more. I don't know where 
the delay is'. 
Applicant typification of appropriate waiting periods was based for about half 
the total number of applicants interviewed on the normal nine-month 
duration of pregnancy. Twenty-nine applicants said that applicants should be 
required to wait for longer than nine months for placement. Thirty-two 
indicated that nine months was an appropriate period for applicants to be 
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required to wait. Only two applicants said that the waiting period till 
placement should be shorter than nine months. While the nine-month 
pregnancy term informs applicant notions of appropriate waiting periods, 
therefore, awareness of structural constraints on officialdom underpins a 
high level of applicant agreement with officers that the process should take 
longer than nine months to complete. 
Four officers said that applicants should have to wait for longer than nine 
months. Four indicated that nine months was an appropriate period for 
applicants to be required to wait. One said that twelve months' wait is 
'plenty'. One said that 'you can't compare' adoption with pregnancy. 
Thirty-seven applicants complained that in Tasmania it takes too long to gain 
approval-to-adopt. Nine officers pointed out that once the file is overseas, 
the length of waiting periods is beyond the Tasmanian agency's control. 
Another one officer said that once the file has left her office it is beyond her 
control. 
There was a high level of agreement between officers and applicants that the 
minimum twelve-month placement period is acceptable. Nevertheless, 
many applicants expressed dissatisfaction with this obstacle to completion of 
their adoption projects. Twenty-nine applicants said that the twelve-month 
placement supervision period was acceptable. Typically, those applicants 
observed that, 
'It's reasonable. It is different to biological arrival. 
Feedback to the sending country at this stage is 
important'. 
Twenty applicants said that it was too long. Ten said that the placement 
supervision period should last only six months. Some gave several reasons. 
For example, 
The twelve months is quite wrong. Local adoption is six 
months. Intercountry adoption should not be different. If 
the relinquishing country has allowed applicants to adopt 
the child and assume full responsibility, the Australian 
government should recognise that decision. Otherwise 
they are not having regard to the law of the other country 
- that country's expression of taking care of the child'. 
Three said it should last only three months. Three said there should be no 
placement supervision period at all where the child has been adopted in the 
sending country prior to arrival in Australia. Seven saw the placement 
supervision period as a rationing mechanism that delays the filing of 
subsequent applications. Subsequent applications are not accepted until 
current applications are finalised by the granting of adoption orders by 
Australian magistrates. That arrangement causes frustration among 
applicants. As one explained, 
'The twelve-month placement period was frustrating 
because it delayed our second application which couldn't 
proceed till the first child was adopted in Australia. It was 
frustrating to think that someone could still walk in and 
... it's still their child'. 
Five explained that the twelve-month minimum supervision period is 
harmful to older children who are aware that their status in the prospective 
adoptive family and in Australian society remains tenuous. Five based their 
complaints about the placement period on the grounds that prospective 
adoptive parents had no guarantee that the adoption would proceed. Two 
applicants labelled placement supervision a 'double standard', there being no 
supervision of postnatal parenting in families of origin. 
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Ten officers said that the twelve-month placement period is acceptable. A 
typical response pointed to the parenting role of the officer, 
'The placement period is sound. It legitimises the worker 
being there in a supervisory role. It stops immediate 
ownership and exclusiveness. For some applicants who 
have no experience of living with a child on their own, 
it's good to have an experienced worker available'. 
One said it is too long. Two indicated that they believed that the bonding 
process is more difficult with older children. They therefore suggested that 
twelve months' placement supervision is appropriate for older aged 
children, but too long for babies or infants, 
'Infants should be brought into line with local adoption, 
six months. With older children it gives time to 
supervise'. 
The Child Welfare League of America (1973: 40) recommends that the length 
of pre-adoption placements should be determined jointly by the adoptive 
parents and the relevant agency. In contrast, the Tasmanian Intercountry 
Adoption Service has established the convention of a minimum twelve-
month placement period despite only oblique and ambiguous reference to 
this stage of the process in the 1988 Adoption Act, Section 39 (3). No 
placement time limits are included in the 1992 Adoption Regulations. The 
intercountry adoption service has, therefore, succeeded in redefining a 
convention as if it were law. Criticism is effectively stalled by redefinition, in 
terms of legal requirement, of this power of official discretion. Insistence on a 
minimum twelve-month placement period is to be expected from officers 
who seek to postpone their relinquishment of the child for as long as 
possible. 
There was a high level of agreement between officers and applicants that the 
entire intercountry adoption process takes too long. Fifty-three applicants said 
that the process takes too long. Six applicants said that they were happy with 
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the length of process. All six had experienced shorter-than-average waiting 
periods. Of that group, two had waited nineteen months for placement. The 
other four had waited nine months for placement. It seems, therefore, that 
applicant evaluation of procedural pace is informed by the length of time 
they had to wait. 
There were high levels of in-group, and low levels of across-group discussion 
about the length of waiting periods. Reluctance among applicants to discuss 
waiting periods with officers may be linked to applicant views on whether 
applicants and officers agree on how long the home study process should 
take. Forty-two applicants said that applicants do not usually agree with 
officers on what constitutes an appropriate time between application and 
approval, that is, completion of the home study. Eight applicants indicated 
that they did not know whether the two parties usually agree. Four applicants 
said that applicants and officers usually do agree on how long applicants 
should have to wait for approval. Fifty-five applicants said that they had 
discussed the waiting period to approval with other applicants. Only twenty-
two applicants said that they had discussed the topic with officers. Of those 
twenty-two, only seven expressed satisfaction with the response received 
from officers. 
Six officers indicated that applicants do not usually agree with them on the 
time taken to complete the home study report. Six officers said that applicants 
usually do agree with officers on this issue. Five officers said that they discuss 
the topic with other officers. Five officers said that they discuss the topic with 
applicants. 
Applicants did not use the term, 'indeterminate', but their dissatisfaction 
with the length of waiting periods, their awareness of the possibility of failure 
to gain a child, and the observations made by some that waiting periods 
seemed to take forever at the time, but with hindsight do not seem so bad, 
together suggest that this group of intercountry adoption applicants identify 
indeterminate waiting periods as a significant stressor. The problem of 
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indeterminacy was expressed by some as 'putting your life on hold'. Raynor 
(1980: 145) records the same result from her British study. 
Reports of quicker intercountry adoption procedures for German, Swedish 
and United States applicants appear in some academic texts. Expedited 
procedures are explained by the partial deregulation of adoption (see, for 
example, Humphrey and Humphrey 1993: 8, 77; Textor 1992: 560; Kim and 
Carroll 1975; Toft and McIntyre 1992: 88). In addition, some intercountry 
adoptive parents in Tasmania assert that prospective intercountry adoptive 
parents in the United States notice less concern about the child's levels of 
health and fitness on the part of the Immigration Department. 
Australian bureaucratic ethos, marked by higher levels of official concern, is 
explained by some applicants not as evidence of increased commitment to 
the welfare of children in Australia, but as a result of the existence of 
Medicare, a national health care system that meets substantial proportions of 
the medical costs of its members. As the Australian state pays for the health 
care of children, it seeks to minimize the costs. Denying or delaying 
potentially expensive children access to the country is one way of reducing 
the state's health care bill. In the United States, where health care is paid for 
privately by citizens who are members of private medical funds, official 
reluctance to allow entry to children who present with medical problems or 
who are merely underweight and undersized (both of which are normal 
for intercountry adoptive children) is weaker. It seems, therefore, that 
institutionalised provisions for the funding of health care have significant 
implications for procedural pace and for the attendant relationship between 
officers and applicants. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, neither bureaucratic ethos nor the socialisation of individuals 
in modernity prepares officers and applicants for shared parenting nor does 
the law of adoption allow it. In a study of court rulings on freeing for 
adoption, Hill et al. note that while social workers '... tend to see themselves 
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as neutral or objective professionals ...', judges '... saw them as an interested 
party' (1992: 385). More than merely interested parties, intercountry adoption 
officers have ex-officio parental responsibilities for the child. In intercountry 
adoption we see a sequential and compartmentalised pattern of parenting, 
starting with the biological parents or mother, then the orphanage staff, the 
relinquishing country's welfare department, the receiving country's welfare 
department, and finally, the adoptive parents. 
It may seem at first that the last two categories share simultaneous 
responsibility for the child, but systematic study shows that, in the unequal 
power relationship between officers and applicants, officers only relinquish 
their pro-parental powers and responsibilities once they are satisfied that 
applicants are suitable and only then at the end of the stipulated placement 
period. In terms of political power, the parenting is never shared. There is no 
evidence that points to the democratisation of parenting roles. After 
placement but before finalisation, applicants provide the child with a source 
of status identity, nurse, tutor, and sponsor, while the officer retains all 
decision-making power. It is the officer who gives permission for 
intercountry adoptive children to have any necessary operations prior to 
finalisation of adoption for example. Bureaucratic ethos prepares officers for 
compartmentalised rather than shared parenting. 
Descriptions of adoption as the transfer or substitution of all available 
parenting roles from biological to adoptive parents accurately represent the 
goals of prospective adoptive parents but fail analytically to account for the 
status and role of the Intercountry Adoption Service officer nor for the reality 
of tension generated by the contest over authority. An adequate theory of 
intercountry adoption must juxtapose applicants' projects of parental 
substitution with officers' ex-officio insistence on the compartmentalisation 
of parental roles at least until officers are satisfied that relinquishment of 
their interventionist and supervisory authority is directly in the best interests 
of the child, and indirectly in the best interests of the officer. A record of 
disrupted placements would, after all, not increase the officer's chances of 
promotion within the bureaucratic management structure. 
Since officers have to satisfy themselves on a matter in which applicants 
have long since reached conclusion, namely, the parenting ability of 
applicants, it comes as no surprise that applicants tend to complain that the 
process takes too long and that the transition to full parental rights is 
unreasonably deferred. Officers, as expected, defend a cautious pace of 
processing, but do so with sensitivity to the impatience or urgency of 
applicants. Officers manage criticism about the length of time the process 
takes by explaining the need for careful supervision, and by deflecting blame 
for delays onto sending countries. 
Conversely, while it is still true that some officers are '... not sufficiently 
conscious of the feelings of hostility and resentment aroused by their 
disregard of the meaning of wasted time for applicants' (Timms 1973: 26), 
Tasmanian applicants show sensitivity to, and acceptance of, the structural 
constraints on officers. For example, waiting for longer than nine months is 
accepted by most applicants, their phrases, such as 'testing commitment' and 
'thorough preparation', echoing the vocabulary of legitimation developed by 
the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service and, as Toft and McIntyre 
(1992: 90) observe, by adoptions officers in the United States. On the matter of 
procedural pace there is evidence of both empathy and dissatisfaction. Those 







Dispute over decision-making authority is a characteristic outcome of 
interaction in settings where representatives of the family meet with 
representatives of the state in order to discuss matters of interest and 
importance to both institutions. Nevertheless, most state-service clients 
accept that state officers should adopt a universalistic orientation to their 
work. Conversely, state officers accept the normative value of autonomous 
and private familial decision-making. Both the disinterested supervision of 
state officers and the emotional warmth of the parents are socially legitimate 
bases for involvement in the intercountry adoption process. There is 
therefore substantial empathy between officers and applicants. At the same 
time, however, the shared legitimacy sustains their contest over authority. As 
the previous chapter demonstrates, and as Tizard (1978: 243-45) observes, the 
question of the 'social ownership' of the child remains unsettled in modern 
society. 
This chapter considers first the ambivalence of officers' and applicants' 
assessments of each other in social interaction. This ambivalence is a product 
of widely shared values about the welfare of the child in adoption that 
sustains the relationship and of the tension, born of fear of failure and the 
awareness of limits to control, experienced by officers and applicants alike. In 
interviews, the mutual ambivalence becomes evident in the responses that 
officers and applicants give to questions on the notions of 'social ownership' 
and 'primary responsibility' for the child. The chapter explores the two sides 
of this ambivalence - first, the notion of state compulsion and second, the 
values that the two parties share. The argument that the state's powers of 
coercion produce social stability are rejected in favour of support for the view 
that social stability is a product of widely shared values. The data gathered on 
bias and objectivity, on eligibility constraints, on the rights of the 
relinquishing parents, orphanages and governments, on the supervision and 
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disruption of placements and on the parenthood status of applicants during 
the placement period show that applicants' support for state regulation and 
supervision persists despite substantial concern over the alleged bias of some 
officers. Despite the tension, the relationship is held together by the values 
that the two parties share. Those shared values are the focus of this chapter. 
Ambivalence 
The empathy between the client and the officer has implications for their 
relationship. Timms' (1973) record of 'consumer accounts of social help for 
children' illustrates clients' ambivalence towards officers. On the one hand, 
clients accepted the need for official universalism or fairness, a point of 
empathy with officialdom that underpinned their compliance with state 
regulations and official directions. On the other hand, clients were dissatisfied 
with their social powerlessness. Relationship difficulties are revealed by the 
juxtaposition of positive and negative comments about service providers, for 
example, 
'...Of course selection is necessary. I am not in the least arguing for 
indiscriminate acceptance of applicants ... I felt again the same sense of 
desperation and complete helplessness ... We had far too much at stake 
to be able to afford the luxury of plain speaking' (Timms 1973: 7, 17, 
34). 
Humphrey and Humphrey reveal the same ambivalence twenty years later, 
'...we could really have done without the official visitors, as more than 
anything we wanted to be left alone to get on with our new life.... 
There was a fair amount of documentation needed, but nothing that 
struck me as being unreasonable and nothing terribly difficult to get 
hold of' (1993: 45, 55). 
What we can expect, then, is that the tension in the relationship between 
officers and clients will emerge as a consequence of the fact that the 
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institutional authority of the family overlaps with that of the state. This 
expiains the confusion and ambivalence of clients who simultaneously 
defend the institutional autonomy of the family and accept that universalistic 
state intervention is needed to protect the rights of the individual. 
Conversely, we can expect officers to be torn between the demands of official 
responsibility on the one hand and private support for the autonomy of the 
nuclear family on the other. 
The polarisation of emphasis here should not be confused with a polarisation 
of views. Each party can be expected to understand and at least in part 
empathise with the views of the other. Family autonomy, individual rights 
and state universalism are not controversial issues. Controversy does arise, 
however, on the question of what constitutes appropriate lines of authority. 
Anxiety emerges not just as a result of the tension in the relationship but, 
ironically, also as a result of the values and assumptions that clients and 
officers share. Each party seeks to legitimise its independent decision-making 
authority by referring to values and principles with which representatives of 
the other institution are likely to agree. 
The client, as an individual, may agree with official supervision, 
intervention and authority. As a representative of a family, however, the 
same client may reject any kind of external authoritative intervention. 
Conversely, the officer is at once a citizen and a representative of the state. As 
citizens, clients and officers can be expected to concur widely. As 
representatives of competing institutions, they can be expected to disagree on 
what constitutes appropriate lines of decision-making authority. In short, 
their relationship can be described as 'inconsistent' (see Frankel 1978a). 
Social ownership of the child In interviews, thirty-seven applicants indicated 
that the child belonged to them from allocation. Another sixteen said that the 
child was theirs from placement. Typical responses included the following 
from one couple, 
'After allocation I feel as if the child belongs to me. She's 
got a picture of him in every corner of the house. As soon 
as you get that photo you feel that the child is part of our 
family. You try not to get this very strong attachment till 
you are actually there. That's the biggest thing. After 
placement the issue of social ownership of the child is 
complete, as soon as he's in the house. The final adoption 
is just a process - doesn't mean anything to the actual 
situation'. 
Fifteen said that the child belongs legally to the Australian state until 
adoption is finalised. As the following comments show, applicants saw a 
clear distinction between the notions of legal and emotional ties to the child, 
The child belongs to the sending country, the Australian 
state, then to you. You feel like the child belongs to you 
when they give you a name. Definitely when you get a 
photo. But she's not legally yours till adoption. Our sense 
of relief on adoption was amazing - finally it was all 
finished with them - they have no power over us'. 
Thirty-six applicants gave a further indication of their emotional attachment 
to the child by identifying the adopted child as their heir. As one applicant 
put it, 
'We would want our child to inherit our wealth if we had 
died during placement. Before placement not because the 
child could be allocated again'. 
Six said they would want the child to inherit their wealth from allocation. 
Thirteen indicated that they would have proceeded with the adoption project 
had the spouse died after allocation. 
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The sense of social ownership for applicants is thus associated with the 
anticipated or physical assumption of parental roles with regard to an 
identified child. In contrast, only one officer said that the child belongs to the 
prospective adoptive parents from allocation. Another one said that the child 
belongs to the family from the point of view of the child. One officer said that 
social ownership of the child is shared between the biological mother and the 
prospective adoptive parents until finalisation of the process in Australia. 
One said the child belongs 'emotionally' to the biological mother. Three said 
that the state adoptions agency and the prospective adoptive parents share 
responsibility for the child. Five said that the child belongs to the Secretary of 
the Department of Community and Health Services who is the legal 
guardian until adoption in Australia. A typical response was, 
'After placement, the child belongs to the Director of the 
Department in Australia'. 
One said the child belongs to 'itself'. Two said that the child belongs to the 
'society in which it lives'. Most officers thus did not acknowledge the pro-
parental status of adoptive applicants. 
Responsibility for the child Responses to the question about primary 
responsibility for the child show that for officers and applicants the notion of 
'parental responsibility' is clearly distinguished from the notion of 'social 
belonging'. While thirty-seven applicants indicated that the intercountry 
adoptive child belongs to the applicants from allocation, only eleven said that 
they had primary responsibility for the child from allocation. For example, 
when asked who has the primary responsibility for the child, one couple 
replied, 
The adoptive parents. After allocation it's your 
responsibility'. 
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'Primary responsibility' did not mean 'sole responsibility'. Some applicants 
gave detailed descriptions of the role of the adoptive parent. For example, 
'The adoptive parents from allocation in a financial 
sense, for food, health care, English lessons'. 
Primary responsibility for the child was claimed by forty-one applicants from 
placement. Some seemed to indicate that they saw no role for the Tasmanian 
Intercountry Adoption Service at all after placement. For example, one 
asserted that primary responsibility for the child rests with the, 
'family after placement. Before placement it is the welfare 
department in the sending country'. 
That applicant later said, however, that he supported in principle the need 
for assessment of applicants by state officers and he agreed with the twelve-
month post-placement supervision period. Such responses illustrate the 
importance of triangulation in interviews. 
Twenty applicants said that primary responsibility for the child rests with the 
child's country of origin until placement. Some indicated that they were 
aware of the complexity of the notion of primary responsibility for the child 
in intercountry adoption. For example, one identified the responsibilities of 
the relinquishing country, the prospective adoptive parents and the receiving 
state. In addition she distinguished between legal, economic, financial, social 
and moral responsibilities, 
'On allocation, but prior to placement, the relinquishing 
country has primary responsibility. Morally, applicants 
would pay for medical expenses for the child but it 
becomes very difficult because it would be nice to have 
some kind of guarantee that the child was actually going 
to be yours. Legally the state — during placement 
ultimately they have the right to remove the child from 
your care. Socially and morally the parents have the final 
responsibility to do the best ... but I don't object to the state 
having supervision rights to make sure you are doing 
that. Parents have primary economic responsibility for 
the child'. 
Only three applicants said that the primary responsibility for the child is 
shared between prospective adoptive parents and the officers in Tasmania 
until finalisation. Conversely, six officers said that they shared pro-parental 
responsibility with the applicants. One officer expressed her awareness of the 
complexity of the notion of primary responsibility in the following way, 
'Difficult to answer. In some ways the Department, the 
whole society/structure/thing community. In other ways 
the couple who do all the necessary physical caring. I 
think it's a shared responsibility'. 
Another two officers said that the primary responsibility for the child lies 
with the Department of Community and Health Services. Three officers said 
that the prospective adoptive parents have primary responsibility for the 
child from placement. Another three acknowledged the custodial 
responsibilities of adoptive parents from placement, 
'In legal terms the state is the primary carer, but in terms 
of everyday care it is the adoptive parent'. 
Officers' responses here were as expected in that they had to claim some pro-
parental responsibility or put into question their post-placement 
involvement in the intercountry adoption process. One officer said that, 
unlike applicants, officers cannot relinquish their pro-parental 
responsibilities prior to finalisation of the process, 
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'In a social sense governments assume social 
responsibility for the child and hand that responsibility to 
the receiving government which hands it to parents. The 
responsibility moves from officers who handle the case in 
the sending country to immigration officers to the 
receiving country government to the Tasmanian 
government to Tasmanian welfare officers to applicants 
with legal adoption. Applicants may pay expenses for the 
child from allocation so the responsibility starts shifting. 
But officers are in loco parentis. The responsibility is 
mine legally. Applicants have responsibilities but no 
obligations. They can relinquish that child at any time 
prior to adoption. They do have social obligations to bond 
with the child etc'. 
If officers, following Janowitz (1980), identify rights as complementary to 
responsibilities, then, in light of official obligations, they will see their pro-
parental rights as greater than the rights of applicants. 
State compulsion 
Analyses that focus only on state powers of coercion over the family fail to 
account for the inconsistencies in the institutional relationship. For example, 
some authors describe the state as an institution that controls society through 
the imposition of sanctions. In that group are Game and Pringle (1983: 100), 
who personify the 'interventionist' state as a social actor with a mind of its 
own. Others, such as Petersen (1991: 93) and Mason (1989: 4), see the state as a 
socially autonomous institution that continues to expand as it achieves 
greater control over the family. Still others, including Meyer (1983), Lasch 
(cited in Gittins 1985: 134) and Mount (1982), focus on the 'malice' or 
'incompetence' of the personified state as it assumes the responsibilities 
traditionally associated with the family. Thus the two institutions are 
conceptualised as autonomous, independent and in conflict with each other. 
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State expansion into the traditional social domain of the family has on 
occasions had undesirable consequences for some individuals. Many authors 
give examples of negative effects of the exercise of coercive powers by the 
state. For example, Van Krieken (1992: 8), Berger (1986), Murphy (1977), Read 
(1983), and Chisholm (1985) show that, as an institution, the state does not 
always provide very well for the welfare of children leading some of them to 
the conclusion that the state should not intervene in family matters. To cite 
such data as evidence for the analysis of the state as a dominant group or 
party that controls the family by coercion, however, is to ignore the 
contradictory evidence. Van Krieken (1992: 141) and Gould (1988: 177), for 
example, observe that the modem democratic state normally depends, at least 
partially, on broadly based legitimacy rather than on relationships of coercion 
and/or economic dependency. 
Furthermore, authors such as de Mause (1974), Gould (1988), Mintz (1989: 
397) and Donzelot (1979) show that the family has throughout history also 
failed in many cases to provide proper care for children. The horrors of 
unregulated family life for some children are Kafkaesque. Support for the 
expansion of state regulation of the family, by these authors, is based on their 
awareness of the dangers of unregulated care for the child. There are many 
state services of high quality and there are many loving families. To show 
that some state service practices are poor and that some families are 
dysfunctional is not a convincing argument for the exclusion of either 
institution from the provision of welfare, neither does it establish that either 
institution is socially autonomous. 
At issue here is not whether the state or the family as institutions provide 
optimum care for children, but the question of whether social stability is 
achieved primarily through dominance by the state over the antipathetic 
family (and other institutions) or whether stability is underpinned by shared 
values and socially legitimised procedures. The latter view, following van 
Krieken (1992), dispenses with the notion of 'social control' as coercion and 
redefines 'social control' in terms of social legitimacy. Stability is thus 
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maintained by official recognition of the civic rights of individuals, and not 
by repression. 
Bias and objectivity Interview responses do not, however, indicate high 
levels of applicant confidence in officer objectivity. Thirty-five applicants and 
five officers said that adoptive parents are usually biased. Bias was seen by 
some as a desirable quality. For example, one couple thought that parents are 
usually biased as well as objective, 
'Both. I hope parents are biased towards their children, 
but also objective about the child's capacities'. 
Others associated bias with bonding or emotional attachment to the child, 
'The child doesn't mean as much to the officers as it does 
to the parents. Officers are more objective'. 
Only ten applicants and three officers said that adoptive parents are usually 
objective. In contrast, seventeen applicants said that officers are usually 
objective. Seventeen other applicants said that officers are usually biased. Of 
those seventeen, fifteen were clients of the Northern Regional Office. The 
remaining group of twenty-six applicants indicated that they were uncertain 
about officer objectivity or bias. Typical responses from this group revealed 
high levels of understanding of the complexity of the task that confronts 
officers. As one applicant put it, when asked whether officers were usually 
objective or biased, 
'Didn't apply. They didn't interact with the children. They 
are just doing a job. It must be the hardest thing in the 
world to talk to two people and find out why they want to 
adopt. Very hard to award points to answers or questions. 
Very hard thing to assess'. 
160 
Despite their awareness of, or uncertainty about, officers' bias, most 
applicants supported official supervision, even where it is conducted without 
parental consent. This result indicates substantial respect among applicants 
for official universalism, that is, most applicants ultimately see state 
supervision as more important than family privacy and autonomy. These 
findings do not support descriptions of the state as an autonomous, 
malicious social actor that uses its powers of coercion to control society. 
Shared values 
In intercountry adoption harmony might be expected among officers and 
applicants who respect the institutional responsibility of both the state and 
the family for the child. However, given the unequal power relationship, and 
fluid lines of authority, the status of officers and applicants will be constantly 
contested, defended, and redefined. Competing and consensual social 
impetuses are simultaneously at play. 
Eligibility constraints Disquiet is evident, for example, in responses to the 
question about the rights of official intervention in the life of the adoptive 
family. The question prompted respondents to think particularly of the 
Regulations about pregnancy and infertility. Applicants' responses were 
almost equally divided on' whether those rules are appropriate or 
inappropriate. Twenty-six applicants said that the pregnancy rule (Regulation 
14k) gives officers undue rights of intervention in the life of the adoptive 
family. Twenty-five applicants said that the rule was appropriate. Twenty-
four applicants said that the infertility treatment rule gives officers undue 
rights of intervention in the life of the adoptive family. Twenty-eight 
applicants said that the infertility treatment rule was appropriate. These 
Regulations were less controversial among officers. Eleven officers said the 
pregnancy rule is appropriate. Nine officers said the infertility treatment rule 
is appropriate. 
The control of pregnancy, the required use of contraception and the cessation 
of treatment for infertility are points of tension for approximately half the 
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total number of applicants. It is not surprising that officers should accept 
provisions that underpin the effectiveness of their service. To have many 
applicants withdraw from the service because of pregnancy would result in 
many hours of bureaucratic work leading to no tangible result for the 
Department. More remarkable is the high level of acceptance among 
applicants of the state's right to intervene in family life to the point of 
policing the most intimate of conjugal relations. Again the evidence 
contradicts those 'social control theories' that pit the state and the family 
against each other as implacable, personified enemies. Rather, the results of 
this study suggest that state officers are agents of socially legitimate and 
formal systems of regulation. 
The ambivalence of the relationship between officers and applicants is 
evident in the juxtaposed points of consensus and tension revealed by the 
empirical study. As we have seen, many applicants accept high levels of state 
intervention in their private life-world. Nevertheless, thirty-four applicants 
said that the process is complicated. Furthermore, twenty-eight applicants 
said that the Tasmanian service makes the intercountry adoption process 
more complicated than it need be. The following comments encapsulate 
these views, 
'Complicated. The Intercountry Adoption Service could 
make it easier for applicants if they give you an up-to-
date checklist of what is required. If you don't know 
somebody who has already adopted from that country 
you'll have trouble getting through the process'. 
'Very complicated. It's made more complicated than it 
need actually be. The mechanics are straightforward and 
logical. Complicated because we are dealing with human 
beings and emotions, viewpoints, lack of information 
and procedure in a Department which is ponderous and 
unwieldy'. 
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Many complaints were recorded about officers' behaviour in interaction with 
clients, the criticism making the high level of inter-group empathy all the 
more striking. For example, twelve applicants complained about inaccurate 
information received from the service. Only fourteen applicants said that the 
process is straightforward. The mean average time waited for placement by 
those fourteen was thirty-one months, just under the mean average of thirty-
three months waited for placement by all applicants. 
Relinquishing parents Shared values were also evident in responses to 
interview questions on the rights of relinquishing parents. There was, 
however, a difference of emphasis in the responses gained from applicants 
on the one hand and from officers on the other. Fifteen applicants said that 
the relinquishing parents should have the right to non-identifying 
information about the child's welfare after placement. Some expressed initial 
reluctance, for example, 
'Parents: none. If they were seeking non-identifying 
information I would like to see that given. But no 
personal stuff like addresses'. 
Thirteen said that the relinquishing parents should have the right to know 
that the child was going to a loving family. Another thirteen said that the 
relinquishing parents should have the right to progress reports even if those 
reports did identify the adoptive family. Thirteen applicants revealed a need 
to confirm the transference of all available parental role elements , by 
indicating that relinquishing parents' right to 'contact' with the child should 
be subject to the approval of the adoptive parents. They were keen to 
recognise the rights of relinquishing parents provided that those rights do 
not compromise what Edith Goody (1971: 342) calls the desired 'total 
parenthood' status of adoption. As one put it, 
'Our child still belongs to her biological mum because 
you've got a lovely mummy haven't you who looks just 
like you in ... The biological mum has lent you to us for a 
long time to help you grow up. She also has the right to 
privacy and not to have her life upset by us making 
contact with her. We'd oppose her if she started court 
action to get the child back'. 
Nine said that relinquishing parents had the right not to have the child taken 
away from them. Six said that the relinquishing parents should have the 
right to 'privacy'. Those applicants expressed respect for relinquishing 
parents' rights to choose not to resume contact with the child. Four said that 
the relinquishing parents should have the right to revoke consent prior to 
placement. Only ten applicants said that the relinquishing parents should 
have no rights in intercountry adoption. Another five said that the 
relinquishing parents should have the right to progress reports only where 
the child had not been abandoned or otherwise inappropriately treated by 
those parents. 
The relinquishing parents' rights recognised by officers included progress 
reports, revocation of consent, choice of country and allocation. Only the first 
of these is relevant to the post-placement period. None of the rights 
recognised by officers compromises official pro-parenthood. Despite the fact 
that openness in adoption is official Department of Community and Health 
Services policy, two officers, but no applicants, indicated that biological 
parents should have no rights after relinquishment. Perhaps persistent rights 
of biological parents are seen by officers as symbolic of yet another pro-
parental competitor. That explanation seems plausible since, given the closer 
assimilation of adoptive, as distinct from official, pro-parenting to the 
normative role of biological parents, official claims to parental rights and 
responsibility are more tenuous than the claims of applicants. 
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Orphanages and governments The shared values and difference of emphasis 
were also evident in applicants' and officers' views on the rights of 
orphanages and relinquishing governments: Thirty-nine applicants and five 
officers said that orphanages should have the right to progress reports. Some 
limited that right to the first year of placement. As one applicant put it, 
'The orphanage has the right to be kept informed of the 
child's welfare in placement'. 
An officer expressed the same view, 
'The orphanage has the right to information for the first 
year'. 
Those responses again show the 'total parenthood' goal of adoption. 
In response to the question about the rights of the relinquishing nation, it 
was predictable that officers would relate to their foreign colleagues. In 
contrast, thirty-two applicants emphasised the importance of the welfare of 
the child by indicating that governments of relinquishing nations should 
have the right to see that the child is well placed. For example, as one 
applicant observed, 
'They relinquish reluctantly. One good thing about 
working welfare to welfare - the sending country has a say 
in what happens to the child. They have the right to 
make sure all goes smoothly and legally for the child. 
They don't want to lose face'. 
In contrast, officers tended to emphasise the importance of recognition of 
state governments' rights to supervision and to choose for or against 
involvement in intercountry adoption. Three officers said that governments 
in relinquishing countries should have the right to choose whether or not to 
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participate in intercountry adoption. Six said the governments should have 
the right to supervise the adoption process. Emphasis on the rights of 
relinquishing governments was typical, 
'It becomes political. Intercountry adoption programs are 
arranged between countries. They can opt out at any time. 
Korea did some years ago. That is an appropriate right ... 
to decide whether or not to be involved in intercountry 
adoption. They should have the right to request reports. 
Ethiopia wants reports until the child is eighteen. Fine. 
It's like being the ultimate parent'. 
Only twelve applicants and one officer said that the government of the 
relinquishing country should have no rights in intercountry adoption. 
It could be argued that, since the United Nations' (1989: article 21) 
Convention on the Rights of the Child identifies intercountry adoption as a 
legitimate permanent placement option, officers here are redefining the 
rights of the state as more important than the rights of the child. In 
summary, the question about the rights of the relinquishing nation 
prompted applicants to respond in terms of the welfare of the child, and 
officers to respond in terms of the legitimacy of state authority. Applicants 
respect the relinquishing state that they see as the relinquishing parent. 
Tasmanian officers respect the relinquishing state as a model of legitimate 
state authority that, by implication, underpins the legitimacy of official 
authority in receiving states. 
The shared values of officers and applicants were particularly evident in their 
responses to the question on the officer's right to supervise. That question 
directly addressed the issue of contested parenthood status. 
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Supervision of placement More analytical light was thrown on respondents' 
constructions of 'belonging' and 'responsibility' by their high level of 
agreement that officers should have the right to supervise placements 
without applicants' consent. Eight officers and twenty-seven applicants said 
that officers should inform, and seek approval from, applicants prior to any 
intended supervisory investigations. As one officer explained, if adoptive 
parents did not give her consent to supervise placement she felt that she had, 
'...the right to take it further. Usually applicants comply. 
The country of origin requests information to be 
reassured that the child is well placed. If I did not gain 
consent I would have to refer to the Adoptions Manager'. 
Thirty-seven applicants and all twelve officers said that their responsibility to 
supervise placements in the interests of the child ultimately took priority 
over applicants' rights to parental privacy. One applicant summarised the 
views, including the initial reluctance, of this group, 
'No - they should go through the parents. It's difficult. If 
the officers had genuine concerns about the welfare of the 
child and went through the parents there would be some 
resistance there anyway. Officers should have ways of 
checking other than through the parents if there is 
genuine concern for the well-being of the child'. 
Conversely, twenty-one applicants said that officers should not proceed with 
supervision without the consent of the prospective adoptive parents. Many 
based their views on personal experiences, 
'No. A young child can say anything which can be 
misrepresented by officers. I attend all supervision visits 
for my child. I did not attend all of one - went to make a 
cup of tea and hung around in the kitchen, thinking let 
the child talk. When I got the typed report the officer had 
done I was shocked. Now I stay in the room. We know 
what our child is trying to say. The officer doesn't always. 
A child can be misinterpreted'. 
The opinion of most applicants that officers should have the right to persist 
with supervision even in cases where the adoptive parents refuse to give 
consent to that supervision shows commitment among applicants to official 
universalism. 
Disruption of placement The strength of the value consensus was 
particularly clear from officers' and applicants' responses to questions on the 
disruption of placement. Forty-six applicants and ten officers agreed that 
officialdom should have the right to disrupt placements against the wishes of 
prospective adoptive parents in cases of child abuse. Those results show that 
applicants on the whole accept that ultimately the legal responsibility for the 
intercountry adoptive child in placement should belong to the state and not 
the family. Fifteen applicants and four officers said also that disruption 
should only occur on the same legal grounds applied to families of origin. 
One applicant gave the following reasons, 
'Only child abuse: physical, sexual, failure of applicants to 
give the child the educational and growing opportunities 
it deserves. Like any biological child'. 
Eight applicants, and no officers, explicitly stated what that response implies, 
namely, that disruption should only occur after due process of law. Those 
eight applicants were keen to explain that their acceptance of the notion of 
disruption against adoptive parental wishes was symbolically representative 
of commitment to the rights of the child, a commitment held dear despite 




Forty-seven applicants and six officers indicated that they did not know of 
any current Regulations that, in their assessments, provide for the possibility 
of inappropriate disruption. Ten applicants and the other six officers said that 
the Regulations did not provide for the possibility of inappropriate 
disruption. There is virtually, therefore, no disquiet in the Tasmanian 
intercountry adoptive population about the Regulations in this regard. 
Comparison with biological parents Finally, the shared values are evident in 
the high level of agreement among applicants that officers should have the 
right to supervise placements despite the attendant delay to applicants' 
achievement of the desired goal of 'total parenthood' status. The final 
question in this section of the study asked whether applicants should have 
the same rights as do biological parents with regard to their children. From 
the perspective that the state maintains control over society by means of its 
coercive powers, it could be expected that applicants would seize the 
opportunity to demonstrate their rugged individualism and insist on equal 
rights, that is, on state withdrawal from family life. Instead, the response 
given by thirty-four applicants and eleven officers was that officers should 
have the right to supervise placements. The question stimulated applicants 
to reflection that was typically along the following lines, 
'After adoption definitely. Before that it's tricky. Officers 
should have the right to supervise. After placement your 
rights should be the same as with biological children. 
Does placement still occur if after allocation one of the 
applicants dies? It's a difficult question isn't it? Does the 
allocated child inherit along with any other children 
already in our family home? I haven't ever really 
thought about the question with regard to between 
allocation and placement. You don't have the same rights 
on allocation as you do with biological children. 
Placement should be overseen. We know of a child who 
was removed from an adoptive family where he was very 
unhappy only because of the diligence of the officer. Not 
all adoptive parents love their children from day one'. 
It was understood that, from the time of formal adoption, applicants do have 
the same rights as biological parents. Prior to finalisation of the intercountry 
adoption process, however, despite the strong desire to assume total 
parenthood of the child, the official claim to supervision is seen as legitimate 
if often frustrating in practice. Only twenty applicants and one officer said 
that applicants should have the same rights as do biological parents from 
placement. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the data gathered in interviews for this thesis confirm 
Thurnharn's impression of applicants' attitudes towards adoption workers: 
'...all the people with whom I have been in contact express their desire 
to follow the system, but do not understand the procedures they are 
expected to follow and are not told how long it will take' (1993: 144). 
The evidence points to a high degree of empathy among applicants and 
officers in a relationship that nevertheless remains characterised by tension. 
Officers and applicants alike agree that there should be assessment of 
applicants, that supervision of placement is essential and that officers should 
retain the right to seek the disruption of placements where appropriate. It is 
remarkable that the substantial levels of value consensus persist on precisely 
the same issues that are the subject on which most dissatisfaction is 
expressed. A more detailed analysis of the dissatisfaction that underpins this 
tension is undertaken in Chapter Ten. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
MANAGEMENT OF DISSATISFACTION IN INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
Introduction 
The tension in the relationship between applicants and officers in 
intercountry adoption has been analysed in the preceding five chapters by 
exploring the institutionalised anxiety and the motivations of the 
participating parties, the rationing of the service and the division of 
parenting roles that contribute to that anxiety. Consensus on key values was 
identified as the basis for the durability of the relationship that survives 
despite the tension. This chapter focuses on the dissatisfaction of applicants 
that is a result of the persistent anxiety and tension and that has been noticed 
by other commentators including Boss and Edwards (1992: 13), Thurnham 
(1993: 143) and Close (1977: 32). 
Those applicants who express dissatisfaction do so on two grounds. The 
more obvious ground for complaint is the failure either to receive approval 
or to succeed in obtaining a child for adoption. Less obvious, but more 
pervasive, is the process itself. Indeed dissatisfaction about the process is so 
pervasive that one might speak of it as being institutionalised, giving 
support to the general assessment (Boss and Edwards 1992; Willee 1986; 
Close 1977; Wilson 1989) that this is a vexed area of social administration 
where joy and pain are inextricably mixed. 
An expression of dissatisfaction is one element in a repertoire of possibilities 
by which applicants act to preserve and protect their self esteem in the face of 
the loss which is attendant upon their failure to be approved or to gain a 
child. Similarly, since applicants are involved in a process that calls into 
question their character and motives, and that substantially restricts their 




Whatever impels an expression of dissatisfaction among applicants, officers 
have to manage the dissatisfaction expressed by their clients or face the 
consequences of their clients seeking redress (publicly or administratively), 
or face damage to their careers, or see the quality of their relationship with 
applicants deteriorate, or see the reputation of the service denigrated and its 
long-term viability undermined. 
First, this chapter identifies the sources of dissatisfaction, including 
applicants' self esteem, their emotional investment, their loss of social 
rights, the social stigmatisation of the client role and the strain of being 
assessed. Dissatisfaction is experienced by non-fecund, preferential, 
successful and unsuccessful adopters alike because the sources of 
dissatisfaction are integral to the process. Discussion of the empirical data 
gathered in interviews for this study reveals the sources of dissatisfaction 
that are of greatest concern to applicants in the Tasmanian Intercountry 
Adoption Service. 
Secondly, this chapter turns to the management of applicant dissatisfaction. 
It briefly considers the ways in which applicants manage their own 
dissatisfaction, but the bulk of the discussion explores the management 
strategies that we might expect from officers and those that were revealed in 
interviews. 
Sources of applicant dissatisfaction 
This part of the chapter explores five structurally-derived sources of 
dissatisfaction that we can reasonably expect to find among all applicants to 
the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service. 
Self esteem Dissatisfaction among social service clients is most likely when 
the object desired is central to their self-esteem, and when the client 
reference group is small. When that object sought is intimately associated 
with the client's body and is normally accessed privately, then the client will 
have a strong need for support but only a small social resource of fellow 
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clients from whom to draw encouragement. The non-fecund adoptive 
parent is a good example of a client in that situation, a client who approaches 
the state service with structurally-derived dissatisfaction at having to access 
the service at all. 
Emotional investment At issue for applicants in intercountry adoption are 
the welfare of the child and the social reputation of the applicants 
themselves. Applications are therefore emotionally charged. Where levels of 
emotional investment are high, there is a concomitant high level of 
intolerance for delays and failure. There is also an understandable 
unwillingness to accept personal responsibility for any problems that might 
arise, as the dients in many cases are seeking to replicate the natural, that is 
unproblematic, process of gaining children. 
Loss of social rights Client dissatisfaction may also emerge as a result of 
substantial loss of social rights such as the right to pursue personal, private 
projects. Intercountry adoptive applicants, for example, are denied the right 
to engage in projects such as invitro-fertilisation or even natural attempts at 
human reproduction. Non-fecund applicants, therefore, are denied the most 
efficient approach, namely, simultaneous attempts at various ways of family-
formation. 
Stigma The decision to apply for welfare from state authorities is stigmatised 
in modernity if the object of the request is normally accessed by most other 
citizens through private welfare sources (see Pinker 1973). The stigmatisation 
is underpinned by the recipients' inability to meet 'the obligation to repay' 
(see Mauss 1970: 40-41). While state services provide a fundamental degree of 
social security for citizens, it is common knowledge that those services are 
paid for out of the public purse that, in turn, is filled from taxation revenue. 
In other words, virtually all citizens pay for the services consumed by a few. 
Despite the fact that everyone benefits from the existence of state services, 
there is prestige associated with high levels of familial autonomy. Pinker 
(1973) observes that the stigmatisation of recipients of state services is usually 
understood and shared by clients themselves. 
Furthermore, stigmatisation of welfare recipients in largely free-market 
economies is, according to Jordan, predictably stronger than in centrally 
planned societies where the more interventionist and authoritative role of 
the state leaves relatively little '...scope for individual choice for any citizens 
in the spheres of production and consumption'. Therefore, the 
'...paternalism which characterises the state's dealings with welfare recipients 
is less distinguishable from the paternalism which characterises its dealings 
with everyone else' (1985: 129). 
Given the stigmatisation of many state services, clients can be expected to feel 
dissatisfied with their need to access those services no matter what the 
quality of the service offered. 
The strain of being assessed In chapter six it was argued that the strong, 
normative motivation for parenthood, that precludes the need for 
assessment of the suitability of adults for the role they unquestioningly seek 
to fill, leaves prospective adoptive parents socially unprepared for the 
evaluation, let alone the questioning, of their parenting ability: 
'...After all, how many natural parents would take kindly to having 
their potential to be good parents assessed by someone who held the 
power to prevent them having a child?' (Timms 1973: 7). 
Many applicants regard parenthood as a basic human right (English 1990: 16- 
20). 
The notion of being assessed for parenthood predictably leads to resentment 
even though the need for publicly accountable procedures may be accepted as 
necessary for the best interests of the child: 
'...They [officers] are not God, even if they are performing one of His 
functions, and they should not presume His infallibility. Just 
occasionally the client may also be right ... I'm sure it is inevitable to 
feel at least partly that one is on trial (Timms 1973: 7). 
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During the assessment process, further dissatisfaction on the part of clients 
emerges as a result of the 'culture shock' mentioned in chapter five. The 
recognition by state bureaucracies of 'merit' in terms of achievement clashes 
with the ascribed value system of the family. Even where dients appreciate 
the need for state officials to evaluate cases on the basis of achievement 
rather than ascription, there is still reason to expect high levels of residual 
client dissatisfaction as a result of the tension that arises from simultaneous 
particularistic loyalty to the family and universalistic support for noble 
democratic, legal conventions. 
A superficial assessment of client dissatisfaction is all we need to be able to 
predict that unsuccessful intercountry adoption applicants will be unhappy 
with the service received. The analysis of dissatisfaction in this chapter, 
however, shows that dissatisfaction is to be expected also among successful 
non-fecund and preferential adopters. 
Non-fecund adopters Involuntarily childless adopters experience the 
heightened stress that Hagestad and Neugarten associate with '...catastrophic 
events that upset expected health and social time tracks' (1985: 41). 
Anticipatory socialisation and an identified set of peers prepare individuals 
for catastrophic events such as widowhood in old age. In contrast, non-
fecundity is often attended by the social isolation that is a result of the 
unscheduled and unanticipated occurrence of the stress. Non-fecund adults 
do not meet in organised groups for mutual support. Their need for social 
support will therefore be greater than the need experienced by other social 
service clients who have access to established reference groups. 
Preferential adopters Preferential adopters do not share the stresses attendant 
to non-fecundity, but predictably experience dissatisfaction as a result of the 
contrast between their experience of adoptive family formation and their 
memories of biological reproduction. Preferential adopters, therefore, 
experience both the privacy of biological birthing and parenting on the one 
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hand, and the openness to official scrutiny of intercountry adoption on the 
other. The loss of prestige that attends the shift from private reproduction to 
family formation under state supervision predictably leads to dissatisfaction. 
For preferential adopters, dissatisfaction emerges from officers' universalistic 
orientations to deeply intimate, normally private, matters and from 
'degradation ceremonies' such as loss of privacy, loss of authority and 
subjection to a long period of indeterminacy. These experiences are shared by 
all adoptive parents, but only preferential adopters can contrast them 
experientially with the social autonomy of biological parenting. 
Successful and unsuccessful applicants Successful as well as unsuccessful 
applicants have to undergo the indignities of inspection, examination and 
evaluation, as well as the frustrations of lengthy waiting periods. In 
intercountry adoption, therefore, dissatisfied clients may include applicants 
who have already adopted a child. Thus it is not only those who are 'never 
allocated a child who need to be appeased. Other clients who require 
consolation include those who fail to gain approval-to-adopt. In addition, 
dissatisfaction is to be expected of those who question certain specific 
bureaucratic procedures and of those who are unhappy with the child they 
receive. In all of these situations, there is dissatisfaction and disappointment 
with oneself, the program, or both. The expectations of dissatisfaction were 
borne out in interviews where almost all applicants complained about the 
quality of the service. 
Quality of service The most frequently mentioned complaints were that the 
process takes too long, that officers have negative attitudes towards 
intercountry adoption and towards clients, and that those attitudes and the 
incompetence of many officers contribute to the poor quality of the service. 
As we saw in chapter eight, fifty-three applicants said that the process takes 
too long. In addition, in response to the question about their positive and 
negative experiences, thirty two applicants complained about delays. Some 
associated delays with administrative error. The following comments from 
three applicants are typical, 
The negatives? With the second child they couldn't tell 
us how long it would take and didn't bother to find out. 
Our officer told us our file had been sent overseas. I 
thought you got written confirmation of that. So I rang 
central office - "Oh no your file is still here. I need 
photos" - this and that. I said [our officer] had told us the 
file had gone. Central office said, "No, it's still here". If we 
hadn't rung the file would have sat in Hobart for two or 
three months'. 
'The negatives were the amount of effort needed to keep 
the officers moving on your case, hoping you had 
enclosed proper documents, the length of time it took, 
always the uncertainty'. 
'Nothing in the assessment process with our officer was 
positive. The heartache! She would blow any little 
comment out of proportion. The waiting drains 
emotionally. You wonder if you'll ever get a child'. 
Twenty-eight complained about of ficers"negative attitudes' such as 
sustained emphasis on the problems and difficulties of adoptive parenting. 
The perceived negative attitudes were typically explained by applicants in 
terms of the obstacles placed in the path of applications, and the lack of 
compassion and respect shown by officers, 
'Our officer sat there and downgraded us in the report, 
but if she could see the child now. But she did apologise 
later. The officers don't give you any positives'. 
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Others pointed to the alleged racism of some officers, 
'Total frustration. If our officers had their way, there 
wouldn't be no intercountry adoption in Tasmania. They 
want a white Australia policy. One officer couldn't give a 
[expletive] if people die in those poor countries. But every 
human life is equal'. 
Alleged negativistic behaviour may be a result of social structures rather than 
personal ideology. For example, many obstacles, such as prolonged and 
indeterminate waiting periods between approval and allocation, are beyond 
the control of the individual officer. Other obstacles, such as failure to meet 
appointments may be explained with reference to officers' crisis-care 
commitments. Failure to notify applicants about postponed appointments, 
however, does suggest lack of respect for clients. 
Further sources of dissatisfaction were revealed by the final question in 
interview that invited participants to reiterate points of interest or to raise 
any topic that had not yet been discussed. Seventeen complained about 
officers"incompetence'. Of those seventeen, six criticised officers for being 
uninformed, inefficient, and inconsistent. The suggestion was made that age 
limits for officers be introduced. As the following comments show, some 
applicants linked the poor standard of service to unethical, as well as 
incompetent work, 
'Negatives: heartlessness, unprofessionalism, unethical 
behaviour in some cases. They lie sometimes. Sophie's 
choice questions: if two children were drowning or in the 
house on fire which would we save first, the adopted or 
the biological child? We were asked that one many times 
and were very insulted by it'. 
'Negatives: some officers lie. They told us at reception on 
the phone that the officer wasn't in. My spouse had to go 
there to deliver a parcel from work and guess who 
177 
popped up at the office?! I got there within minutes of the 
phone call. Some officers are heartless. They wanted to 
split up two biological sisters and let us adopt only one of 
them. One of our adopted children had bonded with a 
child in the orphanage but the Department wouldn't let 
us adopt that child as we had too many already in their 
opinion, even though the number they publicly stated we 
had was one more than we actually had. We pointed that 
out to them and they said, "Sorry we have made a 
mistake", but they didn't change the decision'. 
Others suggested that the quality of the service would improve if it provided 
post-placement parental guidance, if it were better advertised, and if the policy 
of showing applicants their home study reports prior to submission were 
observed by all officers. 
Complaints about poor service were expected because of various structural 
factors that restrict officers' opportunities for acquiring expertise. These 
include the lack of rigorous pre-service training and the minimal co-
operation with specialist non-government organisations and support groups. 
The development of officer expertise is further limited by low levels of 
specialisation and high staff-turnover rates. Those obstacles are underpinned 
by bureaucratic bias towards comprehensive, rather than specialised, curricula 
vitae. Finally, high staff-turnover rates in the Adoptions Unit is contributed 
to by heavy workloads and by departmental marginalisation of the Unit that 
is subject to external control of resource allocation. This marginalisation is a 
source of dissatisfaction for officers. One conveyed her frustration particularly 
clearly, 
'Many workers in the .whole Department in children's 
services don't like adoption. There's a moral stain on it. I 
don't quite know why. One of the difficulties for workers 
is that many of their colleagues look down their noses at 
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adoption. I don't know why. Sometimes colleagues can be 
openly hostile. Some to domestic and intercountry 
adoption. Those only against intercountry adoption tend 
to have reasons such as children should stay in home 
cultures. Those against all adoption tend to have little 
reasoning, more adoption is a dirty word. As if it's not 
real work. It's a middle class thing, for the affluent. It's 
just not true. The people who adopt are normal people. 
It's difficult to work in an environment where colleagues 
don't value the work you do and don't see how hard it 
can be at times. It seems easy and can be lovely. Part of the 
explanation is in the difference between work that has 
pleasant moments in it and some of the other work that 
is pretty soul destroying, trying to work with some badly 
damaged teenagers'. 
High rates of staff turnover underpin applicant dissatisfaction. The number of 
officers consigned consecutively to a case, and low levels of officer experience 
have been associated with increased problems for the post-placement 
adoptive family (Barth and Berry 1988). 
Officers were directly asked about their 'attitude' to intercountry adoption. 
Only seven said that it is in the best interests of the child. The other five were 
not sure. As one officer put it, 
'It's good to see children get better life chances, but there 
may be problems when the child reaches teenage and 
wonders whether it would have preferred to stay in its 
culture of origin. It depends on how the parents handle 
it'. 
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Three expressed concern over problems in transracially adoptive families. 
Without reference to Harvey's (1983) work on adopted children from 
Vietnam, one commented, 
'We don't know enough about the ongoing effects of 
relocating a child in another culture. No-one yet in 
Australia has done any studies on what's happened to the 
Vietnamese children who came in the influx of 
intercountry adoptive children in the 1970s. I know some 
children have gone back to Vietnam and found their 
families and its been quite traumatic for them because 
they were middle class Americans and they've gone back 
to farming families where they've come from. They can't 
go back and live because they've got American 
citizenship. I know of children who have come from 
overseas who just don't fit ... who still continue to come 
and don't fit and we have to find alternatives'. 
Negativistic behaviour may also be demonstrated by officers who are 
reluctant to recognise the legitimacy of applicants' claims to parenthood. 
Officers delay such recognition because they see it as their responsibility to 
legitimise the proposed adoptive parental status only after careful, 
longitudinal scrutiny. Moreover, given the normative culture of exclusive 
parenthood, insistence by applicants that their parenthood status be 
recognised is seen by officers as a challenge to the legitimacy of official pro-
parenthood responsibility. That is, official status is dependent upon the tacit 
construction of the officer as parent and the applicant as carer. 
Eight officers said that they had noticed client dissatisfaction with delays and 
six said that they had noticed client dissatisfaction with the quality of the 
service. Officers raised a number of issues not mentioned by any applicant. 
These include client dissatisfaction with individual officers. Personality 
clashes with officers were seen by three officers to be a problem for some 
applicants. Four officers said that some applicants were ideologically opposed 
to state involvement of any kind. As one put it, 
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'Dissatisfaction among applicants? Yes with Departmental 
involvement of any kind in one case. It is complicated 
and that tests some applicants' commitment and some 
resent that. Some men don't like discussing their 
emotions — especially older applicants'. 
Officer sensitivity about indiscriminate and total opposition from applicants 
seems to be unfounded as, for example, only one applicant expressed the view 
that the Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service should be privatised. 
Furthermore, some applicants did make many positive comments about the 
service. Nine expressed satisfaction with Tasmanian officers. Six said that the 
assessment process was good because it made applicants think about the 
issues and examine their own motivation. Five said they were happy with 
the speed of the process. Finally, as we saw in chapter seven, all sixty 
applicants agreed that there should be an applicant-screening process by state 
officers in Tasmania. Nevertheless, there is evidence of serious dissatisfaction 
that must be managed since it results in substantial tension in the 
relationship. 
The management of dissatisfaction 
There are, broadly speaking, three parties who manage dissatisfaction in 
interco -untry adoption in Tasmania, officers, support groups, and the clients 
themselves. While the work of the last two groups may serve the interests of 
officers, the main aims of clients and their support group friends in this 
context is to redefine the situation in such a way that what has transpired 
does not reflect badly on the client as a person and a potential parent. It is to 
be expected, therefore, that when the desired outcome of rapid placement of 
ideal children does not eventuate, blame will often be attributed to 
procedures and officers. In that way, failure to parent is not seen to indicate 
that there is anything wrong with the clients themselves. 
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Self-management of dissatisfaction by applicants As Wright Mills' observes, 
it is common practice for 'human relations' experts to allow '...the employee 
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to "blow off steam" without changing the structure in which he is to live out 
his working life' (1977: 106). The Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service 
encourages applicants to join support (that is, reference) groups that provide 
for the sell-management of dissatisfaction. 
Fifty-two applicants were members of support groups. Support groups 
maximise the 'political leverage' of applicants in dispute with the 
Intercountry Adoption Service. The metaphor is borrowed from 
Subramaniam (1985: 203) who defines political leverage as the capacity of an 
interest group or agency to contribute to or disrupt the planned 
implementation of government policy. In other words, apart from the 
attendant psychological benefits for individual applicants, support group 
membership is a social answer to 'political vulnerability' (see Matthews 1988: 
155). The development of political leverage and of vocabularies of complaint 
is a predictable social response to officers' agenda control and mobilisation of 
bias. 
The political power of support groups is limited by their lack of official status. 
Even if incorporated into bureaucratic decision-making processes, however, 
support groups deny the client ideal or maximum efficiency of 
representation because they impose constraints on their members (see Jordan 
1985: 139). An example of such constraints was the debate at the 1993 First 
Australian Intercountry Adoption Network (AICAN) Conference at Monash 
University, about whether or not the Inter-country Adoption Resource 
Network should be admitted to the national body. Nevertheless, access to 
sources of political leverage provides all clients with the latent power to 
affect negatively officers' reputations or standing within and beyond 
professional boundaries. Serious negative influences may weaken 
promotion chances for individual officers. 
Fortunately for intercountry adoption service officers, there is a social norm 
in Western societies: 
'...persuading persons to keep their chins up and make the best of it - a 
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sort of social sanitation enjoining torn and tattered persons to keep 
themselves packaged up' (Goffman 1980: 114-5). 
Furthermore, clients can be expected to manage their own dissatisfaction to 
some extent by adopting the strategies of secrecy and hedging. Secrecy about 
their involvement in intercountry adoption programs allows clients to keep 
secret also any eventual disappointment, along with the commensurate 
perceived loss of status, as long as no public complaints about intercountry 
adoption service procedures are made. Hedging implies delayed 
commitment. Clients keep their emotions under control so that any eventual 
disappointment will be easier to bear: 
'... All of these strategies give the mark an out; in case of failure he can 
act as if the self that has failed is not one that is important to him' 
(Coffman 1980: 113). 
The management of applicant dissatisfaction by officers While it is true, as 
Timms (1973) shows, that clients are in a weak position to challenge 
expectations of them as welfare recipients, officers will predictably 
nevertheless seek to manage client dissatisfaction. The management of client 
dissatisfaction by officers emerges as a result of the anxiety they experience in 
the face of client access to formal and informal mechanisms for complaint 
and redress as discussed in chapter five (see also Jordan 1985: 133; Goffman 
1980: 99). Those mechanisms include administrative appeals tribunals, 
review committees, the offices of the Ombudsman and of Members of 
Parliament, the mass media, and client-support groups. 
The management of dissatisfaction is difficult in intercountry adoption 
because, as Aitken (1983: 28) asserts, the notion of parenting makes an 
important contribution to the formation of self-identity for most people. 
Particularly for involuntarily childless adults, to be denied a child by officers 
is for those prospective adoptive parents to be hit where they 'really live' 
(Coffman 1980: 107). In other words, as the notion of becoming a parent plays 
a central role in the ongoing development of most adults' maturing self-
identity, to be denied this goal is to be forced to redefine oneself as a person, as 
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an adult, and as a member of a social out-group. Officers therefore have to 
choose their management strategies very carefully. 
Management strategies Research into the provision of social services has 
identified many ways in which client dissatisfaction has been managed by 
officers. For example, management styles are influenced by the personalities 
of individual officials. More specifically, policy formulation and decision-
making are affected by psychological characteristics that may hinder objective 
assessment. Katz and Kahn (1966: 284-99) identify eleven predisposing factors 
in decision-making. Their classification of observed managerial behaviour is 
valuable, but they do not identify systemic, structurally-derived mechanisms 
for the management of anticipated and/ or experienced client dissatisfaction. 
Those mechanisms include the defence of official authority, the 
incorporation of applicants and the staffing of criticism. 
Defence of official authority In various ways, officers will attempt to 
influence clients' political consciousness by describing the relationship 
between officers and their clients as one that is properly unequal and that 
properly denies the client autonomy. Following Jordan (1985: 142), from the 
official perspective, therefore, there is only one form of authority, namely the 
bureaucracy. The client is not alerted to a plurality of contradictory authority 
that allows the individual the freedom and power of choice between different 
kinds of constraints. Moreover, as Jordan (1985: 143) points out, in capitalist 
societies, where the freedom to exchange items of social value is essential to 
the notion of individual autonomy, officers will remind clients that they are 
competing with other applicants for scarce welfare objects and that clients' 
only item for exchange of value to officers is compliance. 
That strategy for the management of dissatisfaction may not be successful, 
however, since it denies the client the element of choice. Jordan's (1985) 
redefinition of individual freedom as access to choice from among a plurality 
• of constraints is relevant here. It leads him to suggest that it is the: 
'...unitary and inescapable nature of the constraints imposed by 
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intimate, total, face-to-face relationships that seems to explain 
why communes in capitalist countries (even the most 
successful) tend to break up after periods of a few years or less' 
(1985: 145). 
That theory serves to explain in broad terms the likely emergence of tension 
in the intimate, total, face-to-face relationship between officers and applicants 
that, in the political consciousness of the client, is a unitary and inescapable 
system of constraint. 
Officers may try to minimize the risk of conflict with clients by taking great 
pains to explain that all the procedures that are followed are necessary for the 
protection of the best interests of the child. In seeking to define the situation 
by appeals to the generally acceptable moral dictum that the best interests of 
the child should always be paramount in intercountry adoption matters, 
complaints and criticisms from clients can be redefined as evidence that those 
clients are placing their desire to parent above the interests of the child. Thus 
the officers take the moral high ground and explain that their professional 
'distance' allows them the objectivity necessary for rational decision-making. 
Conversely, prospective adoptive parents are presented as well-meaning 
people whose judgement is necessarily clouded by their emotional 
involvement in the quest for a child. In summary, the 'best interests of the 
child' argument is a form of official agenda control and mobilisation of bias 
against applicant contribution to decision-making. 
Emphasis on the paramountcy of the interests of the child not only reminds 
applicants that they should remember their place as defined by officialdom, 
but can also be used as a means of managing dissatisfaction in cases where no 
allocations or placements are made. tailure to gain a child can be explained as 
evidence that no appropriate child was available, and not as an indication 
that the applicants were in any way assessed as potentially inadequate parents. 
That explanation is not plausible where applicants fail to gain approval-to-
adopt. 
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The argument that intercolmtry adoption service oficers enjoy greater clarity 
of vision in adoption maters than do clients can be further substantiated by 
pointing to the managerial perspective or overview that public servants have 
by virtue of their ofice. That is, intercountry adoption service oficers have 
al the data relevant for informed decision-making. Only oficers know which 
children are available and which applicants. Therefore, only oficers can make 
appropriate alocations. Consequently, the appropriate role of clients is to wait 
patiently in the knowledge that al that should be done is being done by those 
in authority. 
Incorporation 	 Perhaps the most fundamental attempt to manage 
dissatisfaction in intercountry adoption is the persuasion of clients to accept, 
internalise and adopt the oficers' point of view. If the atempt is successful, 
rather than question bureaucratic methods, clients can be expected to display
• consistent compliance and obedience: 
'..Dificulties of relationship arise through feelings of indebtedness 
arising from the reception of at least some friendly atention .. "What 
right do we have to complain? Are we queens? We should be grateful 
for anything people do for us" (Timms 1973: 3). 
Oficers can emphaticaly assert that, contrary to popular belief, there is a 
shortage of children available for intercountry adoption, that is, that demand 
exceeds supply. The 'rare object' argument implies that successful clients are 
especialy fortunate or wel-regarded by intercountry adoption service agents. 
Again, clients are motivated by circumstances to curry favour with oficers. 
That approach by oficers has also been recorded with reference to in-country 
adoption. For example, a Child Guidance Clinic in Britain: 
'..sent a leter that said there was such a shortage of babies that we 
should be grateful to have got one' (Timms 1973: 17). 
Where officers seek to distance themselves from decisions that are 
unfavourable to the client, a colusive relationship between oficer and client 
may be developed in order to redirect client anger away from an individual 
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officer or specific department and towards a more diffuse sense of 'the 
system', of which both the official and the client are redefined as innocent 
victims. Officers can assert that they are doing their best, the implication being 
that while some dissatisfaction with' the progress of an application may be 
warranted, complaint would be unfair. Conversely officers can plead 
incompetence. Frank admissions that files have been lost, for example, can, if 
accompanied by apologies, prevent further complaint as failure to accept an 
apology would seem churlish: 
'...At one stage they lost the mother's file and could not contact her and 
we were delayed again. There seemed to be one reason after another - 
partly, I realise, because their department was sorting itself out and 
everyone was taking on new roles' (Timms 1973: 22). 
The incorporation of support groups with the Intercountry Adoption Service 
has the dual function of providing applicants with a sense of decision-making 
power while allowing officers a considerable amount of control over the 
nature, extent and method of expressed criticism of their work. In Tasmania, 
the establishment in 1995 of the Intercountry Consultative Committee is such 
a strategy. 
Another form of incorporation or of 'getting the client onside' is the waiving 
of normal procedures to appease the victims of administrative error. 
Applicants report, for example, that age-difference criteria have been waived 
for couples who were previously told they were too old to adopt young 
children. Placements have been arranged within weeks of the revelation of 
intercountry adoption service misplacement of files. The need for 
reapplication has been waived after exposure of intercountry adoption service 
misinformation and babies have become available from countries that 
allegedly only had older children for intercountry adoption. This strategy has 
been used by the Intercountry Adoption Service after the service has 
embarrassed itself with error. Since error increases dissatisfaction, radical 
management strategies are used to manage the consequences. Appeasement 
strategies are recognised by applicants. The two examples that follow are 
typical of many, 
We applied to Thailand and did all the paperwork and 
then they told us Thailand wouldn't accept our 
application because we already had a child from Korea. I 
nearly died. They'd never said a word about this. Hobart 
knew but they hadn't told the branch office. I said where 
are we going to go and they said [naming a country] but 
we said, "No", because [country] only had older children 
and we had to have one younger than the first child. 
That's the policy. Suddenly there were babies available 
from [country] — four days after the Thailand blunder'. 
'They left our file in The Philippines by mistake and we 
were allocated a two-year-old child even though the 
Department in Hobart told us we could only have a child 
seven or older. We told them they had made a mistake. 
The next day an officer rang and said "Our mistake is to 
your advantage". We were asked to keep their mistake 
quiet'. 
Officers also try to keep applicants onside on the issue of fees. The task is 
difficult because there is substantial dissatisfaction on this issue. Twenty-five 
applicants said that fees should not be charged. Some opposed fees' even 
though they were seen to give applicants more power, 
'You'd feel like you're paying for a service so you'd expect 
and can demand quality service. You shouldn't have to 
pay fees - they are government employees. We pay in 
taxes. Fees will give applicants more power - 
consumerism, "I'm paying for it - where's the action?". 
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Eighteen said that many interested people, who would make good parents, 
cannot afford the fees, 
'It is very offensive to charge fees. Applicants will become 
more demanding, which may not be a bad thing. Just 
because you've got money doesn't mean you'll be a better 
parent - that's effectively what it boils down to. Lots of 
good parents can't afford it. It makes you feel like it's a 
privilege, a treat you can pay for. It's offensive that IVF 
etc are heavily subsidised. And here there are children 
who already exist and it's all out of your pocket'. 
Fifteen said that applicants will now be more inclined to complain. As one 
couple out it, 
'It'd make us less inclined to let them get away with it. At 
the moment we keep our mouths shut, not wanting to 
upset the system. If you'd put your money up front you'd 
expect a service for it'. 
Twelve said the introduction of fees has had no implications for the 
relationship between officers and applicants. Ten contrasted the charging of 
fees with state subsidisation of the costs of infertility treatment and of 
birthing, but none indicated awareness of subsidised transracial adoption (see 
Benet 1976: 151; Toft and McIntyre 1992: 88). A typical comment was, 
'Fees shouldn't be charged.. If people are entitled to have 
assistance on IVF and other programs, then why not in 
intercountry adoption? Ultimately there is no difference 
to the effect on the country. It's morally wrong to charge 
fees when the Department says it is a service for children, 
but the applicants, who are providing the service, are the 
ones who have to pay. It's inconsistent to charge 
intercountry adoption fees when in other areas there is 
no existing child needing a family but you can be paid to 
conceive'. 
Five applicants and one officer said that the charging of fees is bad because it 
has connotations of baby buying. One said, 
'Fees are not good. They make me feel dirty in that I feel 
as if I am buying a child. Paying costs is OK. Fees might 
prevent good parents who can't afford them from 
applying'. 
Only four applicants supported the introduction of fees. They did so on the 
condition that the standard of the service will improve. Three officers 
expressed disquiet about fees, their agreement with applicants forming an 
effective stalling mechanism for the management of dissatisfaction. By 
distancing themselves from the decision to charge fees, officers deprive 
applicants of a target for criticism. Moreover, in agreeing with applicants, 
officers deflect criticism by redefining the Department of Community and 
Health Services, that is the funding body, as the common enemy to officers 
and applicants who are comrades in adversity. Other attempts to get onside 
with applicants include observations about applicants and officers having a 
lot in common, about the hope that fees will encourage applicants to become 
more critical (of the Department of Community and Health Services, not the 
Intercountry Adoption Service), and about officers being terrified about 
having to play the role of God. Officers are thus redefined as responsible 
•individuals who reluctantly wield the power thrust upon them by a heartless 
Department of Community and Health Services. That image is likely to 
engender more support from applicants than the one applicants themselves 
often convey, namely, the impersonal, heartless bureaucrat who, if ever 
sincerely committed to the welfare of the child, has long since been corrupted, 
like Tolkien's Lord of the Ring, by the power of office. 
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Twenty-nine said that applicants will expect better service now that they have 
to pay fees. Subsequent responses show that for most applicants, the term 
'expectation' should be understood in the sense of 'demand' rather than 
'prediction'. For example, only four said that the process will now be quicker. 
Where failure to progress as desired has caused disappointment among 
clients and where incorporation strategies have failed, client dissatisfaction 
can be managed by giving them a second chance. Thus dients are motivated 
to refrain from seeking redress for fear of jeopardising their subsequent 
chances of gaining a child. Where clients are nevertheless determined to seek 
redress, their dissatisfaction can be managed by the use of stalling 
mechanisms. 
Stalling Applicants are often denied the opportunity to seek redress. This is a 
familiar strategy that Goffman (1980: 116) calls 'stalling'. In other words, 
limited, if any, opportunities for complaint are provided by intercountry 
adoption officers: 
'...At this stage I think one of the major disadvantages of dealing with a 
national agency become apparent - there is no real support when 
things go wrong' (Timms 1973: 13). 
That strategy leads to predictable responses from clients: 
'...we did feel so entirely in their hands and nervous about 
antagonising them in any way - after all, they had the babies! This 
feeling of utter helplessness, to me at any rate, characterised our 
position and our dealings with adoption agencies' (Timms 1973: 6-7). 
Feelings of helplessness are mixed with resentment: 
'...Nor, of course, was it any good trying to change the agency's policy. I 
remember feeling extremely resentful that they had put me in this 
position with my husband. If I remember rightly, we wrote one letter 
to them but they said in reply that we should change our agency if we 
could not accept their regulations' (Timms 1973: 11). 
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Dissatisfaction about appeal procedures is also evident in the outcomes of the 
present study. Questions were asked in interview about current and ideal 
redress procedures. Twenty-seven applicants were unaware of current 
provisions, 
'Don't know - I blame the system for that. I've never seen 
any document informing me of my rights with regard to 
complaints and redress'. 
Another seventeen said that there was no adequate system of redress for 
applicants. Typical comments pointed to resentment over official responses to 
complaints, 
'You ring up and make a complaint and they just switch 
off. They listen but just say the same old thing, "There's 
nothing we can do about it - you'll just have to wait". 
'You can see the Head of the Department but it's a waste of 
time'. 
Fifty-two were clear in their preference for an appeals system that is 
independent of the Intercountry Adoption Service and the Department of 
Community and Health Services and that makes binding decisions. The 
former review system, with a board selected, or recommended for selection, 
by the Intercountry Adoption Service and with only the power of 
recommendation to the Secretary of the Department of Community and 
Health Services, was rejected by applicants, 
'There should be somebody who can put the applicants' 
case to the Department, rather than individuals trying to 
fix problems for themselves. There was a panel but if it is 
loaded with Department stooges it's just a smoke screen. 
The adoption review committee was very biased. The 
panel has to be independent. An independent appeals 
board is better, depending on who selects the membership 
of it. It must not be a rubber stamp outfit. Applicants 
should be allowed support like a lawyer if they want it'. 
Five officers agreed that an independent system of appeal is good. Four 
officers said that they did not know what appeals or review systems were 
available for applicants, 
'There's a complaints procedure for applicants. I don't 
know what it involves, I'm sorry. Officers can go to the 
local office manager or the coordinator'. 
'For applicants, yes - they can go to an independent 
appeals board, the Ombudsman, politicians, which they 
all do from time to time - that's how the amendments to 
the legislation came about. I'm not sure whether there is 
an appeals board or a review committee in place now'. 
Access to independent appeal gives applicants the right to be heard by an 
impartial judge in cases of dispute. Appeals thus provide applicants with 
natural justice. Officers may be expected to oppose provision for appeal in an 
effort to manage anticipated dissatisfaction by depriving applicants of what 
Goffman (1980: 116) calls the 'institutional machinery' of redress. 
Dissatisfaction can also be managed, however, by providing an appeals system 
that is independent of the Intercountry Adoption Service and the Department 
of Community and Health Services. Criticism of the service can then be 
deflected with reference to the independent arbiter. 
Ideal systemic appeals structures provide officers as well as applicants with 
natural justice. Through them, dissatisfaction can be managed in a formal, 
socially legitimate manner. Officers can argue that serious, unresolved 
dissatisfaction is always taken to appeal, and that any residual complaints 
193 
194 
must be trivial or must have since been resolved. The procedural formality, 
together with the emotional and financial expense incurred by applicants 
who seek formal redress before the appeal committee, however, may deter 
many applicants from seeking redress in the officially prescribed manner. 
Since appeals may incur the loss of official goodwill, fear of jeopardising 
future applications may also deter many applicants, despite the independence 
of the appeals committee. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion it is to be expected that intercountry adoption service officers 
will attempt to appease frustrated and disappointed clients. Where the dient 
refuses to be appeased, there is a secondary line of defence for officers, namely 
the maintenance of total control over the approval of applicants and the 
allocation and placement of children. Furthermore, often no officially 
recognised avenue for complaint is provided. Where disaffected clients, such 
as the complainants heard by Willee (1986), persist in registering their 
criticism of bureaucratic procedures, officers can minimize damage done to 
reputations and career chances simply by choosing not to respond (see, for 
example, the Inter-Departmental Committee Report 1986). In intercountry 
adoption 'cooling the mark out' may not serve to make the mark feel any 
better, but to suggest to him that there are more costs than benefits in rocking 
the bureaucratic boat: 
'...It is not pleasant even at the best of times to find oneself on the 
receiving end, and this was such a very dependent receiving end' 
(Timms 1973: 19). 
The empirical study reveals evidence of much dissatisfaction among 
applicants, and to a lesser extent among officers. Various management 
strategies appear. Their interest to a sociological investigation of intercountry 
adoption lies not in the light they throw on the imaginative capacity of 
bureaucrats and applicants, but in the contribution they make to sociological 
understanding of the structural implications on participants' behaviour. 
Patterns of social interaction become more predictable and comprehensible as 
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awareness of the implications of social arrangements reduces our reliance on 
the vagaries of genetic chance, idiosyncrasy and psychologism. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
The family and the state, as institutions, both have responsibilities for the 
welfare of the child in modernity. These responsibilities, that at times 
overlap and at other times are discrete, are met in ways that reflect both the 
strain and the interdependence between the institutions. With the rise of 
individualism, the recognition of the citizenship status of the child and the 
structural isolation of the nuclear family, state services have developed to 
provide for the well-being of children. The gradual expansion of state welfare 
provisions, that has occurred particularly where wider kinship structures are 
diffuse and where intermediate welfare structures are inadequate, has seen 
the state assume responsibility for the care of children in official, bureaucratic 
ways that are sometimes complementary and sometimes contrary to the 
informal, primary-group particularistic affection of the family. The 
expansion of the state into areas of welfare, including intercountry adoption, 
has brought with it a new universalistic orientation expressed in impersonal, 
legal and rational terms. Thus, long-term processes of social change have 
brought the institutions of the family and the state into a relationship that is 
characterised by both cooperation and competition. 
Today, where the institutional responsibilities of the family and the state 
overlap and compete, their relationship is marked by strain. In general, this 
strain is the source of the tension that is institutionalised in the interaction 
between state officials and their clients. The public accountability and 
disinterested fairness associated with the state and the privacy and intimacy 
of the family give each institution a social legitimacy that shapes the 
meaning that officers and their clients give to their own and each other's 
behaviour in social interaction. Where the concerns of official accountability 
overlap with the desired self-determination and privacy of families, the 
institutional strain produces tension in the interaction between state officials 
and their clients. In turn, the tension produces institutionalised anxiety for 
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officers and their clients as a result of the structural strain that informs the 
interacting parties' conceptualisations of the roles that they should play. 
The institutionalised tension between officers and applicants in intercountry 
adoption is in part a consequence of the social legitimacy of the role played by 
both parties in competition over the right to decide over applications and the 
future of the adoptive family and child. This shared social legitimacy 
generates value consensus between officers and applicants as each party 
recognises the propriety of the involvement of the other, even though they 
are in competition. To argue that the other party should have no political 
rights in the intercountry adoption process is to deny the social legitimacy of 
that party. The importance of recognition of the social legitimacy of both 
parties is intuitively understood by some journalists. Where the conjuncture 
or balance of political power is tilted one way or the other, the news media 
are quick to exploit for commercial reasons the attendant disadvantages for 
the adoptive child. For example, where bureaucrats are perceived as making 
excessive demands of applicants, those applicants and the children are 
portrayed as the hostages of heartless administrators. Those hostages are 
metaphorically bound hand and foot by red tape. Conversely, when 
applicants are perceived as making excessive, impatient or subversive 
demands of officialdom, those applicants are portrayed in the news media as 
self-serving, idiosyncratic and quixotic rebels. 
Some officers feel that the legitimacy of their role in intercountry adoption is 
threatened by the socially legitimate claims made by applicants. Thus we see 
those officers attempt to demonise the motivations of applicants or at least of 
those applicants who are seen to challenge the authority of the officer. In the 
Tasmanian Intercountry Adoption Service, where there is a responsible and 
professional approach, and an insistence on a cautious and therefore lengthy 
assessment process, these same features serve as mechanisms for the 
exclusion of applicants from decision-making authority. Finally, the political 
power base of officialdom is bolstered by a range of strategies for the 
management of applicant dissatisfaction and by catch-cries and slogans, such 
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as the 'paramountcy of the interests of the child', that associate the well 
-being of the child with the unchallenged authority of officers. 
In contrast, applicants are confronted simultaneously by their desire to 
assume 'total parenthood' status as soon as possible and their respect for the 
regulation and supervision of the intercountry adoption process by state 
officials. Applicants therefore reserve their criticism for specific behaviours 
of individual officers. Where applicants can see that procedures are in the 
interests of the child, they are tolerant and understanding. Where the process 
is perceived to be contrary to the interests of the child, however, such as 
when the process takes a long time and therefore leaves the child 'lingering' 
in an institution, applicants feel justified to express their impatience. They 
do this in the knowledge that any complaints that associate official 
behaviour or decisions with negative consequences for the child will 
amount to socially legitimate criticism that tilts the balance of public opinion 
and political power temporarily back into the favour of the applicants. 
Since the institutional relationship between the family and the state is 
characterised by both interdependence and strain, and since institutional 
relationships change slowly, substantial value consensus and tension will 
continue to shape the interaction of officers and applicants in intercountry 
adoption. Nevertheless, the shared values identified in this thesis provide 
ground for optimism. Furthermore, since the thesis itself is an analysis of the 
structural bases for both cooperation and dispute in the relationship, it 
contributes to improved understanding of the meanings that each party 
gives to their mutual interaction. Officers will be alerted to the approaches 
that succeed in gaining the support of applicants as well as the ones that fail. 
Conversely, applicants can improve their ability to discern in interaction 
with officers between structurally-derived behaviours and idiosyncrasies. For 
example, boundary maintenance such as defence of the officer's right to 
supervise placements can, on the basis of this research, be clearly identified as 
structurally-derived in that officers have to defend their intervention in 
what is normally private family life against the legitimation crisis that is a 
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result of state expansion into welfare areas that previously were the 
exclusive domain of the family. In contrast, the 'Sophie's choice' type of 
question, put by some officers, that asked several preferential adopters to 
nominate whom they would save from a sinking boat or a burning house if 
they had to choose between their biological child or their adopted child, is 
clearly a morally questionable, idiosyncratic curiosity of the individual 
officer. 
By helping officers and applicants to identify the deep social roots of their 
respective approaches to their mutual interaction in intercountry adoption, 
the thesis provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of their 
relationship. The thesis has shown that differing approaches are not 
necessarily indicative of opposing motivations. Furthermore, the thesis 
provides the basis for the development of a more satisfactory relationship 
from the perspective of both parties. By providing sociological insight, the 
experiences of both parties in interaction no longer need to be reduced to 
psychologism or 'personality clashes' even though these will sometimes still 
occur. In broad terms, the thesis has shown that the relationship between 
officers and applicants will be at its best when each party shows 
understanding for the institutionalised anxiety and respect for the 
motivations and orientation of the other. In conclusion, as the state 
continues to expand it is predictable and proper that the nature of that 
expansion be a matter for ongoing discussion and debate with 
representatives of institutions such as the family that are affected by the slow 
but significant processes of social change. Ultimately, the insights provided 
by research such as this will help to improve the quality of the relationship 
between officers and applicants and thereby improve also the quality of life of 
many children currently waiting in institutions. 
APPENDICES 
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SCHEDULES FOR INTERVIEW WITH OFFICERS AND APPLICANTS 
APPENDIX A 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR OFFICERS 
1. STRUCTURE OF MOTIVATIONS FOR ADOIMVE PARENTHOOD. 
1. Are you male or female? 
2. How long have you worked for the Department? 
3. How long have you worked for the Unit? 
4. What is your occupational position in relation to the Department? 
5. What are your goals as an intercountry adoption service officer? 
6. What motivates applicants in intercountry adoption? 
2. SERVICE RATIONING 
1. Are there enough children available for intercountry adoption? 
2. Do you think the Tasmanian Adoption and Information Unit is adequately 
resourced? 
3. Is the service constantly available to the public? If not, why not? 
4. Are adoption workers required to select from among applicants? If so, why 
and on what basis? 
5. Do any applicants object to the selection process? If so, why? 
6. Do any applicants support the selection process? If so, why ? 
7. Do you object to or support the selection process? Why? 
3. MANAGING ANXIETY 
1. Are placements with applicants who have gained official approval-to-
adopt always successful? 
2. What is the disruption rate of adoption placements; nationally; 
internationally? 
3. Is it easy or difficult to assess the suitability or otherwise of applicants? 
4. Are there any professional implications of disrupted placements? 
5. Do workers/applicants worry about the possibility of failing to achieve their 
goals? 
201 
6. Do workers/ applicants ever discuss their concerns, if any, about the 
possibility of failure with you? Why? Why not? 
7. Are staff training and development provided for adoption workers? If so, 
of what kind? 
8. Are information and education provided for prospective adoptive parents? 
4. TIME TRACKS 
1. What do you regard as an appropriate period for applicants to have to wait 
for a child? 
2. How does/ did that period compare with the normal time between 
application and placement? 
3. Should adoptive parents be required to wait for more, less or the same time 
for a child as do biological parents? Why? 
4. Do adoption workers and applicants usually agree on what constitutes an 
appropriate time between application and approval, and then between 
allocation and placement? 
5. How do you feel about the required twelve-month minimum period 
between placement and adoption? 
6. How do you feel about the length of the waiting period between application 
and adoption? 
8. Have you ever discussed this with officers or applicants? 
9. How did they respond? 
10. What did you think of their response? 
5. EMPATHY IN A STRAINED RELATIONSHIP 
1. In intercountry adoption to whom does the child belong? 
2. Who has the primary responsibility for the welfare of the child? 
3. Between placement and adoption, should officers have the right to 
supervise the child's progress without the consent of the adoptive parents? 
For example, should officers be allowed to make enquiries at the child's 
school without first seeking the consent of the parents? 
4. Are parents usually biased or objective in their views on what is best for 
the child? 
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5. Are officers usually biased or objective in their views on what is best for the 
child? 
6. What do you think are the appropriate rights of the relinquishing parents, 
orphanage, nation? 
7. Under what circumstances, if any, should placements be disrupted against 
the wishes of the adoptive parents? 
8. Are there currently any regulations that provide, in your opinion, for the 
inappropriate disruption of placements? 
9. Do regulations give officers undue rights of intervention in the life of the 
adoptive family? e.g. Tasmanian Adoption Regulation 14 (j) and (k): 
"...Applicants for assessment are not to be accepted for assessment 
unless they satisfy the Director or the principal officer of an approved 
agency that they fulfil all of the following requirements:- 
(j)that neither applicant is undertaking treatment for infertility; 
(k) that, in the case of the female applicant, the applicant is not 
pregnant". 
10. Is intercountry adoption a straightforward or complicated process? 
11. Should intercountry adoptive parents have the same rights as biological 
parents with regard to their children? 
6. MANAGING DISSATISFACTION 
1. Have you ever noticed any dissatisfaction among applicants and/or officers 
in your intercountry adoption service? 
2. If so, to what do you attribute that dissatisfaction? 
3. How do you respond to that dissatisfaction? 
4. Do others share your views on these matters? If so, where and when do 
you discuss your grievances? 
5. Does your intercountry adoption service allow for adequate redress when 
officers and applicants are unhappy about procedures? 
6. Would you like to see the service changed in order to change your powers 
of redress? If so, how? 
7. Does the introduction of fees have any implications for the relationship 
between officers and applicants in intercountry adoption? 
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8. Is intercountry adoption in the best interests of the child? 
9. Did you apply or volunteer to work in the intercountry adoption area? 
10. Anything we've missed? 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR APPLICANTS 
1. STRUCTURE OF MOTIVATIONS FOR ADOPTIVE PARENTHOOD. 
1.Are you male or female? 
2.How old are you? 
3.Do you have any biological children? 
4.How long since you first applied? 
5.Of which support group (if any) are you a member? 
6.Did you apply for a 'special needs' child? 
7.Did you pay fees to the Tasmanian Adoption and Information Unit? 
8.Through which branch of the Adoption and Information Unit was! is your 
application processed? 
9. What motivated you to become a Tasmanian intercountry adoption service 
applicant? 
10.What motivates officers in intercountry adoption? 
2. SERVICE RATIONING 
1.Are there enough children available for intercountry adoption? 
2. Do you think the Tasmanian Adoption and Information Unit is adequately 
resourced? 
3. Is the service constantly available to the public? If not, why not? 
4. Are adoption workers required to select from among applicants? If so, why 
and on what basis? 
5.Do any officers support the selection process? If so, why ? 
6.Do you object to or support the selection process? Why? 
3. MANAGING ANXIETY 
1.Are applications always successful? 
2. Are placements with applicants who have gained official approval-to-
adopt always successful? 
3.On what basis do officers select applicants for approval? 
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4. Are there any implications of applicant criticism of the officer(s)/ service? 
5. Do applicants worry about the possibility of failure to gain a child for 
adoption? If so, with whom do they discuss their concerns? 
6. Do applicants need encouragement? If so, from where do they get it? 
4. TIME TRACKS 
1. What do you regard as an appropriate period for applicants to have to wait 
for a child? 
2. How does! did that period compare with the time between your application 
and placement? 
3. Should adoptive parents be required to wait for more, less or the same time 
for a child as do biological parents? Why? 
4. Do adoption workers and applicants usually agree on what constitutes an 
appropriate time between application and approval, between application and 
allocation, and then between allocation and placement? 
5. How do you feel about the required twelve-month minimum period 
between placement and adoption? 
6. How do you feel about the length of the waiting period between application 
and adoption? 
8. Have you ever discussed this with officers or applicants? 
9. How did they respond? 
10. What did you think of their response? 
5. EMPATHY IN A STRAINED RELATIONSHIP 
1. In intercountry adoption to whom does the child belong? 
2. Would you have wanted to continue with the adoption of your child(ren) 
if your spouse had died before placement, or during the placement period? 
3. Would you have wanted your adopted child(ren) to have shared in equal 
part in your inheritance if you and your spouse had died after allocation but 
prior to finalisation of adoption in Tasmania? 
2. Who has the primary responsibility for the welfare of the child? 
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3. Between placement and adoption, should oficers have the right to 
supervise the child's progess without the consent of the adoptive parents? 
For example, should oficers be alowed to make enquiries at the child's 
school without first seeking the consent of the parents? 
4. Are parents usualy biased or objective in their views on what is best for 
the child? 
5. Are oficers usualy biased or objective in their views on what is best for the 
child? 
6. What do you think are the appropriate rights of the relinquishing parents, 
orphanage, nation? 
7. Under what circumstances, if any, should placements be disrupted against 
the wishes of the adoptive parents? 
8. Are there currently any regulations that provide, in your opinion, for the 
inappropriate disruption of placements? 
9. Do regulations give oficers undue rights of intervention in the life of the 
adoptive family? e.g. Tasmanian Adoption Regulation 14 (j) and (k): 
"..Applicants for assessment are not to be accepted for assessment 
unless they satisfy the Director or the principal oficer of an approved 
agency that they fulfil al of the folowing requirements:- 
(j)that neither applicant is undertaking treatment for infertility; 
(k)that, in the case of the female applicant, the applicant is not 
pregnant". 
10. Is intercountry adoption a straightforward or complicated process? 
11. Should intercountry adoptive parents have the same rights as biological 
parents with regard to their children? 
6. MANAGING DISSATISFACTION 
1.What can you tel me about your experience as an applicant from the time 
of application? What were the positives and the negatives? 
2.Have you ever noticed any dissatisfaction among applicants and 	oficers 
in your intercountry adoption service? 
3.If so, to what do you atribute that dissatisfaction? 
4.How do you respond to that dissatisfaction? 
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5. Do others share your views on these matters? If so, where and when do 
you discuss your grievances? 
6. Does your intercountry adoption service allow for adequate redress when 
you are unhappy about procedures? 
7. Would you like to see the service changed in order to change your powers 
of redress? If so, how? 
7. Does the introduction of fees have any implications for the relationship 
between officers and applicants in intercountry adoption? 
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